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Political Affairs

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Soviet Union

Political Affairs

JPRS-UPA-91-030

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5 June 1991

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Shevardnadze Views USSR's Prospects

91UF0745A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 30 Apr 91 p 2

[Interview with President of the Foreign Policy Association (identified as Foreign Economic Association in the source's introduction) Eduard Shevardnadze by IAN commentator Olga Trofimova especially for NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA; place and date not given: "Eduard Shevardnadze: 'Europe and the United States Are Vitally Interested in the USSR Overcoming the Crisis'"]

[Text] [Trofimova] You describe the situation in the USSR as being supercomplicated. As you see it, can the implementation of the anticrisis program submitted by the USSR president and approved by the Union parliament in late April put an end to the probable internal political developments in the country which are associated with your well-known warning about "the coming of a dictatorship?"

[Shevardnadze] I believe that it is difficult to refer to some universal programs at present. The situation in the country has indeed become so complex in the economy, in the social sphere, and in ethnic relations that, perhaps, it is unrealistic to propose an all-embracing program for salvation. Taking this into account, I nonetheless believe that urgent measures which the USSR president and the leaders of the supreme state organs of nine union republics have agreed upon are relatively realistic.

What do we need at present? Fewer debates and discussions, and more practical endeavors because, in principle, a rational foundation for overcoming the crisis in our country does exist. It is visible in the document "Main Directions." A lot has been borrowed from the program of Academician Shatalin; certain new points have been added.

I am not in favor of arranging some grandiloquent forums at present because the people are already tired of all these discussions. Progress is needed at last, perhaps, even with individual mistakes and inaccuracies, but progress after all. Naturally, we should reorganize flexibly as we proceed.

In a word, in our critical time the interests of the people, actual efforts to overcome the crisis in the country, continuation of democratic transformations, and further radicalization of the economic reform combined with social support for the populace should be placed above all else.

[Trofimova] In the West they have been saying that "the democrats are scattering" and "the reformers are lying low." At the same time, recently there has been talk of emerging opportunities for a dialogue between various political forces in the USSR. In your opinion, what is characteristic of the present time?

[Shevardnadze] Incidentally, the first assertion is the phrase I said at one point. Indeed, we face a situation in which conservative and right-wing forces act in a more

organized manner, and have party, state, and other structures at their disposal. As far as democrats are concerned, theirs is a young movement with structures which have not yet evolved. Understandably, those who have a stronger organizational foundation have an opportunity to succeed under the circumstances. In this reference, I voiced my alarm, which to me is absolutely justified; many people think likewise, and some disagree.

However, I have also noticed recently the striving of various democratic political movements for unity. If this unification, merger, or rapprochement on an ideological platform occurs, the democrats will be able to embark on a dialogue with the conservatives, especially those who offer acceptable, reasonable ideas. This means that prospects will appear for the consolidation of healthy forces. However, this is hard to do with a fractured democratic movement. This is why the unification of democratic movements remains the main task, as I see it.

Understandably, in the West they look at these changes in Soviet society with hope. I am convinced that sober-minded politicians are interested in the success of democratization and perestroika, as a whole, in the USSR.

[Trofimova] At present, the political life of Russia is contradictory and even unpredictable. Thus, the Extraordinary Third Congress of RSFSR People's Deputies resolved, on the initiative of Boris Yeltsin, to redistribute powers among the supreme state organs of Russia which many deputies viewed as movement toward a "Russian-style dictatorship." What is your opinion on this?

[Shevardnadze] I do not think so. I believe that we made a major miscalculation when we switched from a unitary, centralized system to democratic forms of government throughout the country, not only in Russia. For example, I and several other comrades together proposed a different transition at the time—a presidency, presidential forms of government from the very beginning. That is, the following happened: We took a correct step toward democratization and the formation of a rule-of-law state, but to the detriment of executive power. We allowed its weakening, and now we are talking about the paralysis of power. Meanwhile, a smooth, predictable, proper transition was needed.

I believe that measures currently being taken to remedy these shortcomings are logical, even more so in Russia. What do all republics, Russia included, lack at present? The ability of the authorities to actually influence the situation in particular regions, in the provinces, at enterprises. I am against amorphous power in principle. I believe that it is necessary to combine democratic institutions and genuine, strong executive power correctly.

[Trofimova] What is your attitude toward the adoption of the act on restoring the state independence of Georgia? As you see it, what are the prospects for actual relations between the republic and the center?

[Shevardnadze] This is a complex issue. It is the constitutional right of all peoples to self-determination—of all peoples, including the Georgian people. A referendum has been held in the republic, direct elections have been held, and the people have come out in favor of this solution. I am one of those who respect the expression of the will of the people. It is another matter how this will be accomplished. After all, the relations of Georgia within the Union, with other republics, took decades to evolve. How will all of this look in real life? What will emerge? This is why I favor an earnest, substantive, and patient dialogue between the center and the republic, and not just Georgia—the Baltic republics, and others.

[Trofimova] Let us discuss the course of Moscow's foreign policy. Has there been a change of priorities recently? If this is true to some degree, has this been caused by the internal situation in the country?

[Shevardnadze] It is premature to talk about a change in priorities and accents at this point. If we succeed in stabilizing the economic and political situation and ethnic relations in the country we may count on the continuation of the foreign-policy course, for which our people have labored in the years of perestroika, and which is based on the principles of new political thinking.

If we do not succeed in normalizing the situation, and chaos, or worse yet, a dictatorship sets in, little will remain of the new policy and new thinking. Therefore, the issue is being resolved right here, inside the country.

[Trofimova] What is your assessment of the results of the recent Soviet-Japanese summit negotiations?

[Shevardnadze] On the eve of Gorbachev's visit to Japan, I was asked about my expectations with regard to this event. I answered: I do not expect any revolution, any radical changes; conditions are not ripe for this yet. To my mind, those who stirred up unusual commotion because of the visit and predicted sensational results were wrong. What happened was that the head of the Soviet state visited a neighboring state—this was without precedent in our relations with Japan, and this was a positive phenomenon of itself. A dialogue at the summit took place, and important agreements were signed—this was also a step forward. However, I disagree categorically with statements saying that some new stage began at this point. We refer to a new stage beginning in 1985, when we started to discuss territorial issues, visits to the graves of the fallen, and the development of bilateral relations with the Japanese on a continuous basis. Nothing new has happened in this regard so far. Let us see what happens next.

[Trofimova] You were in on the beginnings of our new policy with regard to Eastern Europe. In your opinion, is it undergoing some changes at present?

[Shevardnadze] In essence, this has to do with us dealing with new states in an environment in which the old structures of our mutual relations are no longer in

operation, and have been dismantled, the Warsaw Treaty organization is virtually no more, and economic relations need to be restructured substantially. This is why at present a search is in progress for ways to build our relations with these states, our immediate neighbors.

At present, mostly on a bilateral basis. I believe that this is correct. This work began under me. A new Soviet-Romanian agreement has already been signed. Agreements with Poland, Bulgaria, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia are being prepared for signing. This cycle needs to be completed, and subsequently we should think how to proceed, perhaps, within the framework of an all-European process, or within the scope of the region because it has its own specifics, peculiarities, and certain traditions which took decades to emerge.

In a word, we need to move toward new objectives, but on the basis of trust, mutually respectful relations, and complete equality of rights. We should reinforce in our awareness the fact that no so-called "buffer" states exist. All states have their own missions and functions which are primarily determined by their own national interests.

[Trofimova] Did the leadership of the country assess in its time the difficulties associated with the withdrawal of the contingent of Soviet troops going into the thousands from European countries?

[Shevardnadze] Of course, there are many shortcomings in this matter. We should have prepared for these major operations immediately after the statement made by M.S. Gorbachev in 1987 to the effect that we did not intend to have a single soldier beyond the borders of our country. Appropriate departments, including the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, should have joined in this process. However, we had been conditioned differently: Political statements were one thing, and practical actions were another.

This is why I make serious complaints about the government, the planning organs, the Ministry of Defense, and all others who should have mounted preparatory work right then. There was a serious shortcoming in this instance. This is point one.

Second, an element of suddenness did exist. We knew that changes in Eastern Europe were unavoidable (it is incorrect to say that we did not have information). We understood that the peoples would rise up unless our neighbors restructured, but, of course, it was difficult to determine the precise date, sequence of changes, and their consequences.

In short, everything is logical, except that our servicemen live under abnormal conditions. All of us should have taken care of this. To be sure, housing for the servicemen is being built in an accelerated manner; the aid of the Germans in this matter is perceptible...

[Trofimova] Some people in the West who are increasingly concerned about increasing instability in the USSR and its recent allies, ask themselves this question: Will

the idea of "a common European home" remain merely a good slogan? Are their worries justified?

[Shevardnadze] I believe that, once again, we must take a stand. If we ensure the normalization of the situation in the country in all spheres, nothing will threaten the European process. This is why Europe is vitally interested in the USSR overcoming the crisis. I categorically reject the thought that there are people on our continent or in the United States whose desire is for the Soviet Union to disintegrate. Such an assertion is at the level of gossiping, it is not serious.

As far as the concept for building a "common European home" is concerned, I believe that our attitude toward it should remain unchanged. I will say more. The more successfully the process of forming common economic, legal, cultural, and informational space advances, the easier it will be for us to accomplish our tasks. In turn, if things go well here it will be for the benefit of all of Europe.

[Trofimova] For now, the readers know less about the activities of Shevardnadze in his capacity as the leader of the Foreign Policy Association. What does it do? What are your further personal plans? Are you writing memoirs?

[Shevardnadze] The readers know little because we have succeeded in accomplishing little. The association does have plans. It is our common concern with the new political thinking, readiness to develop these principles in both the theoretical and practical aspects, and to develop recommendations for government organs. Ours is an independent organization. If our point of view differs from that of the government on some issues we will take issue with the government.

The association has many projects of its own, as well as joint projects, in particular, with American partners, colleagues from Germany and the East European countries, Japan, and some other states. Strategic stability in the world, Soviet-American relations, economic aspects of politics, and political elements of economic cooperation are the issues to which we pay special attention.

Ecology remains the focus of our attention. I am working personally on a set of such issues, and I want to accomplish a lot, including the use of the most prominent forces of our scientists, production managers, and experts. At present, we are working on the concept of creating a fund for rapid deployment in the event of ecological disasters, for example, in Chernobyl or in the Persian Gulf. It is expected that the entire world community will participate in the fund.

As far as my personal plans are concerned, I will go to the United States in May at the invitation of American colleagues from various universities and nongovernmental organizations. A tour of the country with lectures, presentations, and informal discussions is planned. I am glad about it—after all, I do not know

America, I only know Washington and New York, the official residence and the State Department...

Right now I am completing a book on which I have worked together with my comrades-in-arms. It includes autobiographical pages, and covers the entire period when I held the post of minister of foreign affairs. Its tentative title is "New Vision of the World."

Ivashko Sees CPSU as Only Solution to USSR's Problems

91UN1447A Moscow GLASNOST in Russian 28 Feb 91
pp 1, 2

[Interview with V.A. Ivashko, deputy general secretary of the CPSU Central Committee, by Aleksandr Belikov; place and date not given: "Only the CPSU Can Solve the Country's Problems"]

[Text] [Belikov] Within a couple of days each of us citizens of our great power, having cast our ballots, will determine whether it is to be great and unified in the future or... And therefore, Vladimir Antonovich, do you not consider it expedient for the best forces of the party—the aktiv and apparatus workers from the Central Committee to the raykoms [rayon committees]—to be sent on temporary duty to the cities and villages? To the people.

[Ivashko] In spite of the obvious priority of the problem, we cannot simply drop everything and work on just one thing. The more so since its origins lie in the present condition of the society: signs of crisis have pervaded almost all spheres of our life. I do not doubt for a minute that they will be overcome—our people's life-giving forces are enormous. There is no doubt that this moment will arrive, but it is within our power to hasten its arrival and considerably reduce the duration of the process. And the main thing is that we can ease the difficulties for the people. And the new society must arrive by the very shortest road.

[Belikov] But before setting out on this road, it would not be a bad idea to find out what the other political parties and movements are suggesting...

[Ivashko] We have analyzed many programs and they contain many interesting aspects. But, believe me, any unprejudiced scholar will admit that there is no political force in the country other than the CPSU that has such a range of constructive actions. This is easy to prove.

[Belikov] Arguments are the beauty of dialogue.

[Ivashko] In recent years the active vocabularies of many popular political figures, and not only popular ones, like, incidentally, quite a few newspapers, have come to include words with the prefix "de"—de-ideologization, de-politicization, de-party-ization, de-Sovietization, and so forth. But the "de" leads to destruction and not to creation. Incidentally, the people who like this word call for: "The land—to private ownership!" But what will a

person do with it under the conditions of the existing infrastructure? As recent cases show, once they gain their freedom, the peasants are inevitably drawn to cooperation and unification. Let my opponents forgive me, but discussions like "give it up and everything will work out by itself" show that, as a rule, their knowledge of life comes from various essays. Only the CPSU is capable of leading the people in order to solve the problems that have accumulated. And it must work on all the problems at the same time.

[Belikov] But still the party distributes its forces taking into account the priorities of the tasks.

[Ivashko] Each specific moment makes some sphere of the party's activity urgent, requiring special attention. Today there are several of these spheres and they are all closely interconnected. Of course, the question of preserving the USSR, built on a new basis, is among the extremely important ones. But it "touches" on all spheres at once. Nothing will happen without a full-fledged Union. Just as there will be no winners if it splits up. Society, the economy, culture, and science have been formed over decades and even centuries. And all at once to destroy everything that has been gained is hard-core, undisguised adventurism. As for the priority issues that are coming to the fore, here you are right. Incidentally, your first question was about three weeks late. It was at that time when the CPSU Central Committee formed the corresponding groups of party workers and sent orientation groups to the party committees. At a meeting of the Central Committee Secretariat recently we heard how the Chuvash party organization was working to prepare for the referendum. And, you know, the communists are working sensibly in Chuvashia. And that is not the only place.

[Belikov] It is clear that the party should take responsibility for these and other concerns. But is it its business to discuss the situation in animal husbandry? For this was the subject of one of the latest meetings of the Central Committee Secretariat. Does this mean the party is returning to administrative functions?

[Ivashko] Nothing of the sort! But the number of head of livestock is decreasing everywhere except in two republics. We must not keep quiet but sound the alarm as loudly as we can: If this tendency continues to develop, what will we have to eat in two years? Is this economic activity and management or is it really politics? We are absolutely not interested in technology—this is really not our business. But to alert all party units so that there will be no disaster—that is our immediate task. A good deal of time and energy was wasted in order, under any pretext, to eliminate the party from participation in the solutions to social problems. They managed to do this—we have been eliminated, and a result a political vacuum has formed and everything was shaken loose. The current condition of society must be changed. Everyone seems to agree with that. And more and more people are coming to understand that a change for the better can be made by the CPSU, whose authority, judging from the

latest polls, is growing appreciably. Now it is very important for us to concentrate party activity on the implementation of the socioeconomic policy. We must immediately prepare a complex of legislative acts that will help to form a developed market infrastructure. Can the party really refrain from this work? We see another flaw as well—the lack of a normally constructed system of executive power.

[Belikov] The present executive power is another example of the deficiencies of the political reform, which, in turn, has an extremely negative effect on the development of the economy.

[Ivashko] And how! The individual is an entrepreneur and the producer does not know where the power is, whom he should go to—the rayon, the oblast, the republic, or the center. There is practically no executive power. We must complete the cycle of urgent tasks of the political reform as quickly as possible. And we must not become engaged in work that is clearly absurd: calculating how much each republic owes to whom. Even if we ultimately find a mechanism for calculation, will it be morally conducted? No, this is a thankless task and simply unproductive: This arithmetic will not be of any benefit to anyone. The renewed Union and the market—these are the main factors in our stability and prosperity.

[Belikov] "They are returning us to capitalism!" "Socialism is a bad idea!" What do you have to say about these lines from the reader mail?

[Ivashko] Both of them are pure pompous stupidity which have no basis in reality. The fact is that clearcut determinations and definitions have been introduced into the minds of the people for decades: Only this and no other! But in reality there is not just one kind of capitalism: There is one kind in the United States, another kind in Singapore, and a third kind in Sweden. Incidentally, manifestations of socialism exist in these countries as well. So what is socialism? Briefly, it is a society of free people in which each has the opportunity to satisfy his own needs according to the labor he has invested. While guaranteeing free development of each, it is concerned about those who cannot work—children, invalids, the elderly. One wonders how this is different from the socialist idea.

[Belikov] On the pages of the press there have been assertions to the effect that the government has entered upon a course toward the restoration of totalitarianism, the establishment of a police state in the economy and in social life.

[Belikov] Such things are said and published. And not by Central Committee plenums but by quite different meetings. Drop into any social unit—a plant shop or a kolkhoz farm—and you will hear that people's first demand is for order. In the broadest sense of this concept. I recently visited the Minsk automotive plant. The workers were asking for "iron." One of them, pointing to his hands, said: "I can make everything you need out of metal. I cannot be without work—it is

shameful. Bring order to relations within the economy!" The workers are demanding order as well as the provision of industrial goods and food. Can you really say anything against that?

Crime is on the rise—and order is needed here too. Now let us look at the steps taken by the government. The Cabinet of Ministers decided to exchange the 50- and 100-ruble notes. And the next day a number of newspapers sounded the alarm with banner headlines: The people have been robbed! Name even one worker from whom even one 50-ruble note was taken. There are none. Or there was another decision—about joint street patrols by militia and the Army. Who would it hurt? The passerby returning in the evening from work or from the home of friends? Where did this bitter dissatisfaction come from, since the appearance of soldiers on the streets did not increase hooliganism but, on the contrary, reduced it?

And another thing. You cannot call the actions of those who several months ago were in favor of the price reform and are now zealously proposing a quite different approach anything but elementary politicking.

These and other steps of the government cause a negative reaction not because they are incorrect but because they mean action. Concrete action. Which imposes order in the society. And, as we can see, this does not suit everyone.

[Belikov] There are many people who think that the state of affairs in the economy can be rectified more quickly if Western specialists are called in.

[Ivashko] It is always useful to listen to intelligent and experienced people. But our society was formed over many decades. On its own specific foundation. And no American can understand it, since we ourselves have not yet been able to evaluate its real condition. Even the most excellent specialist does not know the psychology of our people; he has a quite different frame of reference from ours. In Germany, for instance, nobody would think of crossing the street against a red light, even if the street were empty. But here? So such formulas are always naive. Would it not be better for all of us to roll up our sleeves and responsibly get down to work. Our country, as we know, is rich in talent.

[Belikov] Vladimir Antonovich, are you satisfied with the results of your work?

[Ivashko] I think that if a person is ever satisfied with the results of his work he should change jobs right away.

Poll Measures Attitudes of CPSU Members

91UN1489A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 12 May 91 p 1

[Article by V. Potapov, candidate of philosophical sciences: "After the Former 'Unanimity'"]

[Text] Moscow—*After the 28th CPSU Congress there was what I considered to be a promising symptom of increased*

political-ideological maturity of members of the CPSU. The results of one of the polls conducted on the basis of an all-Union selection of sociological research of the Academy of Social Sciences under the CPSU Central Committee shows that the majority of communists retained their belief in the ability of the CPSU to lead society out of its crisis. Their resolve to stay in the party ranks is becoming stronger: 74 percent of those questioned intend to keep their party cards no matter what (in November 1990 this figure was 66 percent). Undoubtedly, relieving the CPSU of some of its "ballast" increases its potential for consolidation within the party and, of course, increases the significance of the achievement of an ideological-political consensus.

And there was this positive point. There was a fairly high degree of solidarity among communists with respect to a number of radical issues of modern political life. Thus 80 percent of them are in favor of preserving the USSR within its existing boundaries (while nine percent were against), 76 percent of CPSU members support a diversity of forms of ownership and their equal development, and 65 percent feel favorable toward the establishment of a multiparty system in the country.

The majority of communists (69 percent), secretaries of primary party organizations (80 percent), and heads of organizational departments of obkoms [oblast committees], kraykoms [kray committees], and central committees of Communist Parties of the republics (71 percent) consider it inevitable that various trends and platforms will exist within the CPSU. It is interesting that there are different attitudes toward this phenomenon: Among the "rank-and-file" communists and secretaries of primary party organizations, positive assessments prevail over negative ones, while among leaders of organizational departments of party committees it is the other way around.

Attitudes toward various trends within the party change depending on the region. For instance, in Central Russia, Siberia, the Urals, the Far East, Kazakhstan, and the Eastern Ukraine more than half of the secretaries of "primary units" (in the North—even 73 percent) consider ideological pluralism within the party to be useful. But in Tajikistan this opinion is held by only 26 percent, Moldova—34 percent, the Western Ukraine—35 percent, Western Belorussia—36 percent, and Estonia—38 percent.

How can one not recall here the conclusion of the 28th Congress: The Communist Party cannot play its role in society without the deepest democratization. This presupposes not only the participation of all CPSU members in the formation of policy through general party and regional discussions and referendums, but also the right of communists and groups of them to express their views in platforms, collective and open work at all levels, and freedom from criticism. The restructuring of relations

within the party, as we know, is directed toward providing for the democratic unity of its ranks and preventing splits into factions. In my opinion, this makes even more alarming the "diagnosis" of our sociological research: Ideological differences among communists, together with obvious confusion in the minds of many of them, are becoming very apparent.

Judge for yourself. Every seventh communist largely shares the position of the Marxist platform. There is almost an equal number who are drawn to the democratic movement in the form suggested by communist reformers. The other trends in the party (and there are about ten of them) are supported by from two to six percent of the communists.

Note that a fairly significant number of CPSU members (18 percent) do not understand the theoretical differences among various ideological trends. And with respect to certain problems of party construction there are diametrically opposed viewpoints. For example, with respect to the applicability of the federalist principle of party construction, the opinions were divided into two equal parts: 40 percent of those questioned were in favor of transforming the CPSU into a union of fully independent communist parties of the republics and almost the same number were against it.

Let me say directly that the fact that many communists are not included in general theoretical discussions makes it possible for unscrupulous politicians to manipulate the minds of the people. There is also deliberate distortion of the content invested in the traditional ideological clichés ("left-center-right," "democrats- liberals-conservatives," and so forth) and refined attempts to pass real intentions in the power struggle off as concern for the good of the people and the fate of the homeland. This means that we must step up our counter-propaganda work. It is time to create at each level—from the large local organizations to the Central Committee—"fast reaction groups" which are capable of responding on the spot to the most important political events and providing a worthy refutation to slanderous attacks from ideological opponents.

Incidentally, 36 percent of those we questioned think that wholesale criticism of the CPSU is now becoming one of the significant reasons for the decline of discipline within the party. The times demand that each communist have, as it were, self-determination. I am convinced that the clearer his position is, the more responsibly he will act.

Position of 'Marxist Platform in CPSU' Detailed

91UN1419A Moscow GOLOS in Russian No 7,
16-22 Feb 91 p 11

[Article by Doctor of Economic Science Aleksandr Buzgalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Marxist Platform Coordinating Council, under rubric "Position": "Who Will be the Master of Life?"]

[Text] The Marxist Platform in the CPSU. Not much information about it has appeared as yet in our press. We think the position of its members deserves attention. Today we give the floor to Doctor of Economic Sciences Aleksandr Buzgalin, member of the CPSU Central Committee and the CPSU Marxist Platform Coordinating Council.

The plenum of the CPSU Central Committee took place almost two weeks ago, something which Central Television nowadays reports in low key, amidst other events of the day.

Yet I think it could become something of a turning point: Communists are beginning to understand the threat of dictatorship from the right, under the sign of neoliberalism. But another danger also manifested itself at the plenum: the danger of a return to Brezhnevite methods of defending socialism by the CPSU leadership. If this kind of tactics prevails in the Central Committee, then catastrophe is inevitable. The party will not be forgiven for this one more time.

How did perestroika start in the USSR and Eastern Europe? Certainly not with the April 1985 CPSU Central Committee plenum. It started with declarations (out loud and in whispers) by "the generation of the 20th Congress," with the leaders of "the Prague spring," with the scientists, poets and artists for whom the ideals of democracy, freedom and humanism were supreme, absolute values, while totalitarianism and conformism were the most bitter foes.

But the initial elation is gone, like the almost six years of perestroika. We have before us not only empty store shelves and huge amounts of decaying products in warehouses and dumps. We have before us tanks and troops in bullet-proof vests on the streets of our cities; refugee camps and rivers of blood; a murky flow of commercialized art products and a brain drain abroad.

And there is also babble. Not glasnost, not pluralism, but cock- and-bull declarations concocted by whoever can. And the only hopes of more and more people are addressed to right-wing liberal order. **Order and enterprise. Enterprise and order.** And all those leftists should be, as a priori criminals, brought to court or, better still, strung up on lampposts so that they wouldn't blather about such stupid things as freedom and humanism, because there is nothing to be had from such words, except for no meat, bread or cigarettes.

But those are dreams. What about reality? Who has the power in the country today? The president? In some regions no one even intends to carry out his decrees.

Perhaps the Supreme Soviet of the RSFSR and its chairman, B.N. Yeltsin? But what has this Soviet managed to produce, except for words and decrees? In Moscow and Leningrad, G. Popov and A. Sobchak, the main free-market ideologists, are eliminating the last

vestiges of retail trade, while the only tangible result has been a multiple increase in the costs of running their city soviets.

So who is in power? Ivan Polozkov? Nina Andreyeva? Thank God, no. They, too, are as far away from being masters of life. Although many statements at the latest CPSU Central Committee plenum are quite alarming. Many party leaders see the active duty of communists solely as a return to the "hold and restrain" mechanism.

The paradox of our life is that so far our country has no such power. But its precursor is already advancing to power. It is advancing in the faceless gray mass of those who are increasingly becoming the real masters of our life. Our "grays" are unmarked. More surprisingly, they often don't even know that they are "grays," that they have almost become the new power. Why? Because they are faceless. It is the most terrible power, the power of the gray mass, which doesn't care how society will be constituted, nor who is at the top, as long as there is something to eat and there is order!

But there are pretenders. That is, there still seems to be no specific "gray eminence" in sight, but his retinue is already there. There are the leaders of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet, the Moscow Soviet, Leningrad Soviet, and many other organizations, so wonderfully democratic in their initial intentions. Subjectively and in words they are wholeheartedly against secrets, torture and gray, faceless power. They sincerely don't want, and perhaps even fear it (no wonder that, unlike Sakharov or Zinovyev, during the years of stagnation they were mostly among the "approvers"). But objectively they have already become a pedestal for the new leader of the "grays." Because they are unable to organize the newly elected city soviets and residents to at least stop the degradation of the economy. Because echoes of ideas about the need to roll back self-government and abandon the power of the soviets in cities and oblasts are already reaching the populace. The new democrats "forgot" to repeal anti-strike laws, special decrees about rallies, etcetera. Moreover, in their muffling and muzzling of democracy (that is, people's power) and self-government from below—in neighborhoods and at enterprises—the new democrats will also be gladly supported by some official leaders of the CPSU. Truly a strange unity of political rivals.

Nor let us forget those who are prepared immediately (or even in advance) to support the soviet "grays" with pen and passion: L. Piyasheva, A. Tsipko... Many of their colleagues have already long begun to replace the word "democratization" with "liberalization," the idea of the emancipation of labor from exploitation and bureaucratic oppression with the slogan of free enterprise (while between the words run ideas of, perhaps, freezing wages? Banning the activities of worker organizations? Putting a brake on the development of strong, independent labor unions?).

"Tsar Nicholas II was a most humane person, Stolypin was a wise man..." Familiar words? And the refrain: We should learn from them! The question is, learn what? How to sling "Stolypin neckties" around the necks of peasants, workers and free-thinking intellectuals? But Stalin and Hitler were much better at it...

And between the lines there's the dream: Ah, if we could have a new Stolypin, and if the public doesn't obey then we'll let out Cornet Obolenskiy and Lieutenant Golitsyn. One will pin on the medals, the other will hand out the bullets and... Fire at the democrats!!! Because the experience is there: In 1907 they fired and hanged, and in 1912, and in July 1917, and during the civil war. Our dear democrats Klyamkin and Migranyan may shed some tears over the bodies and say, Well, the road to democracy lies through enlightened authoritarianism; it's only too bad that the performers didn't understand the ideologists' ideas...

Will you, dear liberals, again recall 1937? Well, we haven't forgotten it either. And we don't want its repetition behind the mask of either liberalism or, still worse, under socialist slogans. To us neostalinism in any guise, even the most enlightened, and organizations like "Pamyat" have been and remain enemies, destroyers of democracy and humanism.

But especially monstrous is that the latter-day liberal and pseudocommunist lovers of order, who have grown on the shoulders of the first bards of freedom, are destroying and pushing aside those who began our country's liberation. Pushing aside, because... the very same ones who had formerly sung the praises of Brezhnev's totalitarianism are coming to power behind a new mask. A corrupt bureaucracy which has merged with the shadow economy, and often even with the mafia, is subtly drifting from ministerial and obkom offices into the chairs of directors of joint enterprises and stock-holding companies. They are joined (and sometimes preceded) by "businessmen" from the shadow economy.

We are threatened not with the replacement of bloody Stalinism and inert Brezhnevism by civilized authoritarianism, but with inheriting the worst traditions of home-grown totalitarianism, bureaucracy and corruption. Only this time in the conditions of a mixed economy and a free market. The question only is, under which slogans: Long Live Socialism or Down With Socialism?

The most tragic thing is that such a scenario of events has its mass base. The notorious administrative-command system has transformed probably most of us into citizens of the Fatherland with a tragic fate, into philistines, into conformists who are being drawn into a struggle of parties, into people with consumer interests but no possibility to consume, into workers used to cracking jokes but who have no desire to assume the functions of masters. It is they who will be capable of watching, and even chuckling, when the soviet "grays" start their witchhunt. While we stand on the sidelines and look on?

What preoccupies us, dear readers? That some people (in the Baltic states and the Caucasus) are signing up as volunteers, some are chuckling, while the intellectuals look on, if they haven't yet sold out to the "grays"? We are artists, we are scientists...

Standing before our eyes today are the bodies of Lithuanians, Latvians, Russians, Georgians, Ossetians... Who shot those people? Boy soldiers or the central and local bureaucracy which has turned the army into a hostage of its crimes?

One cannot but recall the old adage that the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Alas, in the hands of the "grays" kings quickly turn into puppets. To be sure, a king is always a puppet, whoever pulls the strings, the old bureaucracy or the new masters of life.

Indeed, there is no hope in a king. But who is he, the new leader of Russia? A new strong individual from among the present defenders of socialism at any cost or a protege of the proponents of a civilized society who, in a time of difficulty, helped a fallen party leader rise and come out of nowhere into the light of glasnost?

But whoever our official leaders are, they already have the power. Boris Yeltsin may think that everything still lies before him, but he is no longer master of the future. If we follow the road of implementing his programs and laws we will have to arrive at a much harsher economic policy, aimed at Pinochet-style privatization, when the prices of all goods are set by the market and only the price of manpower is set by machine-guns. Yeltsin is incapable of such a policy. Besides, the former secretary of the Sverdlovsk Obkom and the Moscow Gorkom and former member of the CPSU Central Committee is of no use to those people or to that economy. They need another kind of power, erected on the ruins of the actions of the present Russian leader, should he finally come to power.

Perhaps we will be saved by a new hero? Is that what Nevzorov appeals for, with such rare pathos for our times? However, it seems that we, the 1991 inhabitants of the USSR, are no longer expecting heroes.

Leaders and philistines. Intellectuals and rabble. Elite and workers. But heroes? No, that is not for us, for now...

But really? Times are changing rapidly. The coming "gray" power will be quick to give rise to heroes who will refuse to accept it. The question only is, who will they be?

Real masters can appear in our country, too. Not today, not tomorrow. The day after. But they will not be the naive bureaucrats for whom the supreme luxury was a government ration and a state dacha, not the "entrepreneurs" of today wondering how to spend crazy thousands in a cooperative cafe... No! New masters of life will yet come to us.

The only alternative to crisis, disintegration and the dictatorship of philistines is the consolidation of basic

democracy, of people's power from below: self-government in the labor collective that will ensure the first step towards the economic power of the working people; self-organization of consumers for democratic control over supply, over the organization of rationing as a temporary cure on the way to normal commerce; broad economic and socio-political functions for worker, labor, ecological and cultural movements: these are the simplest and absolutely essential steps of today.

This is not enough, but it is necessary. If the majority—workers, artists, peasants, scientists—do not awaken and unite for the realization of their vital interests, grayness and blood will consume us.

'Communists for Democracy' Meeting Viewed

91UN1576C Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 24 May 91 p 2

[Article by *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA* correspondent Grigoriy Bazhutin: "An Attempted Split?"]

[Text] A meeting of supporters of the Communists for Democracy movement has been held in Perm. Draft CPSU programs developed by the Central Committee commission and the Leningrad Initiative Congress were discussed.

The positions of a majority were revealed quite clearly in the course of discussion. The main position is: "The Leningrad version" is unacceptable to those who come out in favor of genuine democratization of the CPSU.

The draft developed by the CPSU Central Committee group also drew serious criticism. However, it was noted at the meeting that, all this notwithstanding, this draft "turns" the CPSU toward the real interests of broad strata of society.

The communists made a number of substantial changes in the draft. Organizational decisions were made. In particular, a permanently operating regional political club of the supporters of democratic transformations was set up.

Will they succeed in implementing these plans? The latter very much resemble those still being implemented by a segment of the party apparatus, especially at the oblast and rayon level. Communist-democrats themselves are sometimes intolerant of dissidence.

What if they manage to assert their ideas? Will this not bring about a split in the CPSU?

CPSU Commission Assesses Work on Property Holdings

PM2904151591 Moscow *PRAVDA* in Russian
19 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[Unattributed report: "Strictly According to the Law"]

[Text] The CPSU does not have any factories, plants, or other significant enterprises, with the exception of

printing plants. Party property consists of buildings and installations needed for the work of party committees, educational establishments, and sociopolitical centers, and also for the provision of medical and recreational facilities. Despite this, some mass media continue to exaggerate the situation with CPSU property, thereby inciting its political opponents to unlawful action, including the seizure of party property by force. To be fair, it should be pointed out that party bodies themselves often give cause for unhealthy talk about party property. Some have still to juridically substantiate party committees' legal ownership of property and draw up documents on buildings and installations built exclusively with party budget funds that are within the committees' jurisdiction.

As is well known, the 28th CPSU Congress instructed central party bodies to conduct an expert assessment of CPSU property in 1990-1991 and draw up proposals on how to put this property to the most effective possible use. After the congress, in accordance with a Central Committee Secretariat and CPSU Central Control Committee Presidium resolution, the union republic communist party central committees and republic, kray, and oblast party committees worked together with control bodies to form commissions for the assessment of CPSU property. A session of the Central Committee and CPSU Central Control Committee Commission was devoted to the initial results of their work. The session was chaired by O.S. Shenin, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo and secretary of the CPSU Central Committee.

CPSU Central Committee Administrator N.Ye. Kruchina gave a report on progress in implementing the congress instruction. He said, in particular, that local party bodies have been sent methodological recommendations defining the main lines of work, indicating a list of the necessary legal documents, and establishing a uniform procedure for drawing up final documents and commissions' conclusions. N.Ye. Kruchina stressed that these recommendations were drawn up in strict accordance with USSR laws on ownership and public associations and the CPSU Statute. According to available data, 5,326 buildings and installations are currently owned and used by or at the disposal of local party committees; 89.8 percent of these buildings and installations were built exclusively with party budget funds or on a shareholding basis with other organizations.

I.F. Dotsenko, deputy administrator of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, shared his experience of resolving problems arising in connection with the work of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet Commission for Verifying Legality in the Acquisition of Party Property. He said that in the first half of 1990 the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee studied all documents ensuring legal protection for party property and, first and foremost, the legality of the acquisition of buildings and installations. It made a complete

inventory of all buildings and installations on the balance sheets of the republic's party committees. It established that the overwhelming majority of buildings and installations have all the relevant documents. But, as a rule, those who lay claim to party buildings do not have any documents proving that they are the legal owners. A document on the results of the expert assessment has been sent to the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet; it shows that property currently at the disposal of the Ukrainian Communist Party has been acquired and is used on a legal basis.

Reports on work done in this area were also delivered by the following: V.B. Leshchinskiy, deputy administrator of the CPSU Central Committee; V.A. Brott, administrator of the Kazakh Communist Party Central Committee; and N.V. Moroz, deputy administrator of the RSFSR Communist Party Central Committee. Members of the commission were briefed on arbitration and legal practice to protect the CPSU's property interests.

Cabinet Issues Resolution on Training for Unemployed

*PM2604141391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
19 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2*

[A. Ivanov report under the rubric: "In the USSR Cabinet of Ministers: No One Will Remain Without Work"]

[text] The USSR Cabinet of Ministers has adopted a resolution: "On the Procedure for Forming a System of Vocational Training, Skill Enhancement, and Retraining for Workers Released From Their Jobs and Unemployed People."

The Cabinet resolves, it says, to instruct USSR ministries and departments and recommend republic governments to organize work to predict and constantly record and analyze—on a territorial and sector basis—the numbers of workers being released from jobs and unemployed people in the population, taking into consideration their training and skills, as well as the demand of enterprises, institutions, and organizations for skilled workers and specialists.

The task, the resolution goes on to say, is to specify before 1 July of this year the vocational and technical training institutions, personnel skill-enhancement and retraining systems, and also enterprise training departments that will serve as the basis for the training, skill enhancement, and retraining of workers who are being released from their jobs and unemployed people.

Another point in the resolution adopted: The USSR State Committee for Labor and Social Questions, in conjunction with the USSR State Committee for Public Education and in coordination with local soviets of people's deputies, is to create this year at leading vocational training institutions 30 vocational training, skill-enhancement, and retraining centers for workers who are being released from their jobs and unemployed people.

To involve foreign firms in the work of these centers if the need arises, with the aim of training personnel for top-priority areas in the development of the national economy. To finance these centers from the all-Union part of the state fund for the promotion of employment.

The resolution of the country's Cabinet of Ministers recommends that republic governments create within the state employment service economically accountable vocational training, skill-enhancement, and retraining centers for workers who are being released from their jobs, and unemployed people.

During the period of vocational training, skill enhancement, and retraining, the resolution notes, citizens are paid grants under procedures and of a size laid down in USSR and republic legislation and decisions of local soviets of people's deputies within the limits of their authority.

USSR Law on State Youth Policy

91US00492A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 6 May 91 pp 2-3

[Law: "USSR Law on the General Principles of State Youth Policy in the USSR"]

[Text] This law defines the general principles of state youth policy in the USSR and recognizes them as the legal basis for developing the appropriate legislation in the republics.

The legislation governing state youth policy in the USSR has been called upon to ensure the implementation of the state youth policy of the USSR and the republics and to reinforce the legal guarantees for carrying out the rights and freedoms of young citizens, as well as the rights of youth organizations.

Section I. General Principles

Article 1. State Youth Policy

1. State youth policy is an important area in the activities of the USSR and the republics, that is carried out by their agencies and that has the goal of creating socioeconomic, organizational, and legal conditions and guarantees for the social growth and development of young citizens and their most complete self-realization in the interests of society as a whole.

2. State youth policy in the USSR is constructed on the basis of the following principles:

- the involvement of youth in direct participation in forming and implementing the policy and programs pertaining to society as a whole, and particularly to youth;
- the guaranteeing of the legal and social protection of young citizens, which is necessary to compensate for the age-related deficiencies of their social status;

- the granting to the young citizen of social services involving education, spiritual and physical development, vocational training, the volume, types, and quality of which guarantee the complete development of the individual and preparation for independent life;
- the promoting of initiatory public activities in the area of the social, spiritual, and physical development of youth.

Article 2. Competency of the USSR and the Republics in the Area of State Youth Policy

1. The following are within the jurisdiction of the USSR:

- the determination of the overall socioeconomic, organizational, and legal principles and trends in state youth policy on the entire territory of the USSR;
- the determination of the principles of the legal status of youth organizations;
- the establishment of the nationwide social norms and standards that determine the development of youth and the guarantees of its rights;
- the regulation of the principles of organization and operation of the state service dealing with youth affairs;
- the establishment and carrying out of nationwide comprehensive and target programs in the area of state youth policy in the USSR;
- the disposal of the financial means intended for implementation of USSR state youth policy from the union budget, as well as the disposal, upon coordination with the republics, of the funds voluntarily transferred by the republic to the USSR for these purposes;
- the carrying out of international contacts with regard to questions of state youth policy on behalf of the USSR;
- the legislative regulation, on the basis of the powers transferred to the republics, of other relations of an interrepublic nature in the sphere of state youth policy.

2. All the questions of forming and carrying out state youth policy, with the exception of the questions included in Part 1 of Article 2 of this Law, are within the jurisdiction of the republics.

Article 3. Legislation on State Youth Policy in the USSR

This Law, in conformity with the USSR Constitution and the basic trends in USSR domestic and foreign policy, as defined by the Congress of USSR People's Deputies, establishes the general principles and statutes governing state youth policy in the USSR.

The action of this Law with regard to citizens' rights and duties that evolve from the general principles and statutes of state youth policy extends to USSR citizens up to the age of 30 years, unless otherwise stipulated by the legislation of the republics.

The implementation of state youth policy in the USSR is guaranteed by legislative acts of the USSR and the

republic that are enacted in conformity with the USSR Constitution and the constitutions of the republics.

Article 4. Legislation Governing State Youth Policy in the USSR and International Treaties

If a USSR international treaty has established other rules than those contained in this Law or other legislative acts of the USSR with regard to state youth policy, the rules of the international treaty apply.

Section II. Legal and Social Protection of Youth

Article 5. Guarantees of the Legal and Social Protection of Young Citizens

1. Young citizens of the USSR possess socioeconomic, political, and personal rights and freedoms in all their fullness and bear the duties stipulated for USSR citizens by the USSR Constitution, the constitutions of the republics, and other legislative acts.

Any direct or indirect limitations of the rights and freedoms (discrimination) of young citizens on the basis of their age, other than those stipulated by law, entail the responsibility established by legislation of the USSR and the republics.

It is not allowed to impose on young citizens any additional duties, including those in the area of observing state and public order, as compared with the duties established for the remaining citizens, when those duties have been specially stipulated by legislative acts of the USSR and the republics.

2. Persons who have not reached the age of 18 years (minors) enjoy the special protection of the state. The state, proceeding from the fact that minors, by virtue of their age, cannot completely recognize the importance of their actions, limits their ability, by their own actions, to acquire rights, to create duties for themselves, or to bear legal responsibility, and also establishes a special procedure for implementing their rights. The incomplete volume of the legal capability of the young citizens, as well as the special procedure for implementing their rights, can be established only by law.

Compulsory measures stipulated by the law which are of an educational nature, including those that are not criminal punishment, are applied to minor citizens only in accordance with a sentence or the appropriate court decision.

State agencies and officials and pedagogical and social workers cannot use with respect to minors any measures of influence that are based on the public dissemination of information concerning the deeds perpetrated by the minors that contain signs of a crime, or any legal violations, with the exception of instances when those measures are a type of criminal punishment or administrative penalty, or pertain to compulsory measures of an educational nature that are applied on the basis of a court decision.

Article 6. Guaranteeing the Rights of Young Citizens In Interrelations with Educational and Training Institutions

1. The legal relations between young citizens and educational and training institutions are based on the equality of the participants in those relations.

2. The rights and duties of students in their interrelations with the administrators of educational and training institutions are established by legislative acts of the USSR and republics, and also by decisions of the self-government agencies of the educational and training institutions, in the adopting of which the students or their legal representatives participate, and by contracts (agreements) between the students, their collectives, and the administrators of the educational and training institutions.

3. The administrators and workers of the educational and training institutions do not have the right to force the student to execute any duties that do not evolve directly from the educational process, or to force him to reject the use of his rights, or to interfere in any way in the student's personal life or to debase his human dignity. In the event that the administrators or workers of these institutions commit these illegal actions, the students whose rights were violated, or their legal representatives, have the right to require by court procedure the compensation by the educational or training institution of the damages that were inflicted.

Article 7. Rights of Young Citizens to the Guaranteed Receiving of Social Services

1. Young citizens, irrespective of their race, sex, religion, nationality, social status, or income level, have the right to the guaranteed receiving of the necessary minimum of social services stipulated by Part 2 of Article 1 of this Law.

The state establishes a system of social norms and standards that reinforce the guaranteed level at which young citizens receive these social services.

2. The rights of young citizens that are stipulated by this article are guaranteed by the state, and, in the event that they are violated, the protection of their rights is carried out in the legally established procedure.

3. State and public agencies and officials do not have the right to make decisions or carry out other actions that entail the reduction of the volume of providing young people with social services, or that worsen their quality as compared to the guaranteed level.

Improper actions or decisions of state and public agencies or officials can be appealed to the court in conformity with the existing legislation. The complaint can be lodged by the citizen whose rights have been violated, by his representative, or by the representation of a youth organization or agency in the state service dealing with youth affairs.

4. The state renders the necessary financial and other material support to public and other associations and organizations that carry out activities to provide social services to youth, establishes preferential conditions for their activity, and also, using methods of state economic regulation, encourages the investments into the creation of conditions for the social growth and development of the youth.

Article 8. Guaranteeing the Economic Independence and Support of Young Citizens

1. The state establishes a system of measures for the socioeconomic, organizations, and legal support of the entrepreneurial activities of young citizens, young families, and collectives of young citizens who have united for the purpose of carrying out those activities.

The measures mentioned include the granting to individual, family, and collective enterprises of young citizens benefits in taxation and the providing of credit; the providing of the necessary means of production and production facilities; the insuring of their commercial risks; the issuance of appropriately developed warranties and guarantees; as well as the financing of training and the preparation of founding documents; the providing of information concerning the legislation that is in effect, and the methodological recommendations for applying it.

2. Young citizens and young families are granted benefits in the allocation of plots of land for individual housing construction; long-term credit for the purchase of homes and apartments; the payment of shares for acceptance into housing-construction cooperatives; the setting up of a home; the purchase of durable home appliances; the payment for instruction at educational institutions operating on a commercial basis; and for other purposes.

This kind of consumer credit is issued by banks in the USSR at reduced rates of interest and is paid of in a preferential procedure established by the legislation of the republics.

3. The state provides to schoolchildren and students at educational institutions, and to military personnel on active duty in a period of enlistment, preferential conditions for using cultural-educational and sports-therapy institutions by establishing preferential prices for visiting them.

Union, republic, and local agencies of state authority and their executive-directive agencies establish for these categories of young citizens benefits for travel by rail, air, motor, and urban transportation, stipulating the payment of compensation to the transportation branches and enterprises from the appropriate budgets.

The preferential conditions can also extend to the use of transportation means during passenger shipments by way of youth tourism, including international youth tourism and international youth exchanges.

Section III. Organizational Foundations of Carrying Out the State Youth Policy in the USSR

Article 9. Guaranteeing the State Youth Policy

1. In the Union budget and in the republic and local budgets, provision is made in the appropriate sections for the appropriations needed to finance the measures in the area of state youth policy.

2. The makeup of state programs for social and economic development stipulates the purposeful conducting of measures to carry out the state youth policy.

3. When organizing the legislative, executive, and court authority and local self-government, there is a determination of the structure and procedure of operation of their agencies, which guarantee the taking into account of the interests of the young citizens and the peculiarities of protecting their rights.

4. For purposes of implementing the state youth policy and guaranteeing the proper social protection of young citizens on the entire territory of the USSR, a state service for youth affairs is created.

Article 10. State Service for Youth Affairs

1. The activities of the state service for youth affairs at the union, republic, and local levels are carried out under the direct guidance of the executive-directive agencies of authority.

The procedure for forming the state service for youth affairs at the union level is defined by USSR Cabinet of Ministers. In the republics the state service for youth affairs is formed in the procedure defined by the republic's legislation.

The makeup of the state service for youth affairs includes, in addition to its agencies, an inspectorate for protecting the rights of minors and the youth, as well as social services with various areas of specialization.

3. The state service for youth affairs:

- develops the drafts of comprehensive and target programs, and the social norms and standards in the area of carrying out state youth policy; prepares other decisions in this area; and coordinates and monitors their execution;
- participates in developing the drafts of programs for economic and social development, and the drafts of the appropriate budgets;
- concludes with the representatives of the work-providers (owners or agencies empowered by them) and the corresponding territorial and branch associations of trade unions, general agreements that stipulate the measures to assure the socioeconomic protection and the protection of the labor and labor-use of young workers;
- guarantees the rendering of direct social assistance and other services to minor and other young citizens who require special social support;

- guarantees the protection of the rights and legal interests of minors and other young citizens; and monitors the organization of guardianship and wardship;
- grants subsidies to youth and children's organizations;
- carries out the financing of programs (plans for youth, other public, and other organizations in rendering social assistance to young citizens and carrying out the socially beneficial initiatives of youth;
- carries out other functions entrusted to it.

Article 11. Social Services For Youth

1. The social services for youth carry out the following functions:

- the informing of young citizens concerning their rights and opportunities in all spheres of life;
- the providing of consultative services to minors, other young citizens, and their parents; and psychological, pedagogical, drug-education, and legal assistance;
- social assistance to the young family;
- assistance to young citizens who have proven to be in especially undesirable conditions as a result of health defects; to the physically disabled; and also to persons who are located in or who have completed a stay at state children's institutions, and to neglected minor citizens;
- social work in special educational and training institutions for minor violators of the law;
- adaptation assistance to young citizens who have been released from places of incarceration or who have returned from special educational and training institutions;
- other functions in the rendering of assistance and the creation of conditions for the development of youth, as stipulated by legislation of USSR and the republics.

2. The persons authorized to work in the system of the social services for youth as social workers are those persons who have the appropriate education and professional training, or who have undergone certification in the established procedure.

Article 12. Involvement of Nonstate Organizations and Citizens in Social Assistance For Youth

The involvement of nonstate organizations and individual citizens in the work of rendering social assistance to youth is carried out on a contractual basis. The contract concluded between those organizations or persons, on the one hand, and the agencies of the state service for youth affairs at the appropriate level, on the other hand, defines the types and content of the services to be rendered by those organizations or persons, and the conditions for their financial or any other material support by the state service, and the requirements on the quality of the services to be rendered.

Article 13. Compensatory Youth Funds

In order to compensate the credit institutions for profits lost as a result of the granting of preferential consumer credit to young citizens and young families, as well as preferential credit granted to individual and collective enterprises of young citizens, and also to provide for the insuring of the financial risks and the issuance of guarantees (bails) to young entrepreneurs and to finance other expenses, specialized compensatory funds are created.

The disposal of the money in these funds lies within the competency of the leadership of the funds or the agencies of the state service for youth affairs.

The procedure for creation and operation, and the sources of formation of these funds, are defined by the legislation of the republics, as well as the decisions of the local soviets of people's deputies.

On the basis of agreements between the specialized youth funds, regional and interrepublic funds can be formed.

Section IV. Foundations of the Legal Status of Youth Organizations in the USSR

Article 14. Youth Organizations

1. Organizations that are recognized as youth organizations are those public organizations that unite young citizens and that have as a mandatory requirement in their charter the cessation of a person's membership in it upon the achievement of a definite age. Youth organizations have the right to establish to exclude from that requirement their members who were elected to the elected agencies of those organizations or who work in them.

Youth organizations also include public organizations that unite mostly young citizens, if their activities as indicated in the charter is aimed at guaranteeing the social growth and development of youth. Various associations of youth organizations are also youth organizations.

2. Mass youth movements that are not based on the fixed (formalized) membership of their participants can operate in the USSR. The representative agencies of mass movements (committees, councils, boards of governors) possess the rights stipulated by legislation for the corresponding agencies of youth organizations.

3. Associations of young citizens that have been created by public organizations and that carry out their activities within the confines of the tasks as stated in the charters of those public organizations and on the basis of decisions made by their governing agencies are youth (young persons') sections of those public organizations and are not recognized as youth organizations.

4. The legal status of youth organizations is defined by the legislation governing public associations, as well as by this Law and the legislative acts of USSR and the republics that are promulgated in conformity with it.

Article 15. Participation of Youth Organizations in the Formation of State Youth Policy

1. The nationwide and republic-level agencies of youth organizations, unless otherwise stipulated by the legislation of the republics for those republic-level agencies, possess the law of legislative initiative in the highest agencies of state authority of the USSR and the republics.

2. With regard to questions of carrying out the rights of youth that are encompassed by the tasks as stated in the charter of the youth organizations, the agencies of state administration do not make decisions until after the carrying out of preliminary consultative sessions with the governing agencies of the appropriate youth organization.

Decisions pertaining to questions of the activities of the youth organization are made by the agencies of state administration with the mandatory participation of the representatives of the agency of the particular youth organization.

Article 16. Guarantees of the Activities of Youth Organizations

1. State agencies render youth organizations financial support, primarily in the form of freeing them from payment of taxes on the profit (income) derived by the youth organizations from their investment activities, in that part that is to be directed toward the implementation of the programs for the social protection of youth.

2. For the purpose of guaranteeing the activities of youth organizations, they can be granted subsidies from funds in the appropriate budget, if the particular youth organization has not had transferred to it, on a noncompensatory basis, funds from other public associations, or from enterprises, organizations, or institutions.

3. State agencies have the right, on a noncompensatory basis, to transfer to youth organizations the buildings, structures, and other property that is necessary for the carrying out of the tasks indicated in their charters.

Section V. Guarantees of the Carrying Out of the USSR Law Entitled: "General Principles of USSR State Youth Policy"

Article 17. Guarantees of the Rights of Young Citizens and Youth Organizations That Have Been Firmly Established By This Law

1. The rights of young citizens and youth organizations that have been firmly established by this Law are carried out by them directly and in full volume, with the exception of instances of limitation of the legal capability of young citizens for reasons stated in, and in the procedure stipulated by, the legislative acts of the USSR and the republics.

2. If the use of these rights requires the definition of the procedure for carrying them out, the agencies of state

authority and administration are obliged to enact the necessary normative and other acts that regulate these questions.

Prior to the enactment of those acts, the young citizens and youth organizations have the right to carry out their rights in the procedure independently selected by them, if it does not contradict the legislative that is in effect. Any hindrance to the implementation of rights in such instances is illegal.

If the carrying out and protection of the rights are influenced by the commission of acts by state organizations or their officials and there is a lack of any procedure firmly established by legislation for the commission of such acts (departmental responsibility for consideration of disputes), such procedure is defined by those organizations independently within the confines of their competency, and, when protecting rights, on the basis of analogy with the legislation that is in effect. The lack of a previously established procedure cannot serve as the justification for refusing to carry out or defend rights.

Article 18. Correlation Between This Law and Acts Enacted To Develop It

1. The state agencies bear responsibility for observing the statutes in this Law when enacting normative or other legal acts pertaining to the practical implementation of the Law.

Any legally binding acts that limit the volume of rights granted by this Law to young citizens and youth organizations are invalid completely or in the appropriate regard from the moment of their enactment.

If the courts and agencies that resolve economic disputes detect, in the course of the investigation of cases and the resolution of disputes, any nonconformity of the legally binding acts to the statutes in this Law, they are to be guided by this Law.

The damages incurred by young citizens and youth organizations as a result of implementing a legally binding act that contracts this Law are to be compensated in full volume at the expense of funds that are at the disposal of the state agency that enacted the particular legally binding act.

Article 19. Overview and Monitoring of the Execution of This Law

1. Higher overview for the precise and uniform execution of this Law is entrusted to USSR General Procurator and the republic procurators.

2. Monitoring of the implementation of this Law is carried out by the soviets of people's deputies and the appropriate state agencies.

M. Gorbachev, President of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

Moscow, Kremlin, 16 April 1991.

Students Seen As Last Hope for Miners

91UN1517A Moscow NEZAVISIMAYA GAZETA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 pp 1, 3

[Article by Vladimir Ruban: "Cheremukha" in Kiev: Students Are the Last Hope of the Strikers"]

[Text] For a week and a half now in Kiev every day begins and ends with small rallies at which members of the republic strike committee call on Kiev residents to support the striking miners. However, there was not a day when more than 12 enterprises were striking. Meanwhile, the strike was intended for one day, but with the participation of 50 to 60 plants and factories. Why did it not turn out differently? What are the political reasons for the failure of the strike?

It would seem that an opportune time was selected—16 April, a time when, on the one hand, people could feel the blow of the sudden increase in prices, and, on the other hand, the plenary sessions of the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet were renewed after a long interval. The aim of the initiators of the warning political strike was to force the parliament and the government of the republic to act more decisively. It was supported by the central leadership of Rukh [Ukraine People's Movement for Perestroika] a half day before the beginning of the strike. Such delayed solidarity provided only moral support. The opposition parties, with the exception of the republicans, did not express themselves on the strike at all. Even the Ukrainian Interparty Assembly, which unites ultraradical parties and movements, remained on the sidelines. In October of last year, during the previous wave of rallies, hunger strikes, and strikes, the People's Council openly summoned citizens to a campaign of civil disobedience. At that time, the main thing was the confrontation between the democrats and the Communist Party. Now the situation is different. The Center is the main opponent not only of the democrats but of the so-called sovereign-communists as well. Singly, neither the latter nor especially the former can overcome it. They understood this very well, and at the beginning of this year concluded a private alliance between themselves. Being in power, the sovereign-communists, headed by Leonid Kravchuk and Vitold Fokin, naturally, are not interested in the strike. Leaders of the moderate wing of the opposition cannot help but take this into account. Therefore, they limited themselves to an appeal to the people of the Ukraine that states: "The People's Council supports the economic and political demands of the striking collectives."

Thus, all of the preparatory work lay on the shoulders of the strike committees and the Ukrainian Republican Party—the most organized of the opposition parties, but small in number and not very influential in Kiev. Of interest is the evolution of the imperial wing of the

Communist Party, which is headed by Stanislav Gurenko, first secretary of the Ukrainian Communist Party. In autumn last year they categorically rejected the strike movement, but now they were ready to head it. Gurenko himself, speaking before workers of the Kiev plant imeni Artem, spoke of the undesirability of a union between the Ukraine and Yeltsin's Russia. The decisions of the last plenum of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee are significant, demanding that the CPSU Central Committee do everything possible to save "our great multinational fatherland," and simultaneously criticizing the Center no less harshly than is being done by Rukh. Choosing between the federation with democratic Russia and a confederation, the imperial communists, it appears, prefer the second version.

Judging by everything, not one political force has yet lost anything from the Kiev strike. The sovereign-communists retained their positions. The conservatives for the first time declared for all to hear their intention to play the national card and thereby changed their image, which is of no small importance for the future. Owing to the pressure of the street, the Supreme Soviet canceled two paragraphs of the presidential ukase of 12 April and, probably, any day will give the Declaration of State Sovereignty of the Ukraine the status of constitutional law. So the democrats, with their slogan "in support of the government of Fokin, criticizing and pushing it forward," also maintained their positions. In this they are counting on strengthening them in the near future. After all, the Lvov students are continuing to strike, and they were supported by colleagues from Lutsk, Chernovtsy, and three Kiev VUZ's—the university, and the pedagogical and polytechnical institutes. If the leadership of the country does not find a common language with the leaders of the Ukrainian student union, the students together with the miners can rock the boat of social patience.

The events of October last year in the republic clearly showed that the students are a powerful opposition force that represents a real threat to the authorities. If the students had started a strike, as they proposed (in the event their demands were not met), on 23 April, only then would it be possible to hope for its successful conclusion. But things turned out otherwise. Some democrats suspect that the ruling party provoked the strike committee into an unprepared strike so that the matter would not reach the point of a serious social outburst in May-June. So that when on 23 April a column of 2,000 students and miners headed for one of the largest Kiev plants, Arsenal, to call its workers to strike, the authorities, who were already prepared for these events, dispersed the demonstrators with the hands of the OMON [special-purpose militia detachment], who used not only physical force but also "cheremukha," which has become a constant attribute of reprisal. After this, the republic strike committee made a decision to conduct an all-Ukraine strike on 25 April.

Baltics

Estonia's Savisaar on Relations with Armed Forces

Part I

91UM0479A Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 7 Feb 91 p 2

[Part One of E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet: "On Relations with the Armed Forces of the USSR: E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] This is being published in abridged form.

Dear Supreme Soviet!

The Government of the Estonian Republic considered it necessary to submit to the Supreme Soviet session the issue on relations with the Armed Forces of the Soviet Union, while considering the attempts, especially those that have appeared recently, to expand the army's interference into the life of civilian society and at that the rights granted to the army are incompatible with the laws of the Estonian Republic and the USSR, and also with international law; while considering the problems associated with alternative service and the refusal of young people to serve in the Soviet Army; and also issues of everyday life for servicemen (residence permits, supplying them with goods, etc.).

The Government of the Estonian Republic, while manifesting its good will toward the establishment of internal political stability, has repeatedly taken steps toward achieving a mutual understanding with the Ministry of Defense, the Baltic Military District, and local military unit commanders.

During the course of half a century, the Armed Forces of the USSR have occupied nearly 90,000 hectares of Estonian territory and in so doing they have not considered either economic, natural, or social conditions. They have been guided by political and military political considerations alone.

I must point out that during the first postwar years (1946) the Estonian SSR Council of Ministers was compelled by its own decision to transfer free of charge to the army all barracks and other military structures belonging to the Armed Forces of the Estonian Republic and also dozens of homes in Tallinn, Tartu, Pärnu, and other cities of Estonia that were spared from destruction. Having received this property that had belonged to the Estonian Republic free of charge, today the current military leaders are demanding compensation from the Government of Estonia to return individual structures that have become excess to the needs of the army. You will agree that logic is lacking here. For 50 years, Estonian Republic construction organizations have built and local self-government organs have transferred tens of thousands of square meters of living space to the army. If

this living space had been rationally used by the military departments, today we would not have the problem with the resettlement of hundreds of officers and the members of their families.

USSR President M. Gorbachev's November 27, 1990 telegram, addressed to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet Chairman and to the Chairman of the Government of the Estonian Republic, reports that recently there have been massive refusals to issue residence permits to officers and naval and army warrant officers who are arriving along with members of their families to serve in military units.

To our request for appropriate maintenance, the majority of city and province [uyezd] administrations answered that until the present no insurmountable problems have arisen with residence permits for servicemen and members of their families, including military units that do not have any other housing. Joint commissions with representatives of the army have been created to better solve these problems in some local self-governments, for example, in Tallinn and Tartu.

At the same time, the leadership of some military units are ignoring local government organs. (In Tallinn, the local self-government prohibited a military parade on Svoboda [Freedom] Square but the garrison conducted it anyway). Naturally, local government organs also cannot fulfill all military unit requests for residence permits if they are not treated as being in total control of this territory.

A Baltic Republic Supreme Soviet appeal that was adopted on December 1, 1990 in Vilnius stresses that, while demanding in principle the withdrawal of Soviet Armed Forces, the Baltic States at the same time do not in the least want to degrade the dignity or to infringe upon the human rights of servicemen and members of their families.

Proceeding based on this, henceforth we consider it necessary, in the procedure prescribed in the Estonian Republic, to provide to officers and army and navy warrant officers and to members of their families who arrive for service in military units temporary permits for housing that belongs to the military unit or that is under its jurisdiction or direct them to the military unit if there is no other housing.

Servicemen and members of their families who are residing here temporarily are granted the right to a buyer's card, to food coupons, compensation and other services on an equal basis with local residents.

The situation has changed with housing that is being built for military units. In accordance with a decision adopted in the middle 1980's by the CPSU Central Committee and the USSR Council of Ministers, the union republics have been tasked to allocate housing to the army. They are also attempting to expand the force of these decisions to current conditions and according to them Estonia must annually allocate at least 4,600

square meters of housing to the USSR Ministry of Defense and to the border troops which was done until 1987. Up to 10 percent of the housing that was constructed using capital investment was transferred to the army. As a result of the transition of enterprises to cost accounting in accordance with the law on state enterprises, housing is being constructed using one's own assets and its seizure for the needs of the army contradicts the law on enterprises.

We need to recognize that in the event that we totally transition to individual cooperative construction, the housing situation for servicemen will become even more critical.

According to USSR Ministry of Defense data, there are a total of 1,400 servicemen's families in Estonia who do not have housing and 2,100 families need improved housing conditions. We need to seek the solution of these problems through improved ties with military unit commanders and local self-governing organs and a desire to better understand each other's problems.

This concerns the resolution of such problems as the allocation of housing sectors under construction to military units, recruitment of civilian construction organizations, military unit participation in the construction of housing by enterprises and organizations with the transfer of the appropriate monetary and material assets to the builder, leasing housing from local self-governing organs, etc.

I must inform you that next Monday government representatives along with self-governing organ leaders and military unit commanders will examine all proposals associated with regulating social and everyday life problems of servicemen and members of their families. Further, according to our plans, on February 18, this subject will be discussed at a republic government session. I am certain that if we desire we can find a solution on these problems that suits both sides. Province and city administrations have submitted proposals on temporary residence permits for servicemen in barracks, on leasing housing, on granting construction authorizations, on department advertising of housing that is in the hands of military units, on permanent and temporary buyer's cards, etc.

Now about conscription for active military service in the Soviet Army. First of all, permit me to inform the Supreme Soviet about what the situation is like in various regions.

They have succeeded in sending a large portion of conscripts for active service in Ukraine, other than Lvov and Ivano-Frankovsk Oblasts where the majority of young men have evaded the draft. The draft evaders are frightened that they will be caught and sent to serve in areas that have been affected by the Chernobyl accident. The Ukrainian Supreme Soviet has not developed any conscript protection mechanism whatsoever.

In the Republic of Moldova, young men have been promised that they will be kept in Odessa Military District to perform service if they present themselves to the conscription commissions. Thus far, no special repressive measures have been employed with regard to those who are evading army service. The population of Moldova has a negative attitude toward the conscription of young men into the Armed Forces of the USSR and they are demanding the creation of their own army.

In Latvia, they have begun forcibly directing young men into the army who are performing alternative service, thus violating the procedure generally accepted in the Soviet Union, that is, without a decision of medical and conscription commissions. A military patrol is simply arriving at a work place and taking young men with them to a unit, then sending them outside the borders of the Latvian Republic. For the time being, massive actions against conscripts have not yet been conducted but they are very aggressively seeking persons who have run away from military units.

The most difficult situation has developed in the Lithuanian Republic where a total of 1,300 conscripts, 403 of them Lithuanians, have voluntarily appeared for active service. Assault troops are systematically verifying documents of young men of the appropriate age groups and all of those who have not performed active service are detained and sent to the commandant's headquarters and from there to military units, primarily outside the Lithuanian Republic. A massive search for deserters is also taking place.

In Estonia, the Supreme Soviet, through its decisions and the law on work service, has taken a primarily negative position with regard to service in the Soviet Army. The USSR views these decisions of ours as contradicting human rights. Recently all USSR ambassadors abroad were sent out for use in propaganda-oriented material under the title "How much do laws and resolutions adopted in the Baltic republics correspond to international human rights principles?"

This material warns that Estonian legislation on the issue reviewed does not correspond to the USSR Law on Universal Military Obligation and also to the Constitution of the USSR. This contradiction of union and republic laws could result in the fact that citizens must fulfill their military obligation twice. The motivation to avoid service is viewed as a violation of the law and confused citizens of the listed republics are committing deeds that are punishable by the criminal code (evasion of military service is punished by five years imprisonment).

The material also points out that refusal to serve in the Armed Forces and incitement to do this is punishable in accordance with the laws of many countries. For example, according to U.S. law, a \$10,000 maximum fine or 10 years in prison is stipulated for U.S. servicemen who violate loyalty to the U.S. Armed Forces or undermine their morale or order.

The government of the Estonian Republic has persistently and with reflection strived to solve the problems associated with Estonian youth serving in the Soviet Armed Forces. The overwhelming majority of the Estonian population lack the ideological motivation to serve in the Armed Forces of the USSR. The attitude of the Estonian people has been manifested in the failure of last year's draft into the army. In the Spring, 42 percent of those conscripted for military service appeared at military commissariats and 22 percent appeared in the Fall. At the same time, no obstacles whatsoever were made for those who voluntarily wanted to serve in the army.

(To be continued.)

Part II

91UM0479B Tallinn SOVETSKAYA ESTONIYA
in Russian 8 Feb 91 p 2

[Conclusion of E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet: "On Relations with the Armed Forces of the USSR: E. Savisaar's January 30, 1991 Report to the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet"]

[Text] (Conclusion. First part published in the February 7th issue).

Reforms in the Soviet Army have become bogged down or, more correctly, have generally not begun and army manning is being conducted according to obsolete laws that nevertheless remain in force. Work service is not being recognized as an alternative and conscripts who refuse service in the Soviet Army are threatened with the use of force and with strict sanctions. So, at the beginning of January, the threat arose to use assault troops to recruit people into the army and then the republic government was compelled to issue the order on granting winter leave to young men who are performing work service. Furthermore, in eastern Virumaa, the Kokhtla-Yarve Militia sent 10 young men from Sillamya, who had performed work service at Estonia Mine, to the military commissariat for their further assignment into the army. Right now, as a result of a certain decline of tension and considering practical needs, an order has been prepared on the rapid termination of winter leave for lads who are performing work service.

Work service being practiced in the Estonian Republic and the law "On Work Service in the ESSR" in principle are not distinguishable from the draft of the appropriate law of the USSR that was published on December 26, 1990 in KRASNAYA ZVEZDA. There are only several inconsequential differences. For example, in our country, receipt of statements and organization of work service is assigned to work service and work employment commissions and in the union draft—to Councils of Ministers and to rayon and city Soviet ispolkoms. In the union draft, a single three-year work service period is prescribed for everyone when in our country it has been reduced to 12 months for conscripts with a higher education. That draft states that a uniform will be used

for work service that is different than a military uniform and our law has no such provision. There are also several other differences. But it is still a draft. And our young men are being compelled right now to execute existing obsolete Soviet legislation.

As we all know, on January 14 a meeting with a group of high-ranking military commanders, headed by Deputy Chief of the General Staff of the Armed Forces of the USSR Colonel General G. Krivosheyev, took place in Tallinn in accordance with a previously achieved agreement with USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov. Primary attention at the meeting was devoted precisely to conscription into the Armed Forces of the USSR on the territory of the Estonian Republic. We all know that this is precisely what explained the need to bring assault troops into Estonia. In accordance with the proposal made during the negotiations by the General Staff delegation, USSR Minister of Defense D. Yazov's directive to Baltic Military District Commander Kuzmin and to Military Commissar of Estonia Pyder appeared according to which changes are being made to the 1990 conscript allocation plan which guides the military commissariats of Estonia. Conscripts are being sent to units located on Estonian territory—air defense—200 men, air force—200 men, construction troops—800 men, and navy—240 men. The remaining conscripts are being sent to a training center located on the territory of the Latvian Republic with subsequent performance of service in military units located on the territory of the Estonian Republic when possible.

The directive states that the allocation of personnel will be made to military units that are known beforehand and strict control is being established over their return to Estonia.

In so doing, each conscript may select his service location outside the boundaries of the Estonian Republic if he so desires.

The General Staff delegation also promised that young men who have willfully left military units prior to completion of the term of service will be left to complete service in military units located on the territory of the Estonian Republic and specifically to the motorized rifle division located in Tondi if they appeal to the military commissariat.

The Supreme Soviet has to determine its position on this issue in its further activities.

What should our point of departure be here? First of all, we do not have any grounds to change the laws of the Estonian Republic. The legal protection of young men is provided by these laws but I must add that 1) this legal protection is unilateral since the Soviet Union does not recognize the appropriate laws, and 2) legal protection does not signify physical protection. The roundup of lads using special military subunits has already been announced several times and we only succeeded in postponing this action with great difficulty and only through negotiations but the scales are not tipping in our

favor. They will most probably begin with searches for deserters which will be understood in international society since deserters are caught everywhere. The experience of Lithuania and Latvia demonstrates that the special subunits at the same time assume greater powers than the search for lads, in other words, their activities affect a large circle of people. The fact that in so doing they detain young men of any age can be essentially assessed as a provocation to quibbling which someone will react to sooner or later and they anticipate this.

During the course of the negotiations, we have until now managed to expand the possibility of a choice for our young men. We have simultaneously sought fundamental solutions to military problems. For the first time, the other side has understood the need for this type of negotiations, has recognized us as a partner, and has begun to seek compromises. Of course, it is still early to say that the guarantees given to our lads will be completely reliable. Therefore, additional proposals to the Ministry of Defense are necessary (not to redeploy military units where our boys are serving; to transfer those boys now serving in the USSR to Estonia).

I must add that, according to the most recent data, 31 percent of conscripted young men have entered the army from Estonia and this is precisely 1,276 young men. Of them, there were 276 in January. Everyone who wanted to has remained to serve in Estonia.

Recently we made a new attempt to obtain recognition of work service from the union government. During a meeting with Valentin Pavlov last week, we arrived at an agreement that the Estonian law on work service and the draft union law on alternative service will be subjected to comparative examination both in Tallinn and in Moscow. And then we will meet once again on this issue. I do not harbor any great hopes since the military are very inflexible on this issue but in any event an attempt is not torture.

And in conclusion. In recent days additional tension has arisen as a result of union government plans to use military personnel and military equipment to insure public order.

The government of the Estonian Republic has issued an order to the Republic Ministry of Internal Affairs to not accept for execution the USSR MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and USSR Ministry of Defense general order on joint patrolling of internal affairs workers organs and Soviet Army and Navy servicemen since this order contradicts the agreement concluded on August 1, 1990 between the Government of the Estonian Republic and the USSR MVD on cooperation in the sphere of activities of internal affairs organs. There are no massive violations of the law in our country. And in general the number of crimes on the streets and in public places has not substantially increased in our country but it has first of all increased in apartments and here patrolling along the streets in armored personnel carriers will not yield any particular benefit. The Supreme Soviet Presidium in

its statement also supported the government's point of view—to prohibit application of this law.

These rights which are not stipulated by laws of the USSR for military subunits are being granted through a joint army order. In our view, this is an unconstitutional act which, especially after the bloody events in Vilnius and Riga, is being perceived as a step in the direction toward a military dictatorship. All the more so since activities to maintain order are being removed from under Supreme Soviet control since the army is not subordinate to the parliament.

If it was the militia or the police, it would swear an oath and assume obligations with regard to the civilian population. It is not at all clear how they propose overcoming problems in the event of disagreements since army and civilian population interrelations are not juridically regulated on many issues.

The decline of discipline in the army is also one of the causes of the appearance of this order. I need to say that we have not had any serious complaints against the leadership of local garrison military units in our country. Of course, problems have previously occurred and we will not get by without them henceforth but it was always possible to find a mutually acceptable solution of these problems within the framework of existing contacts.

Assignment of police functions to the army is a factor of moral responsibility for it. (The army is structured to defend national security against an external enemy). In any event, this order will inflict harm on the USSR's defense capability. It may entail worsening the contradictions between the civilian population and the army.

While meeting on January 24 with the new USSR Prime Minister Valentin Pavlov, I informed him about the Republic Government decision and made a suggestion to annul the December 29, 1990 joint order of USSR Ministers B. Pugo and D. Yazov or for the government of the USSR to at least suspend it on the territory of the Estonian Republic since its execution by the army will entail increased tension in Estonia. In other words, this order needs to be made to conform with the agreements between Estonia and the Soviet Union (first of all, of course, with the agreement concluded with Bakatin which none of the other republics have).

Naturally, it also may occur in our country that we need the assistance of local military units (large fires, clearing mines, etc.) but then we ourselves will be able to come to an agreement as we have done previously. We do not oppose the Ministry of Defense granting the right to local garrisons to render support to legal authorities in extraordinary situations.

Nine months of work under conditions of a transition period today permits us to make the first generalizations on those principles on which our relations with the army must be structured.

1. In relations with the army, we can proceed based only on the laws of the Estonian Republic while considering USSR legislation insofar as it does not contradict the normative acts developed in the Estonian Republic.

2. We need to maintain contact with the army since, when the army is isolated—this is very dangerous. Then the army will not understand our problems and we will not understand the army's problems. Rejection of contacts with the army only restricts our political capabilities.

3. We need to differentiate army problems as such from personal problems of servicemen as citizens. The problem of the army's presence is first of all a political problem and it is being resolved through negotiations between the Estonian Republic and the USSR. Issues of an economic nature are mainly servicemen's problems as citizens and their resolution rests primarily with local self-government. If we differentiate these two levels, then from this it follows that the army cannot make complaints that local garrisons are not equipped to resolve if only because the army's structure is based on the principle of centralism.

4. The army's activities in Estonia must be under society's control. If the army recognizes the presence of certain obligations to the civilian population, this means that the civilian population also has certain rights with regard to the army. And realization of these rights is the government's task as the executor and businesslike institution of civilian life.

Estonian Parliament Members' Pay Raise

91UN1460A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 8 May 91 p 2

[Article by RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA correspondent Sergey Tarakanov: "It Is Hard To Believe! For the Poor Deputies..."]

[Text] Tallinn—A couple of months ago the Estonian parliament debated the question of raising deputy salaries. It evoked a negative reaction from the people. But Tartu students organized a money collection for the "needy" parliamentarians. A bag with five- kopek coins was delivered to Tallinn with instructions to hand it over to the poorest deputies.

And then a draft decree emerged from the depths of the parliamentary kitchen about changing the wording of Article 17 of the provisional regulations and procedures on the work of the Estonian Republic Supreme Soviet. Appearing as its authors were the commissions on social questions, budget and economics, and also ethics. It follows from the changed wording of Article 17, which was passed by the session, that henceforth a regular member of parliament should be paid two and a half times the average statistical salary. But for those standing higher on the hierarchical ladder of the Supreme Soviet, the factor increases depending on the step occupied—3; 3.5; 4; 5. Plus 200 rubles [R] for

deputy expenses not subject to income tax. Inasmuch as the average monthly salary in Estonia today is R406, it is not difficult to calculate the salary of deputies—from R1,015 per month and higher. It is planned to review them twice a year.

It is interesting to note that the day before the parliament increased the pensions for those who are not receiving it by R25- R50. Now the average pension—R105—amounts to a fourth of the average statistical monthly earnings. In comparing pensions with deputy salaries, it turns out that today one parliamentarian in monetary terms is equal to 10 pensioners.

But speaking seriously, without the amusing mathematics? There are now in Estonia about 360,000 persons of pension age, 35,000 invalids, and 15,000 recipients of pensions in cases of loss of a breadwinner. That is, every fourth resident of the republic is in need of social assistance. The question arises: What can the people think about their elected representatives?

Lithuania's Premier Views Economic Prospects, Cabinet Changes

91UN1348A Vilnius *TIESA* in Lithuanian 21 Feb 91
pp 1,3

[Interview with Gediminas Vagnorius, chairman of the Lithuanian Council of Ministers, by Violeta Griskoniene: "We Will Not Tear Anything Down Artificially"]

[Text] [Griskoniene] Last week you visited Tallinn. What was the reason?

[Vagnorius] We met with representatives of Latvia, Estonia, and neighboring republics of the USSR. Most of our attention was focused on economic problems. One of them was price reform. All participants in the meeting emphasized that the Soviet Union has already raised the wholesale price of raw and other materials and production. The republics, still not having raised retail prices, experienced the greatest losses, so their situation is critical and cannot last long.

In Tallinn we also spoke about organizing an inquest. Our experience interested Latvia and Estonia. We discussed the planned USSR referendum, what USSR leaders might hope to seize in our respect, wanting to implement their own political aims, and how we should defend ourselves against the threatening danger.

We signed a protocol that all three Baltic republics will maintain one customs system on their eastern border governed by the same rules.

[Griskoniene] What are Lithuania's economic relations with the Soviet Union and its republics? Are there any plans to improve them?

[Vagnorius] Life goes on. Enterprises are producing goods, trade is active. We have good ties with Soviet republics and have even concluded economic cooperation agreements with many of them. We are finishing up

an agreement with Russia which includes concrete numbers as to what we will supply and in what quantities, what we receive in return, and how we will guarantee the supply with the breakdown of centralization. Apparently after a broadened economic agreement, immediately there will be signed a political one as well. Apart from this, we are concluding preparations for an agreement by which we would guarantee Russia free transit to the Kaliningrad region. Although we never said that it would be otherwise, however there has been talk that we would be interfering with Kaliningrad's existence.

And economic relations with the Soviet Union's center have not been broken off. However, so long as there is no political understanding, they play according to their own rules and we, according to our own. But even under such conditions is it still possible to confer about mutual supplies. In truth, they supply less, so we give less to the Soviet Union. Some products we no longer receive at all such as paper for newspapers. Thus they pressure us for political reasons. Neither we nor the Soviet Union implement any agreements automatically. When it does not supply us with grain, we decrease our supply of meat to them. Trade must be balanced.

[Griskoniene] How do you intend to weave closer economic ties with the West?

[Vagnorius] In wanting to be less economically dependent upon the Soviet Union, most of all from its monopoly of raw materials, we must expand our economic ties with the West. This does not mean that we break off relations with the East. Quite the opposite, we will expand those as well since they are useful to us. So, the only way to become truly independent is to have relations with the West. We encourage joint ventures and trade. But if we sell goods to the West, we must receive them from there as well. An exchange of goods must take place. Unfortunately, good products are often taken out of Lithuania and in return we only get back are the means for production or money. It is a vicious circle: we produce, sell, import means of production, produce once again, sell,...

[Griskoniene] However, industrial workers very much need good equipment in order to produce valuable goods ...

[Vagnorius] Doubtless, but we cannot exchange all of our products for equipment. There must be a balance. We cannot just produce and not use anything.

[Griskoniene] Many enterprises that sell their products to the West import products for their workers.

[Vagnorius] This sort of barter economy is not good. Barter trading is uncontrolled. And it is not good for the worker because it brings in not what is needed most but what someone thought up. We are preparing decrees for most stores trading in imported goods, and will seek to have enterprises receiving hard currency as income to pay part of the worker's salary in hard currency. Then these people would have the possibility of selecting

goods in a store, or selling the hard currency. A person has to be able to decide for himself what he needs. What he does not need is a centralized system of buying goods.

[Griskoniene] Retail prices in the Soviet Union will be changed in the near future. How about in Lithuania? How does G. Vagnorius' government's price reform and compensation mechanism differ from that prepared and rejected by K. Prunskiene's cabinet?

[Vagnorius] This problem is broader than an increase in prices. First of all, we must protect our market and stabilize it. We began not from price increases but from distributing considerably more goods to our internal market. Although production has decreased, the citizens of the Republic should not feel it. On the contrary, there should be an increase of goods for them.

We required that all enterprises in Lithuania's internal market supply our material expenditures or the Ministry of Trade exchange fund with products of the same value as paid out in salaries, and no less. Until now, certain Soviet enterprises produce in the name of production. They export their products, pay salaries, but there is nothing to cover them. Perhaps such a decree will help enterprises understand that employees need more than just paper money. They should also have a fund of goods.

We will change prices in the very near future. Undoubtedly, they will rise. However, if the difference between the former price and the new price is compensated, it should not be important for example how much meat costs: five or nine rubles. The problem arises, however, when the compensation does not catch up with the speed of price increases. We will try to compensate all Lithuanian citizens at the first price increase for daily needs. I am not talking about those who earn a large amount, such as a thousand rubles a month.

Price reform is a process. It cannot proceed by leaps and bounds such as raising everything overnight. Our price policy must be moderate and gradual.

[Griskoniene] Will our lean budget suffice? Will subsidies be refused?

[Vagnorius] Yes, our budget is not very large. With the increased expense of raw materials, we have experienced great losses, enterprises will have to compensate the price difference. At the same time, a subsidized industry is not rational. Subsidies are often used ineffectively. It would be much better to subsidize a user, a person, not an industry. However, we understand that this is impossible to do in a day's or a month's time. It demands time to implement such a system of subsidies. At first, subsidies for certain meat and industrial goods will remain. Subsidies will be given for an assortment of children's goods, goods for the elderly, etc. Little by little we will supply subsidies to young families with children, to elderly people, to everyone who receives a low income.

[Griskoniene] Lithuania's farms are already on the edge of bankruptcy. They will be slain in the spring by

increased payments, constantly rising technology, the price of material expenditures. Maybe this is what is necessary for a state seeking to privatize its economy. However, won't Lithuania begin to starve? What are you doing to assure that this does not happen?

[Vagnorius] I think that we will not return to the campaign: a private farm is no longer appropriate, the collective farm is driven together by coercion, or the opposite. Turning a cooperative farm into a private one is a process which requires time. We will not destroy anything artificially, we will not force anything to be founded artificially. Our task is to create the conditions for our citizens who are not prepared to farm and for those people who want to remain on the collective farms, although, obviously, not on the kind that exist today but on cooperative companies such as exist in Hungary and elsewhere. I think that cooperative farms will remain for a long time.

No way do we intend to create a situation that would bankrupt collective farms or work toward their disintegration. I do not think that collective farms would go bankrupt on a massive scale. We would not allow this. It may be, that one or another goes bankrupt. But not at this time, not this spring, but later, when we will also allow some industrial enterprises to go bankrupt. However, we will try to block this process as well.

The lamentable financial situation of a third of the Republic's agricultural industry came about not because payments were increased. However much they increased, we raised the price of buying. But what did increase significantly was the material expenditures which agriculture uses. They increased quite a bit more than had been planned, raising purchase prices. Last week we were weighing that and this week we shall consider how to save farms from bankruptcy. Several projects have already been prepared: we will forgive some payments, we will postpone the change in purchase price a bit. However much agricultural enterprises may have suffered, those people in agriculture with a private (home) farm, income has increased quite a bit—60-70 percent.

[Griskoniene] We would like to know your opinion about the return of personal property and the selling of apartments. Many people are concerned about this.

[Vagnorius] People are actually terrified of it. We must correct the injustices done to those people whose property was expropriated. However, it has to be understood that the state cannot totally repay the loss which all of us have experienced, including our parents. Standards will be set, the maximum size of a building or lot that can be returned. There is not so much arable land now as there was before the war.

People should not have to suffer. They are not guilty if they happen to live in a building that was expropriated from someone else. The return of expropriated property will be a rather long process. It is not simple to build new

homes and move in the people now living in expropriated buildings. I would think that the most important matter is that we are restoring justice, and at what tempo will depend upon how strong and capable our nation is.

The law on selling apartments should be adopted immediately after the law on general privatization. While the latter does not exist, people will have nothing with which to buy apartments. It is no luck if only two to five percent of the citizenry has the funds to do so. The law on privatization envisions certain payments to each individual. At that time practically all residents of communal apartments will have something to buy with.

[Griskoniene] No one has said anything as yet about changes in the government cabinet. However, it has temporary ministers. Can they really work productively and effectively?

[Vagnorius] First of all, it is not because of my advise that some are true ministers and others just assume those responsibilities. We have assumed that problem and envision in the very near future to complete the formation of a government cabinet. Let us have patience for a few more days and everything will become clear.

[Griskoniene] Thank you for the interview.

Lithuania's Opposition Forces Hold Press Conferences

91UN1435A Vilnius LIETUVOS RYTAS in Lithuanian 23 Apr 91 p 5

[Article by Aldona Svirbutaviciute: "Getting To Know Each Other—Its Effects Will Be Determined by Life's Events"]

[Text] Last weekend two politically opposed organizations held meetings. The Lithuanian Freedom League organized a protest meeting in Independence Square, which according to the league, was for the purpose of evaluating political reactions to the Forum on Lithuania's Future. The Communist Party organization in Lithuania met in a solemn session to celebrate Lenin's birthday. Antanas Terleckas, as always, was only too happy to make critical remarks concerning the Forum on Lithuania's Future. The leader of the Communist Party organization Mikolas Burokevicius praised the legacy of the great leader, in both the Lithuanian and Russian languages. This session was broadcast on television Sunday evening. The camera shots were routine except for one—While the camera was scanning the auditorium, a gray haired woman, sitting someplace in the middle, was shown covering her face with her hands. After a while this same shot was shown again....Was she anxious?

This is the same anxiety that now exists among the masses. Julius Veselka, a member of the coalition council of the Forum on Lithuania's Future, addressed this syndrome at a press conference held on 22 April on the premises of the Union of Journalists. He said: "We

will try to serve as an informational loyal-opposition group to the Supreme Council and the Government. We do not pretend to function as a government and are not calling for new elections. However, we feel obliged to criticize mistakes made by the Supreme Council and Government."

Aleksandras Bendinskas, also a member of the coalition council, said that we must unite moderate and rational organizations which can find a way out of the present situation. The journalists asked if the Forum on Lithuania's Future will be registered as a political party. Not just yet, was the answer. The people at the conference looked upon it as a mass movement. What is the future of the Forum? Conferences are planned in all the rayons; it is important to see what kind of ideas the people will come up with.

Coalition council member Mecislovas Saltenis was heartened by the excitement resulting from the Forum's conference. "Was it worth it," he asked, "to create such a storm among the 400 hundred people who gathered on 13 April? We are grateful to V. Landsbergis and A. Terleckas for providing such good publicity."

Marijonas Visakavicius gave his optimistic opinion about the Forum. He liked the fact that, at the conference, a priest sat next to a free-thinker; a LDDP [Lithuanian Democratic Labor Party] member sat next to a resistance participant. It is not important to the Forum who belongs or belonged to which party; its purpose is to unite all moderate organizations interested in the general welfare of Lithuania. Julius Veselka, in closing the press conference, repeated: "To fear nothing—this must be life's principle...."

At another press conference called on the same day by the new mayor of Vilnius, Arunas Staras, the journalists heard about principles and responsibility. They asked him how he rated the work of the former mayor. Even though the question was somewhat provocative, A. Staras answered in an objective and principled manner. As the mayor is to begin his program, his most important goals are to correct noted shortcomings, to improve government infrastructure and to divide operations between the Council and the Government. Will the new mayor need many advisers? Is a political adviser necessary? A. Staras explained very well that the Government must be depoliticized, but that as of the present, the Government's job descriptions are still stuck in a drawer. They must specify what duties are essential. The mayor himself is not contemplating lay-offs, not even one person. First of all, he must work for a while to become familiar with the situation. Then, if it does become necessary to fire anyone, his criteria for doing so will be based on labor productivity.

The journalists' questions were abstract; but on the other hand, could they have been any other kind? It's a beginning.... In response to one colleague's question asking if even a mathematician would not be afraid to

assume such duties, he mayor answered that he was afraid, but nevertheless he was sure of his capabilities.

Political Controversy Over Lithuania's Ignalina AES

91UN1432A Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 30 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA special correspondent K. Belyaninov: "Nuclear Island—For the First Time in World History a Nuclear Power Station Has Become a Political Weapon"]

[Text] Vilnius-Snieckus—Lithuania stopped about 40 meters from the platform. True, there was a transition of somewhat dingy woods, but beyond that came Snieckus where, except for the street names and free dissimilarity of houses, even a museum of local lore and history would find nothing Lithuanian.

One day scientists will probably try to delve into the oddities of our country's geography which has dozens of institutional cities and settlements strewn throughout. Where people live according to directives drawn up in the Ministry of Medium-Machinery Manufacture or Ministry of Defense. Where history begins the day a nuclear power station starts operating and ends the day "the facility is taken out of operation."

But all this relates more to the Snieckus of three years ago. Built next to the Ignalina Nuclear Power Station [AES], the only one in the Baltics, perhaps the town was not the living incarnation of a bright future, but at least it tried to meet expectations to the greatest possible extent. The pride of Soviet power energy—two modernized RBMK-1500 reactors—provided electrical power to Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, and Belorussia with Kaliningrad Oblast, and working at the Ignalina AES was considered advantageous and prestigious for any specialist.

Chernobyl brought to Lithuania, in addition to some "traces" of radiation, a distrust of atomic energy in general and of the Ignalina power station in particular. The station was branded with shame in republic newspapers. The "greens" conducted thousands of demonstrations, accusing the power energy specialists of conducting "ecological war against the Lithuanian people." And the republic leadership of that time, with enviable persistency, sent commissions of every possible variety to the nuclear power station. But these commissions consisted mainly of Central Committee personnel and preferred not to get involved in purely energy problems.

And who knows how this entire confrontation would have ended up had politics not interfered in primarily ecological disputes? Having regenerated the election campaign during one of its fateful stages, perestroika forced us to recall half-forgotten martial methods. The most effective among them—the search for an enemy. Although there was no special need in most republics to do so—the "center" was guilty of everything, having

shoved nuclear power stations, defense plants, and secret proving grounds on the republics. And there they were, the specific agents, destroying the environment just a two-hour drive from Vilnius.

And this was not even a specifically Lithuanian matter. The problem was not a Russian-Lithuanian one. It was the same all over. In the Ukraine and Belorussia disfigured by Chernobyl, in Latvia—with its pulp and paper combine, in Kazakhstan—with Baykonur, Semipalatinsk, and Saryozek. In short, there was simply no way the Ignalina AES could not become another political trump card.

"I believe a policy of discrimination was carried out with respect to the power station beginning in 1988. And it was an entirely conscious policy," station director Anatoliy Khromchenko categorically asserts. "Snieckus has always been a Russian-speaking settlement, and just a little over three percent of the 35,000 residents are Lithuanians. But Lithuania adopts a very strict Law on language and we are directed to transition completely to Lithuanian for the conduct of official business over the course of three years. Almost 400 people are required to pass an examination in order to continue working. We tried to show that it was illogical, and simply foolish, to exacerbate relations between the republic and the AES, which provides Lithuania with a third of its electrical energy. But they did not want to listen to us."

Today probably no one can say exactly when the issue of the power station became relegated to the sphere of pure politics. The "green movement" somehow came to naught inconspicuously after the victory of Sajudis in the elections and, following adoption of the Act on Independence of Lithuania, people were no longer mindful of ecological problems at all.

"All facilities situated on our territory are the property of Lithuania," Snieckus residents were told. But such explanations were not very settling to the nuclear power specialists themselves. They were offended. Try to explain to the Sajudis congress participants, for example, that the energy specialists who came to the republic 10-15 years ago had nothing to do with the deportation of Lithuanians or the Stalinist repressions, that it was not they who declared the blockade of Lithuania, not they who were telling Moscow how to conduct relations with the first independent republic in the USSR.

Snieckus, accustomed to living autonomously during the years of its existence, at first silently kept the grievances to itself. When restoration of independence is the topic of discussion, a ban on sending parcels outside the republic is a trifling matter, of course. But how were the Ignalina AES personnel to feel who had come to Lithuania from the Ukraine, from the Urals and Siberia, and who had left their friends and relatives there?

"We have tried to live normally," argues Pavel Kriger, deputy chairman of the Ignalina AES trade union committee. "But it is just not working! We live in Lithuania

and must obey Lithuanian law, but as a Union-subordinate enterprise, we work in accordance with Union laws. And they contradict each other in almost every other word. Have you ever tried to live two lives at the same time?!"

Registering the early political differences expressed in "kitchen discussions" by the state which was standing up on its own two feet, it was over purely economic reform that the station "cracked." At the beginning of January, the Lithuanian parliament adopted the retail price reform proposed by the Prunskiene government, and on the eighth a meeting of the power station's labor collective announced its ultimatum: The Lithuanian Government must resign, the Supreme Soviet must be dissolved. Otherwise, the station would "cease delivering electrical power to consumers in the territory of Lithuania," reserving for itself "the right to shut down the power units."

Probably for the first time in world history, a nuclear power station became a political weapon. On 11 January, a two-hour warning strike took place at the AES, and on 16 January—the line delivering electrical power to Lithuania was to be shut down.

On the night of the 12th to the 13th, tanks came into Vilnius...

Even today, almost half a year following these events, they are perceived differently. Some believe a strike was indeed necessary and that power station personnel to this day have no other way to express their demands. Others shrug their shoulders in bewilderment—"I had heard the power station intended to strike," states employee Sergey Martyshok. "But there were not very many people at the meetings in which resolutions were adopted—no more than 400 individuals."

The Lithuanian Government, for its part, is convinced that all the AES demands, without exception, were drawn up in the Central Committee building of the Lithuanian Communist Party, and that the threat of strike at the power station fit in perfectly with statements of the Lithuanian "National Salvation Committee." But the Ignalina AES director is prepared to dispute this with anyone, stating that the demands of the strike committee were only a loud statement—"Shutting down power units and even cutting off consumers in Lithuania would be a violation of all engineering production norms. And that even in such an instance, the republic would obtain energy through the country's Unified Energy System. Additionally, I do not know who would implement all these threats—all existing norms require as a minimum approval of the chief engineer or the director. And we announced right away that the administration did not support a strike."

Nonetheless, even an action which did not take place caused endless discussion about Ignalina in the ministerial corridors of Moscow and Vilnius. Threatening to become one of the main issues in future negotiations

between Lithuania and the Union is the question—who will manage the power station?

In the final analysis, the Law on Language and ban on parcels are just trivial. They are by no means the reason that almost 70 percent of the Snieckus inhabitants supported preservation of the USSR in the Union referendum and 85 percent did not approve of the policy of the Lithuanian parliament.

Closed to all and basically self-sufficient, the town is now probably feeling for the first time that perhaps it has no future. And economic calculations and arguments that, without the Union, Lithuania will be unable to operate the nuclear power station can hardly be considered the real cause of alarm to the power energy specialists.

"Who will need me in Russia if I am forced to leave here?" Pavel Kriger asks me. "Here I have work, my family, my home. For five years now Russia has built no new power stations. No one is waiting for us there."

I do not know how this dispute will be resolved. The Union Government, troubled more by rising prices, is not yet up to dealing with Snieckus.

"If Lithuania becomes truly independent, I will leave," the Ignalina AES director today forcefully asserts. "And a great many more will leave in addition to me. We are no less patriots than the Lithuanians."

But in the Lithuanian Power Energy Ministry they argue simply:

"The specialist issue can be completely resolved once their appropriate level of salary has been determined. No one mentions the prospect of having to shut down the power station. We are even in agreement with respect to completing construction of a third, 'moth balled' power unit, if the Ministry of Atomic Energy offers us an acceptable type of reactor, one which meets international safety standards."

"We want to maintain economic and power energy ties with the USSR. We are prepared to be subordinate to a Unified Regulatory Service, operate in the same scheduling framework with Soviet stations, and provide power energy lines for supplying Kaliningrad and Belorussia with electricity. But under one condition—that Lithuania bear the expenses for the nuclear power station's costs and development, while the USSR bears those for delivery and burial of fuel."

"If such an arrangement is not suitable to the Union, we are prepared to engage in any form of cooperation—the power station can become a joint enterprise, the concession of a foreign state in Lithuanian territory, etc. But as yet there is no real discussion—we want to talk about energy, and they talk to us about a strike. We are attempting to discuss entirely different things at the same time..."

Two weeks ago, the Lithuanian Power Energy Ministry received an official package from Moscow, from Union

Atomic Energy Minister V. Konovalov. It contained proposals on talks concerning the future Ignalina AES and an enumeration of solutions acceptable to the USSR. The Lithuanian Republic is presently preparing its response.

Whatever the case, one thing is clear—talks have begun. It is just that Snieckus residents have not yet been invited to them. And so the means they have of expressing their own demands remain as before one thing—strike. And who has counted up how many such "islands" we have spread across our country?

RSFSR

RSFSR Drafts Decisions on Status of Moscow

Presidium Decree

91UN1476A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 p 1

[Decree: "The Status and Structure of Administrative Agencies of the City of Moscow, the Capital of RSFSR"]

[Text] Recently our newspaper published the draft of the Law entitled "The Status of the Capital of USSR and RSFSR," which had been prepared by a commission formed in accordance with an Ukase of the country's president. The document was the fruit of a large amount of work in which specialists, scientific collectives, and various organizations had been involved. The draft reflected also the opinions of the public, as expressed in numerous letters and appeals. Obviously, the draft requires additional modification, taking into consideration those comments and recommendations that will be made in the course of the discussion.

Today we are publishing the decree of the Presidium of the RSFSR Supreme Soviet concerning the status and structure of the administrative agencies of the city of Moscow, the capital of RSFSR, and the Statute pertaining to the decree.

For purposes of defining the legal status of the city of Moscow, the capital of RSFSR, and improving the administration of the city, with a consideration of its functions as a capital, the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet decrees:

1. The confirmation of the Statute Governing the Status and Structure of the Administrative Agencies of the City of Moscow, the Capital of RSFSR.
2. RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Questions Pertaining to the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies and the Development of Self-Government; the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Questions of Interpublic Relations, Regional Policy, and Cooperation; and the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Legislation are to be entrusted with the job of developing, on the basis of the experience of applying the

indicated Statute, the draft of the RSFSR Law Governing the Status of the City of Moscow, the Capital of RSFSR (by 1 December 1991).

3. RSFSR Council of Ministers and the executive committee of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies are to resolve the question of differentiating between republic property and municipal property (by 1 September 1991).

4. RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Security is to make recommendations with regard to the procedure for appointing a chief of the Administration of Security for the city of Moscow and Moscow Oblast, with a consideration of coordinating his candidacy with the RSFSR government and with the Moscow City and Moscow Oblast soviets of people's deputies (by 1 July 1991).

5. RSFSR Ministry of Foreign Affairs is to make recommendations with regard to the procedure for opening up in the city of Moscow representations of foreign states, republics (including republics that are part of RSFSR), and international intergovernmental organizations in RSFSR (by 1 June 1991).

6. The coordination with the recommendation made by the Presidium of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies concerning the creation of the Moscow city (municipal) militia. RSFSR Ministry of Internal Affairs, jointly with the executive committee of Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies, is to prepare the draft of the Statute Governing the Moscow City Local Militia in conformity with RSFSR Law entitled "Militia" (by 1 June 1991).

7. Moscow City and Moscow Oblast soviets of people's deputies are to carry out on 12 June 1991 a survey of the population of the city of Moscow and of Moscow Oblast concerning the desirability of uniting the city and the oblast into a single capital okrug with a single registration system, and single system of supply and the providing of trade and personal services to the population.

8. RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Questions Pertaining to the Work of the Soviets of People's Deputies and the Development of Self-Government and RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Committee for Legislation are to develop the draft of the Statute Governing the Procedure for Electing the Mayor of the City of Moscow and to submit the draft to the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet (by 30 April 1991).

The date for conducting the election of the mayor of the city of Moscow is set at 12 June 1991.

R. I. Khasbulatov, first deputy chairman,
RSFSR Supreme Soviet.
Moscow, House of RSFSR Soviets.
19 April 1991.

Statute on Capital Status, Government Organs

91UN1476B Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 25 Apr 91 p 2

[Statute: "Statute Governing the Status and Structure of the Administrative Agencies of Moscow, the Capital of RSFSR"]

[Text] This Statute defines the foundations of the status of the city of Moscow as the capital of RSFSR; establishes the interrelationships between RSFSR and the city of Moscow in questions of providing the capital's functions; and defines the structure of the administration of the city of Moscow.

1. The city of Moscow is the capital of the Russian Federation, the location of the highest agencies of authority and administration in the RSFSR, and the representations of the republics (including the republics that are part of RSFSR), foreign states, and international intergovernmental organizations in RSFSR.

The interrelationships between RSFSR and the city of Moscow in questions of carrying out the capital's functions are constructed on the basis of RSFSR legislative and normative acts.

The interrelationships between union agencies, on the one hand, and the Russian Federation and the city of Moscow, on the other, in the process by which the city of Moscow carries out its functions as the capital of USSR are regulated by the Treaty of the Union of Sovereign Republics; the legislation based on that Treaty; and agreements between the appropriate agencies of USSR and RSFSR.

2. The city of Moscow, as capital of RSFSR, is responsible for:

- guaranteeing the conditions for functioning in the city of Moscow of the highest agencies of authority, administration, justice, the procuracy, and arbitration of RSFSR, the central republic agencies of administration, the representations of the republics (including republics that are part of RSFSR), foreign states, and international intergovernmental organizations in RSFSR, and the systems for serving them;

- the formation of the capital's urban environment;

- the execution of other functions as the capital.

3. RSFSR compensates the city of Moscow for the expenditures incurred in providing functions as the capital in the form of:

- subventions and earmarked payments to the city budget;

- payment for the land and for natural and labor resources;

- payment for the services of urban systems;

- compensation for ecological damages.

4. On the recommendation of the agencies of authority and administration of the city of Moscow, the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet defines:

- the conditions for transferral by the city of Moscow of plots of land, buildings, structures, and accommodations for housing and nonhousing purposes, on a rental basis to the agencies and organizations indicated in Paragraph 2 of this Statute;
- the size and procedure for making payment for land and for natural and labor resources, as well as the conditions for paying compensation for ecological damages;
- the size of the earmarked payments to the city budget;
- the programs and plans linked with providing the functions of the capital, and the procedure for financing them and providing them with material support;
- other conditions for the interaction between RSFSR and the city of Moscow in questions of supporting the capital's functions;
- mutual responsibility and the procedure for resolving disputes.

5. The highest representative agency of state authority in the city of Moscow is the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies.

The following lie within the exclusive competency of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies:

- the approval of the long-range trends and the General Plan for the development of Moscow;
- the approval of the budget for the city of Moscow and the monitoring of its execution;
- the establishment of local taxes, assessments, and payments;
- the definition of the price policy in the branches and spheres of management that are within the jurisdiction of the city;
- the definition of the principles for the sale, rental, and purchase of municipal property in conformity with RSFSR legislation.

6. The head of the executive authority of the city of Moscow is the mayor of the city. The population of the city of Moscow elects the city mayor for five-year term by direct secret voting. The mayor can be recalled prior to the expiration of his term of office. Prior to the enactment of the appropriate RSFSR legislative acts, the procedure for electing and recalling the mayor of the city of Moscow is defined by the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet.

7. The mayor of the city of Moscow:

- guarantees the execution of the RSFSR laws and other acts, the laws and other acts of USSR, ukases and other acts of USSR President that are enacted within the limits of the powers transferred by the Russian Federation to USSR, and also the decisions of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies;
- enacts orders that are mandatory for all city and rayon (municipal) agencies of administration, public self-government agencies, and citizens, enterprises, and organizations on the territory of the city of Moscow;
- carries out the guidance of the socioeconomic development of the city of Moscow;
- guarantees the fulfillment by the city of Moscow of its functions as capital;
- submits to the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies for approval the drafts of the budget, the long-range trends, and the General Plan for the development of the city of Moscow;
- appoints and removes the managers of the city agencies of administration;
- represents the city of Moscow at the RSFSR Council of Ministers;
- acts as the official representative of Moscow in the country and abroad;
- submits to the Presidium of RSFSR Supreme Soviet recommendations for changing the administrative-territorial division of the city of Moscow, and for establishing and differentiating between the competency and functions of the agencies of authority and administration in the city of Moscow;
- guarantees the protection of public order and gives authorizations for the holding of rallies, street marches, and demonstrations.

8. The decisions of the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies can be returned, within the period of two weeks from the day of their enactment, by the mayor of the city of Moscow to the soviet for reconsideration. If, during the reconsideration, the Moscow City Soviet of People's Deputies confirms its decision, it goes into legal effect.

9. This Statute is in effect until the enactment of RSFSR legislative acts pertaining to the city of Moscow.

'Moscow Workers Center' Activities Assailed

91UN1464A Moscow *RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA*
in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by Aleksandr Krotkov: "At the Map of the Workers Movement: Dollars for the Dictatorship of the Proletariat?"]

[Text] *Many readers of RABOCHAYA TRIBUNA cannot stop thinking about the following question: Why are miners so intransigent?.. After all, the reasoning goes, they cannot*

but understand that their political demands are unrealistic and, therefore, monstrous damage inflicted on the national economy of the country, on all of us, citizens of the USSR, including the miners themselves, may be the only result of the strike?

Vera Nikolayeva from Stavropol wrote to us: "Even when Spetsnaz [Special Forces] personnel mount an operation to rescue hostages, they strive to recapture them from the bandits without harming the innocent people. In the course of their fierce battles with the leaders of the great power, coal miners run the risk of ending up with 'the cold corpse' of the economy of our entire country on their hands which will have expired of wounds inflicted on it to a significant degree by the strike itself. Besides, the miners are not fighting it out with some criminals who have flouted the law, but with the parliament and the government elected in a constitutional manner. Do they really fail to understand just how unethical their position is?"

Esteemed Vera Sergeyevna, I have also asked strike committee members about this on many occasions. As a rule, their answers boil down to this thought: It is no longer possible to deal with Gorbachev and Pavlov any other way anymore; war is war...

Why such "war" logic all of a sudden?

Sabotage Instructions

About a month and a half ago, at the very beginning of the coal miners' strike, I met with a group of young people who fancy themselves ideologists of the workers' movement and have come up with philosophical substantiation for the ethical apology of hard-heartedness.

...Andrey Isayev, a 26-year-old history teacher at School No. 734 in the capital city and a member of the Party of Anarcho-Syndicalists, misspoke when he introduced himself as one of the leaders of the Moscow Center "for creating—oh, pardon me—studying the workers' movement." As I understood later, this slip of the tongue was not random at all. The main function of the associates of the center boils down to publishing a weekly news bulletin on the workers' movement and its free distribution (very unexpected generosity...) to the workers' councils, clubs, and strike committees—to 250 addresses throughout the country. In the future, they are planning to create a workers' university at the center, in which strike committee leaders will be trained... To do what?

Let me cite an excerpt from one of the bulletins (1991, No. 38, pages 7-9) which is headlined as follows:

'What Is an Honest Person To Do Under a Military Dictatorship'

Three types of behavior may be opted for, depending on how resolute you are.

The first type: NON-COOPERATION. ...You should not take part in endeavors organized by the new authorities. Do not attend official meetings; do not vote in the

pseudoelections and pseudoreferendums organized by them; do not subscribe to official newspapers; do not give testimony claiming to have poor memory...

If it is not enough for you as an honest person to simply fail to cooperate with the dictatorship, and you would like to accelerate its fall at least a little bit, you may opt for the second path: SABOTAGE. Confuse technical and financial documentation; sabotage equipment designed to be used in the interests of the authorities; delay the fulfillment of government orders in production as much as possible; do not miss any opportunity to harm the dictatorship to some degree, no matter how small or nonsensical these actions appear to you...

Such actions do not pose a serious danger to you. Unfortunately, this cannot be said about the third, most effective form of behavior: PARTICIPATION IN AN ORGANIZED RESISTANCE MOVEMENT. Try to set up a social self-defense group where you work or live; establish contacts with a social self-defense organization in the capital, or the oblast seat, which has contacts with the foreign mass media; organize what protest actions by the populace against the tyranny of the central and local authorities you can, signature collections, and rallies and strikes when possible; propagate the concept of a general political strike as an effective means for toppling anti-people forms of government.

Since such activities entail certain risks, it is good if several "echelons" of leadership exist in your group (organization), and if a "second generation" ready to perform the functions of those "who have left the field" is prepared in advance.

Such are the, so to speak, rules of the "game." However, this "innocent" admonition was packaged as an excerpt from an unfinished science-fiction novel. Supposedly, the authors are joking and entertaining themselves. However, in a conversation with me they admitted that they specified the genre of their "work" only to divert attention—so that an article could not be "pinned" on them... Besides, Andrey Isayev gave similar advice, but this time without science-fiction references, in one of his regular presentations on the Voice of America.

Portraying the unknown schoolteacher as the main culprit in all strike misfortunes is the last thing on my mind. At present, figures with a lot more stature are giving considerably more frank recommendations to the workers leaders. However, unbeknownst to him, Isayev gave me the key to an answer to the question concerning hard-heartedness. He said:

"Indeed, sabotage as a method of struggle is not particularly ethical. However, we proceeded from the fact that if the government indeed decides to establish a military dictatorship, it will thus declare war on its own people. In this case, ethical notions will shift."

Do you see how simple it is? Does this reasoning remind you of the words of some young hoodlum who explains the "black eye" of his adversary by the fact that the latter

"started it all...?" Such infantilism is dangerous because a hoodlum affected by "prewar hysteria" may mistake the most innocent gesture of his opponent for the beginning of "aggression."

Incidentally, the newspaper KURANTY, and not only this newspaper, announced the emergence of a dictatorship in the country to its readers as early as last fall. Passions, because of the hypothetical readiness of the center to deal with the democrats, have been recently inflamed with such unity that one is left wondering why the miners did not press "the red button" to launch the strike before the new year. After all, they have tried for a long time to persuade the miners that the use of this destructive weapon is ethical.

Crafty Guides

They might object to me saying: Stop portraying workers as blind kittens who are manipulated by "elements alien to them" whichever way the latter like. They will say that the workers' movement stands shoulder to shoulder with the radicals.

Let me assure you: I do not consider anyone blind. As far as standing shoulder to shoulder is concerned, let us return to the Moscow Center for the Study of the Workers' Movement. Andrey Isayev, who is already known to the reader and who, I believe, can hardly be suspected of being in sympathy with the official union structures, is convinced:

"The workers movement and the democrats are not headed in the same direction. After all, the latter are, in essence, the heralds of the nascent Russian bourgeoisie whose interests on many points are directly opposed to the interests of the proletariat. If someone hopes that we will settle labor disputes in an amicable manner only, he is profoundly mistaken. It will be much more in character for tomorrow's capitalists—the present-day 'shadow-economy operators'—to hire a goon squad in order to pacify trade union leaders, rather than sit down with them at a negotiating table. As far as the underpinnings are concerned with regard to the Russian leaders wooing the miners, they are simple: The segment of the nomenklatura which has expeditiously left the Communist Party is now trying to convert its power into property by luring the coal miners under the wing of the republic through generous promises. We, the Anarcho-Syndicalists, advocate the complete independence of the workers' movement, including from Democratic Russia whose slogans the strikers are now repeating."

I would take the last words of Isayev with a grain of salt because the associates of the Moscow Workers' Center have their own interests in the entire game involving the strike committees. Let us recall the adage: He who pays the piper calls the tune. So, the aforementioned center was set up a year ago by the association Social Program and was financed with charitable contributions made by cooperative members, i.e., entrepreneurs, interested in having the workers' movement "in their pocket" from its very inception. These are not idle fantasies. Literally

days ago, the USSR Union of Cooperative Members stated its intention to transfer 10 million rubles to the account of the Independent Miners Union of the USSR.

Not only our homegrown, but also foreign businessmen are in a hurry to beat a path toward the workers' movement. The Fund of Cultural Initiatives of Szoros [name as transliterated] (an American billionaire of Hungarian descent supporting "cultural endeavors" in the countries of Eastern Europe), also appears among the organizations financing the Moscow Workers Center. As a matter of fact, all office equipment which the center operates (a computer, a fax machine, a xerox, and a phone answering machine) belong to the Szoros Foundation.

The associates of the center themselves told me this with smiles of embarrassment. Their embarrassment became even greater when one of them said that the Voice of America does not pay them anything for their weekly presentations on the air, whereas another one "blurted out" that there has been payment after all.

As far as I am concerned, I do not consider such payments bad or, worse yet, criminal. When somebody does not get paid for his work this means exploitation. If we take into account the fact that three out of five associates of the center are indigent students from the department of history, it would be altogether immoral to fleece them. However, if these very students, sort of as a sign of gratitude to their foreign employers, persistently advise that "self-defense committees" establish "contacts with the foreign mass media" then, pardon me, what has this got to do with fighting for the independence of the workers' movement?

Nor do I have anything against people studying the workers' movement who have never been to a shop or to a mine drift. As they say, may God help them, because this is a much-needed endeavor. However, here I am opening yet another bulletin of theirs and reading:

"...Ideally we would succeed...in ensuring, through a general (or adequately massive) political strike, the resignation of the dictatorial regime, breaking the back of the dictatorship, and ensuring the development of our society along the path of a people's democracy. The chances are not good. Let us say frankly that the nomenklatura is superior to the workers movement many-fold, as far as organization is concerned. This is why for the workers an honorable defeat is a more realistic outcome of the struggle."

The candor of this statement is precious! This is to say nothing about the fact that so far no dictatorial regime has been observed in the country, whereas an all-Russian political strike has been called for today by the Federation of Independent Trade Unions of Russia and Democratic Russia. However, I am outraged by the kamikaze role which students with incomplete educations are foisting on the strike committees and workers' committees. The struggle of the hegemonic force, they say, is doomed to defeat anyway, so to heck with it, let it die

advocating the alien interests of the bourgeoisie and the entrepreneurs. This has been its destiny because "the workers' movement got on its feet within the framework of a unified democratic movement, and a neutral position of its leaders would smack of betrayal." The cynicism is astounding!

* * *

There is no denying that the most powerful wave of the workers' movement which is sweeping our country this spring has been brought to life by the obvious economic and political miscalculations of the union leadership. The anger and intolerance of many people are attributable primarily to the falling standard of living in the country rather than just the instigation by the ideologists of political sabotage. It is, at the very least, dumb to reduce everything to the "designs of destructive forces." However, it is also dangerous to belittle the role of numerous parties and "workers' centers" which are trying to take the workers' movement for a ride. It is dangerous first of all for the worker activists themselves, who are yet to find their own sociopolitical niche in the whirlwind of our difficult daily round.

Day of Solidarity With Miners Planned for 28 Apr

*LD2704224991 Moscow All-Union Radio in Russian
2130 GMT 27 Apr 91*

[Text] The Moscow association of electors of the Democratic Russia movement, with the support of the Moscow City Executive Committee, instead of a communist subbotnik, is holding a day of solidarity with the striking miners on 28 April. For the first time, an agreement has been concluded with the executive committee of Moscow City Soviet on specific work which will be paid for. All the money thus raised will go to aid the miners on strike.

Western Republics

Organizing Group Hopes To Unite Chernobyl Aid Efforts

*91UN1480A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 3*

[Statement by the Public Organizing Committee of Chernobyl Organizations: "The Chernobyl Organizations: A First Step Toward Unification"]

[Text] Having set exceptionally complex and global tasks affecting virtually all spheres of life and many of the fields of science and production, the Chernobyl catastrophe has moved beyond the framework of an ordinary accident and acquired the nature of an international disaster. Convinced that finding a solution to the problem exclusively at government level is not producing the required result, the public in the republic has decided to take the initiative itself. Throughout all of Belorussia foundations, unions, committees, and other

public organizations have been set up to provide aid for those who have suffered as a result of the catastrophe. Many of them have been in existence for several years and have built up a significant production and material base and have to their account quite a number of useful actions that deserve respect. Nevertheless, this has done little to change the picture.

All of this is happening because organizations and associations with the same sacred goal of saving people are operating in isolation and are often unable to elevate themselves above personal ambitions and weaknesses. As a result, they sometimes undertake things from different sides instead of uniting their efforts after deciding on priorities. Preservation of this situation is not only intolerable but also criminal. This is why on the eve of the fifth anniversary of the accident at the Chernobyl nuclear power station, at the initiative of the Belorussiya Foundation for International Cooperation for Social Protection, the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet commission, the Belorussian SSR Academy of Sciences, and representatives of Orthodox and Catholic churches, a public organizing committee has been formed that includes more than 50 state, public, and religious organizations. The purpose in creating the public organizing committee is the need to coordinate the activity of all organizations engaged in matters relating to Chernobyl, determine their priority, and devise ways to solve the problem of the cleanup following the catastrophe.

All resources used to implement measures associated with the Chernobyl catastrophe will be paid into account No. 700404 at the Belarus commercial bank in Minsk, account No. 812161000 in the State Bank office in Minsk City, account No. 400417 at the Minsk Financial Department, and account No. 933430696 in the Belorussian SSR joint stock commercial bank for foreign economic activity, with control over spending exercised by a board of trustees made up of members of the Public Organizing Committee, or a coordinating council. Giving due consideration to the fact that an amount equal in size to about 10 of Belorussia's annual budgets will be needed for the cleanup following the catastrophe, the Public Organizing Committee is paying a great deal of attention to the question of attracting resources from foreign companies.

In addition to the statements and measures carried out independently by organizations that are members of the organizing committee, it is planned to hold a Chernobyl week and conduct a roundtable on 27 April. The deputy chairman of the Belorussian SSR Supreme Soviet Standing Commission on Cleanup Problems Following the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station Catastrophe, A. Obukhov, the metropolitan of Minsk and Grodnyy and exarch of Belorussia, Filaret, the head of the Roman Catholic Church in Belorussia Archbishop T. Kondrusevich, Pilot-Cosmonaut of the USSR P. Klimuk, and others will take part in its work. The organizing committee invites representatives of state, public, and religious organizations to take part in the roundtable. We are also inviting business cooperation from all who could

become potential and actual producers of output or services or provide material-technical resources to help solve the problems arising as a result of the Chernobyl catastrophe.

The Public Organizing Committee of Chernobyl Organizations

Moldova Youths Attempted to Capture Parliament

LD2405155391 Moscow TASS International Service
in Russian 1100 GMT 24 May 91

[By TASS correspondent Fedor Angeli]

[Text] Kishinev, 24 May—(TASS)—The outbursts of violence which took place during 21-22 May in the capital of Moldova, shocked the whole republic. Crowds of young people, shouting various political slogans, provoked clashes with the police forces protecting the parliament building. Over 30 policemen were injured as a result of the clash. None of the attackers required medical attention.

Ion Koshtash, minister of internal affairs of the Republic of Moldova, told a tass correspondent that the main aim of the attackers was to capture the parliament, to disrupt its work. If they had succeeded in doing so, the consequences would have been unpredictable. This was averted by measures that were undertaken, including the use of truncheons. About 15 people—the most extremist-minded citizens—were detained. An investigation is underway.

Minister Ion Koshtash considers that there are many reasons behind these events. One, according to him, he sees as street meeting between some deputies and the people. When some particular forces in parliament fail to get their ideas or views passed by conventional means, they resort, in violation of the law, to support in the street. To put it in other words, some of those that have been elected by the people are trying to put pressure on the parliament and on the president.

Yukhnovskyy Comments on Educational Reform, Ukrainian Sovereignty

91UN1440A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA
in Russian 30 Mar 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Igor Yukhnovskyy, Ukrainian SSR people's deputy, chairman of the commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet for questions of education and science, chairman of the People's Council, by Olga Unguryan, head of the KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA department of pupils and student youth: "Igor Yukhnovskyy: 'Time Tells the Truth'"]

[Text] From the KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA dossier

Igor Rafailovich Yukhnovskyy was born in 1925. He participated in the Great Patriotic War. He is a doctor of

physical-mathematical sciences, professor, and academician of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences. He is the director of the Lvov Institute of Physics of Condenser Systems, chairman of the Western Scientific Center of the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, and the author of 350 scientific articles and four monographs. He has his own scientific school in static physics.

He is a Ukrainian SSR people's deputy and chairman of the commission of the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet on questions of education and science. In December 1990 he withdrew from the CPSU.

We have the ideal of the moral person but we have no ideal of the decent person. This statement of the half-forgotten man of letters of the last century, alas, is not becoming outdated. All we have is the maximum: either Professor Vyshinskiy or Academician Vavilov or the "renegade" Solzhenitsyn, or the Lenin prize winner in the area of literature, Brezhnev. God, what a sad black-and-white contrast we have in our history! If there is a genius he is not recognized during his life, if there is a villain—he is unmasked after his death...

Against this background one cannot immediately see efficient and decent people. But...are they not the ones who make our nation strong?

[Unguryan] Igor Rafailovich, you have probably noticed that we are mistrustful of and hostile to people who are "too intelligent," who "want to show off their education." Why is this?

[Yukhnovskyy] You know, when I was intensively involved in science, that is, in solving complicated problems, if I was unable to solve a problem, I had to go into it very deeply and marshal all my energy in order to find a solution. I have solved three or four complicated problems in my life—and then other people have developed what I discovered and defended candidate and doctoral dissertations... When I was looking for a solution I became somewhat eccentric and absolutely defenseless with respect to my environment. And at that time I had no moments of self-protection—when I knew how to behave in one situation or another. I could speak inappropriately and be absent-minded (even my family did not take it very well at such moments). But...the solution would be found and I would become a "normal" person again. Talented people (in this case I have in mind not myself but others) are always concentrating on solving some original problem—be it in music or medicine or in some other area. They never have the energy to keep themselves "in check." And it is very important for society to develop a tolerance for people who are "too intelligent" or talented. For sometimes they expend their energy not on developing their talent but on self-protection.

[Unguryan] Somehow this kind of tolerance is not being felt yet... And in general, Igor Rafailovich, a professor and an academician is a rare phenomenon in our parliaments. How did it happen that you went from science into politics?

[Yukhnovskyy] I have studied a very specific science, statistical physics—it has to do with systems of many particles, the principles of balance, and the processes occurring in these systems. Our society is also essentially a multi-particle, multi-object system. And certain laws from physics may be applied here. I happened to guess what was going on in society, I frequently spoke to people about this, and they listened to me. And when perestroika and democratization began I had no other choice: People believed me, they started to put me forward and...it was simply awkward to refuse. Although now, of course, I would have a better life and would earn more in the position of director of the Institute of Theoretical Physics, and so forth... But, you see, you cannot walk away from something that has been entrusted to you—these are the most important categories.

[Unguryan] I have heard that you had the reputation of a dissident in the institute.

[Yukhnovskyy] That is an exaggeration. I simply always had my own opinion. I spoke what I considered to be the truth. Some agreed with me and some did not, but I tried to express what I thought. Sometimes my ideas were not in keeping with the official "directives." And nonetheless it seems to me that I was tolerated. I recall a meeting in the physics department with the writer Roman Ivanchuk regarding his novel "Children." It was attended by some people from the outside who gave speeches that were illegal at the time. There was some unpleasantness and we were severely reprimanded. But I still defended both the book and the author because I thought "Children" was an excellent work. When such difficult situations would occur I would bury myself deeper in science. And business communications and trips to conferences would help me start feeling good about people again. Having done my professional work, I thought I had the right to say what I thought. In general it seems to me that the person who has done something for society and is a professional should be the one to participate in social work.

[Unguryan] We are especially short of professionals now...

[Yukhnovskyy] There is always a shortage of them. I do not know of a society that has an abundance of competent people. For complete analogies are impossible in history. And therefore with each new turn there is a shortage of professionals. It is just that it always seems to me that people should tell the truth and act according to the truth. Perhaps this is banal but nonetheless it is true. The time has come for truthful actions. We must be aware of the system taking form in our country and ways out of the crisis. Very many people wish to return to the past. That is absolutely absurd! It is impossible. But how to do things in a new way is also unclear. So what we are lacking in the Ukraine today is not so much professionalism as executive discipline. Situations now arise in which democrats seem to be taking the upper hand. Democrats consider themselves to be free people. But

freedom in a democratic society means deliberate and voluntary subordination of the lower level of management to the higher one. So we frequently confuse this lack of executive discipline with a shortage of professionalism.

[Unguryan] In the Ukrainian Supreme Soviet you are in charge of one of the most difficult and thankless areas of its work. Is there any hope that our long-suffering education will finally get off the ground?

[Yukhnovskyy] I am definitely confident that the Ukraine too will be built as an independent state, and this state will have the proper education. I am not alone on the commission—many efficient people are working on it, and I think that after a certain amount of time we will be able to start moving on the problem of education. Both elementary and higher. Especially higher. Especially—engineering. We must increase the length of time spent on education. The Soviet Union is one of the least educated countries in the world. We spend less time on education than many other countries do. This is a serious problem! The period of education in the secondary school should be extended to 12 years as it is in the West. Higher education should be increased from four to seven years. After four years one should receive a baccalaureate and general semi-professional higher education. And after that should come the thorough training of a specialist. Education should be paid for. And there should be a weeding out process... When I was studying at the institute, dropping out was regarded as a normal phenomenon. There were 80 of us who entered and 42 finished. That is, almost half were "lost" on the path to the diploma.

[Unguryan] Igor Rafailovich, you came to the VUZ [higher educational institution] after demobilization, did you not?

[Yukhnovskyy] Yes, we were a special group—former frontline soldiers... I participated in combat for the first time when Lvov was attacked on the First Ukrainian Front. I fired my weapon and saw how people fell, how prisoners were taken... That is, this was a real, terrible battle. Well, after that we fought our way to Breslau.

[Unguryan] What was your rank?

[Yukhnovskyy] I was a soldier. An enlisted man.

[Unguryan] That was probably hard on you.

[Yukhnovskyy] You know, this might sound strange—nowadays it is somehow acceptable to complain about life, but it was never hard on me. Even at the front. Perhaps because I had good comrades beside me... And I cannot call my childhood difficult. It was happy. Although the times, of course, were difficult.

[Unguryan] They say that childhood offenses are remembered for life. But childhood joys are probably not forgotten either.

[Yukhnovskyy] Yes, that is true... I was devout as a child. The fact is that my grandfather was a clergyman and lived alone, and my mother left me with him until I was six years old. He not only served in the church but also gave medical treatment to people in the villages.

[Unguryan] With herbs?

[Yukhnovskyy] No, no; everything was scientific. He had modern (for those times) medical instruments. He even had a Ruhmkorff coil for some things... My grandfather also worked in agronomy. All this was very interesting. I think I gained something from my grandfather... But in addition to this, my brother and I spent some of our childhood in Volyn. Imagine the Volyn meadows, and those tiny winding streams in which the water was above the grass—oh, how clean that grass was, God! And on the grass there were strips of linen which the women were drying in the spring air!... I remember all this...

[Unguryan] And do your children have any memories?

[Yukhnovskyy] When Natasha and Pavel were small my wife and I spent time with them walking through the forests. The children loved to spend time out in nature... True, we might have had a difficult life in the sense that we did not have our own apartment. It took a long time for us to find an apartment. My daughter was already an adolescent and I was in charge of the department when we finally received a one-room apartment. So it was not so easy for me and my wife. But it never seemed to me that we were leading an impoverished, unhappy life. Although now when I look at old photographs and see the clothing my children were wearing I am surprised: By present standards they were quite poor. But at that time it seemed to me that we were living normally...

[Unguryan] You know, Igor Rafailovich, when I look at the photographs in the albums at home I too am surprised: What happy faces there were in snapshots taken 20-30 years ago! You do not see faces like that any more. It seems to me that in general people have forgotten how to smile.

[Yukhnovskyy] That is natural. The system is now collapsing. At that time it was closed and in a closed system people somehow become narrowly adapted and they find their place up to a certain point. The idea of a "bright future" also buoyed them up. When Khrushchev came along the people were able to breathe a little more easily. That was a certain measure of happiness. A kind of renaissance. I was an elementary school teacher and a graduate student during the Khrushchev times. We had a happy group of friendly and extremely motivated young people.

[Unguryan] And how were your studies?

[Yukhnovskyy] It seems that I did fairly well. I graduated from Lvov University with distinction. I entered graduate school. I wrote and defended my candidate dissertation a year ahead of schedule. I was released from the Army in 1921 and by 1933 I was in charge of the

theoretical physics department. Then I defended my doctoral dissertation... All the time I was busy with calculations. I had fairly good results. Professionalism gave me a sense of protection.

[Unguryan] You have dealt with many students, including hungry ones. What distinguishes today's students from former ones?

[Yukhnovskyy] I must tell you that now, as 30 or 40 years ago, the number of talented, capable, working students is not decreasing. It simply happens that one course is strong and another is weaker. Well, of course, there are also failures, who know nothing. We also had people like this when I was a student, and, imagine, some of them were "strung along" to the fifth grade, although I am deeply convinced that they did not know a thing. But life is complicated; it is not formed from knowledge alone. These people "got by" better in life.

[Unguryan] But still, is there really no difference between the generations of students?

[Yukhnovskyy] Today's students have much less fear. But they should have less fear. They are no longer frightened by the forces that make people two-faced: to say one thing and to think something else; to be one thing at home and something else at work. That was a strange time!... Our present generation need not be two-faced and can be whole. Herein lies its advantage. It is immense happiness to be whole. But from the management and economic standpoint we have complete chaos, and here it is appropriate to speak of the tragedy of the present generation.

[Unguryan] Was it difficult for you to shed the ideological dogmas that prevailed over your generation?

[Yukhnovskyy] I was always weak in questions of Marxism-Leninism. It was difficult for me to find the essence and logic in them. But I had to take exams and I did. But this did not affect my awareness or my life. Therefore it was not difficult to "shed" this... I withdrew from the Communist Party recently. This was a fairly serious and decisive step for me... Frankly, I was not serious about ideological things even before. They were not the main things in my professional activity.

[Unguryan] No matter how you try, you cannot get away from ideology and politics these days. Igor Rafailovich, what do you think of the referendum that was just conducted?

[Yukhnovskyy] The referendum was a ruse intended to take people's minds off the problems Gorbachev cannot handle. I have a positive feeling toward Yeltsin. But I have a negative attitude toward Gorbachev. In my view, the present Gorbachev is not real, he is "forced"... I am deeply convinced that the Union will inevitably fall apart into independent states. Russia itself does not need the empire. Russia is self-determining as a sovereign state. Yeltsin still has many concerns about the autonomous republics. I saw who drew up the Union Treaty

from Russia—they were enemies of Yeltsin and representatives of the autonomous entities who are afraid of Russia's independence.

[Unguryan] Why?

[Yukhnovskyy] I will not presume to judge others. But in the Ukraine, in my view, the main reason for the lack of desire for sovereignty is laziness.

[Unguryan] Laziness!?

[Yukhnovskyy] Yes, after all, it is much easier to sign the Union Treaty than to work for sovereignty. What is independence? It is the maturity of the state, right to the point of self-government. And in order to achieve this it is necessary for the state to have an efficient, professional administrative apparatus. But far from everyone wants to work hard! Nonetheless we have no other way out except sovereignty. The Ukraine deserves it, as the strongest and most developed of all the republics, including the RSFSR.

[Unguryan] Do you not believe that the road to sovereignty is covered with blood?

[Yukhnovskyy] The path to freedom has always passed through sacrifices... But I think that we all have enough awareness and common sense to find a bloodless variant.

[Unguryan] In certain of the mass media, the Western Ukraine, mainly the Lvov area, can almost officially be called a "hot spot."

[Yukhnovskyy] This is a provocation. People from Lvov and Galicia are wise and organized people and are very aware of the problem of relations among nations.

[Unguryan] But still, Igor Rafailovich, I am probably not the only one to experience fear in these times. I am terrified about the children...

[Yukhnovskyy] Do not be afraid!

[Unguryan] They say that there was another commandment in the Bible in addition to the usual ten: "Thou shalt not fear!" But we are in no mood for lofty literary parallels now. And we have no time for books. Do you, Igor Rafailovich, ever find time to read?

[Yukhnovskyy] Only one book—the Bible. Now, for example, I have devoted attention to the organized and courageous way the people of Israel achieved freedom and a place on earth.

[Unguryan] One recalls from the Bible that Moses spent 40 years leading his people through the desert before he freed them from bondage. Do we still have long to wait for our Ukrainian Moses?

[Yukhnovskyy] Well, in the first place we have no desert to unite us and make us organize ourselves. And in the second place... As I have already said, absolute analogies are impossible in history. The roads people take are not

repeated. The Ukraine has its own path. And it is leading to a real national renaissance of its people.

[Unguryan] P.S. Perhaps I was in too much of a hurry with conclusions about our lack of an ideal of the decent person. According to the results of an unofficial poll conducted by KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA (more than 1,000 respondents, including readers living outside the Ukraine), Igor Rafailovich Yukhnovskyy was among the "five" most popular men in the Ukraine.

FROM I.R. Yukhnovskyy'S SPEECHES

Science is the brain of the republic. In the convulsions of a dying organism the brain is the last to die. If it dies, the country will never recover. And therefore, regardless of how difficult our position may be, we must protect science and education... In the Ukraine today we spend two-tenths of a percent of the gross national income on education, in the FRG, France, and Japan it is two to four percent of the gross national product and not the gross national income, that is, 100 times more.

...We have catastrophic pollution not only of the environment but also of the human mind. And people are seeking rescue. This is impossible under the old banners and slogans, with the old system. And therefore do not be surprised if people look for their own historical banner and do not stand in their way. We must build a sovereign Ukrainian republic. During all the history of our people not a single people's parliament has been faced with such a large task.

I think the nation and nature are two interconnected factors. When nature is destroyed, the nation disappears. When the nation is being destroyed, the nature typical of this land disappears.

It is no longer important whether a person belongs to the party or not. One thing is primary: All of us, regardless of whether or not we belong to the party, must concentrate on one major task—building a sovereign Ukrainian power.

...The sovereignty of the republic means maximum sovereignty of individual branches of the republic's economy. The miners must solve their own problems. The whole problem of the mining branch, which is the property of the Union, is that the extremely small deductions for modernization have led to an excessively difficult situation and the production cost of coal is very high—and coal is becoming less profitable. The miners themselves must decide how to get out of this situation.

At any price we must send our engineers abroad for on-the-job training. Somehow they must become

familiar with European labor organization and European equipment. This is the only way we will be able to have technical progress. I assert with complete certainty that in terms of theoretical developments in mathematics, physics, electronics, chemistry, and biology, the Ukraine occupies one of the leading positions in the Union. The introduction of scientific developments into production is another matter. Here there must be an intermediate level—with engineering sufficient to understand the final formula of fundamental science and skilled enough to translate it into the corresponding graphics. And everything depends on raising the scientific level of engineering significantly and immediately...

* * *

Political sovereignty is embodied through economic sovereignty... The main shortcoming of the economic situation is the complete lack of information about the republic's economic position and potential with respect to the outside economic world. A basic law—the law of value—has been violated. The existence of practically free national property and capricious price setting have led to informational chaos. The so-called state and market prices have led to a catastrophic growth of speculation within the country and mass shipment of products abroad. The only way out of this situation is a free market.

Belorussian KGB Officials Discuss Aspects of Intelligence Work

91UF0703A Minsk SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA
in Russian 27 Mar 91 p 4

[Report on a "roundtable" discussion held in Minsk with the Belorussian SSR KGB, by SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA correspondent A. Lemeshenok under the rubric: "For the First Time"; date not given: "Why Does Belorussia Need Intelligence Officers? An Unusual 'Roundtable' in One of the Quiet Offices of the Republic KGB"]

[Text] It is truly an out-of-the-ordinary undertaking. I have had more than one opportunity to visit the Belorussian SSR KGB. But never this building. I was told as much: "You are the first journalist to walk into the office of the head of Belorussian intelligence."

This is where we decided to conduct our discussion, which was set up with the help of P.I. Geydich, head of public relations.

In addition to the head of intelligence, one of his deputies and the unit's leading specialist took part in the conversation.

You understand, esteemed readers, that we cannot mention the names of employees of this special unit. I suggest this. We will call the participants in the meeting on the side of the office owner by generic names: the head of intelligence, the deputy, and the intelligence officer.

So...

[Lemeshenok] By now, the curtain over many aspects of the KGB activities have been lifted. People especially welcome the chekists' participation in combating organized crime. Information related to this activity once in a while appears in the press and is impressive.

Many people do not suspect at all, however, the existence of an intelligence unit. The common belief is that it is the function of the center. However, here we are... Please, tell us about it in as much detail as you can.

[Head of Intelligence] This service has existed in various states for centuries. The direction of its work is clear. It is also understandable why such activities are surrounded by secrecy and mystery. Let us not delve into history. Rather, take our time. Even the greatest politician, be he an intellectual giant, cannot conduct negotiations and make correct decisions unless he has reasonably reliable information about some region or another, its specificities, and the current situation. It is naive to suppose otherwise. Such information can only come from intelligence. By various means, both open and special.

Here is a convincing example. The Americans have successfully brought the war in the Persian Gulf to an end. They won. Nevertheless, the decision was made to review the work of intelligence. Why had aviation been

put in the position of bombing Husayn's "balloon" tanks and other camouflage targets? It appears that certain organizational conclusions will be reached, and some people will be reprimanded...

[Deputy] The national KGB intelligence service has its own structure—as do other units. Many aspects here are interrelated and interdependent with other chekist services.

[Lemeshenok] I understand. For instance, we do not directly call Manevich—who is now known to everybody—a Belorussian intelligence officer, although his coming into being and some other moments related to his work could have easily had roots in our republic as well. Having said that, let us move from the "warm-up" to the more concrete matters of specifically your work.

[Head of Intelligence] Intelligence works in many directions. For instance, scientific and technical. This includes certain aspects of science and technology. We can also mention the economic direction. This is now especially appropriate. We need to compare our problems with foreign successes and experiences.

Of course, the defense aspect remains a priority. In the past, it was related to the same atomic bomb. Time flies, and many things change. Today, as we are surrounded by electronics, a breakthrough may take place in armaments that will put us in an unenviable position. This cannot be allowed to happen. So far, Soviet intelligence has successfully accomplished this task. Now, however, our own national economic problems are increasingly often placed on its shoulders. It is known that information is a most expensive commodity. It has become more difficult to work. But, as they say, we are carrying this burden, too.

[Deputy] In this respect, it is appropriate to mention the following. Your colleagues from various publications often hint that we are allegedly a burden around the people's neck. Holy naivete! Or, perhaps, an intentional malice. Intelligence is always profitable.

[Intelligence Officer] It is probably time for me to join the conversation. We previously mentioned scientific and technical intelligence, of which I am a part. It should not be made to sound synonymous with the so-called industrial espionage. These are qualitatively different notions, although their goals at certain points may coincide. Intelligence officers are, first and foremost, striving to obtain information that gives an impetus to the development of our own economy in some aspect or another on a nationwide scale.

[Lemeshenok] Can we talk, in this respect, about specific results for our republic?

[Intelligence Officer] Of course. For instance, a lot is being done in the area of developing our computer technology. At almost no cost, one could say. For instance, for the same antivirus program one would normally pay tens of thousands of dollars. But here is a

paradox. It is clear that it is far from easy to obtain some technology. But it can be even more difficult to convince our scientists and specialists to make use of it here. Sometimes we offer ready-made "goodies" that only need to be developed and implemented. But then ambitions and behind-the-scene intrigues come into play, and as a result priceless information is simply wasted.

We go even further than that. We know that even when one is in possession of some design, it is not easy to implement it in practice. Some time ago the Germans took the T-34 apart, down to the smallest screw, but still were not able to create anything of the kind. We take this into account and take such information to its logical end. But even at that stage amazing things often happen: One official says that he does not want to get involved in it; another says it is unprofitable. Such a shame.

[Lemeshenok] Nevertheless, many are probably grateful to you. I am looking at these documents—analytical reports stamped "secret"—that are addressed to scientists and state organizations... It is hard to believe that there are people these days who would brush off such recommendations.

[Head of Intelligence] Of course. We are not complaining; we are simply stating known facts. To finish this topic, let me clarify a few more points. For instance, as early as a few days after the Chernobyl disaster we gave to scientists and designers samples of needed instrumentation—the same dosimeters. It is not our fault that they are still in short supply.

We have rendered substantial assistance to Belorussian machine builders, agrarians, and medics.

Now, about a very current problem. Belorussia is beginning to conduct direct trade. Far from all businessmen are ready to conduct business with us cleanly. There are dying firms that have no prospects, or just plain adventurers. Errors in contracts turn into enormous losses. We already have such instances. There are also attempts (often successful) to curry the favor of some of our "business" people during contract negotiations by presenting them with a video tape recorder. In short, all kinds of things happen.

From the History of Belorussian Intelligence

The first information on the activities of chekists-intelligence officers in Belorussia goes back to 21 January 1921, when they were involved in uncovering the channels through which Polish agents had been sent to the rear of the Red Army. Foreign departments and units (INO) of the Belorussian SSR Cheka [Extraordinary Commission]-GPU [State Political Directorate] were located in Minsk and Vitebsk and were not large in terms of personnel.

According to available data, up to 7,000 members of various bands and formations were entering Belorussia annually. Chekist-intelligence officers, Red Army units,

and special purpose brigades had managed, through joint efforts, to neutralize the enemy.

[Lemeshenok] I am convinced that intelligence officers are the best paid people in the KGB system.

[Deputy] You are wrong. A lieutenant or a captain who works in intelligence receives the same salary as those working in other operational units. I can see your reaction and agree that this is nonsense. You may or may not believe my word, but we are truly guided first of all by patriotic, ideological motives.

[Lemeshenok] Well, do you not have any "failures?" After all, we occasionally detain foreign agents and intelligence officers...

[Head of Intelligence] All kinds of things happen. I repeat, it is a harsh and very complicated world. But such is the reality, and one cannot escape it. I will only say that work is much more difficult for our boys abroad.

[Lemeshenok] Why?

[Intelligence Officer] Think... Here is an elementary example. One could say that in foreign countries it is a habit to be suspicious. Every old lady on a bench is in a hurry to notify the police if she thinks something is suspicious in a stranger's behavior. This is the way they are brought up, and it is considered patriotic.

We often have the opposite. Some people are ready to run a very dubious errand for some rags or remuneration.

[Lemeshenok] It is my understanding that the intelligence unit is sort of an elite group in the KGB system; people are specially selected to work here, and they undergo special training.

[Deputy] Elite or not elite, we do have special selection procedures. You can understand how costly a mistake could be here. We are happy with the fact that in the "Belorussian team" everything is truly well. Our people value very much the trust bestowed on them and their honor.

From the History of Belorussian Intelligence

During 1921-1923, Belorussian intelligence officers actively helped the USSR OGPU [Unified State Political Directorate] conduct operations "Syndicate" and "Trust." At that time, border "crossings" were selected and organized, routes developed, and legends for intelligence officers worked out. One such "chains" was used to bring in B. Savinkov, who was arrested in Minsk by INO officers.

Our intelligence also suffered heavy losses. For instance, in November 1925, Polish counterintelligence detained a courier, Irina Lastochkina. A month later her mutilated body was found in the Fifth Border Brigade Zone.

Our intelligence obtained valuable information in the course of operation "Corsair," which was directed

against the Wilno branch and the leaders of the Russian National Party (RNP), who were there at the time. The program of this party stated that it saw the future of Russia in a fascist-type dictatorship, and it was ready to use political assassinations as a potential means in its struggle.

[Lemeshenok] You were talking here about loyalty, patriotism, and decency among the chekists. In this respect, how do you see the current behavior of former intelligence officer Kalugin?

[Intelligence officer] In any case, professionals can see right away where he is, to put it mildly, imprecise. We also know many things he does not mention, keeps silent about. Kalugin probably has good reasons for it.

[Lemeshenok] Our conversation seems to be going too smoothly. Will you be upset if I go into more touchy subjects?

[Deputy] The intent was that we gather here to talk frankly, without evasions...

[Lemeshenok] Well, I will not go into details as to how this information filtered down to me, and to what extent it is widespread and reliable. But I have heard the following from chekists. The party, they say, has betrayed us, the soviets do not know what to do with us; at the same time, the KGB is an organization of a kind that cannot sit idle—it must work for somebody. Such work today is offered by the mafia...

So, I imagined for a second: If even some chekists, with their training and knowledge of the methods of "undercover" work, become part of the criminal world... Then, it seems, all our efforts to finish organized crime off forever will truly remain a mirage.

[Head of Intelligence] Let us talk about this, too. Who says that the soviets—as you put it—do not know what to do with us? We still have, up to this day, a rather close interaction with the authorities, with the Council of Ministers, and other official state organizations. How can it be otherwise? We work in the interests of the state. The law on the KGB that is now being drafted will bring even more clarity in all these issues.

[Deputy] There is no possibility of merging with the mafia. That is not the way with our specialists. It is a completely different breed of people.

[Intelligence Officer] If someone did indeed take the risk of establishing such contacts with the criminal world, believe me, he would be "figured out" very quickly. By us.

I want to mention something else. It may be a groundless suspicion, but I sensed a sort of dirty trick in this question. The hint is that the soviets are afraid of our party affiliation—it is no secret that the majority of chekists are Communists. However, as was already mentioned, the law on the KGB will put everything in its place. Something else. I, for instance—as well as many of

my comrades here—joined the party at the factory, as a member of a workers collective. So why should somebody find me objectionable today just because I am a Communist?

[Lemeshenok] Here is a question that probably should not be addressed to you. But since, in my opinion, intelligence officers are the most informed kind of people, I will ask you. Are there or not dossiers on our citizens? Is a so-called "political investigation" being conducted?

[Head of Intelligence] You would not be a journalist if you failed to ask us this question. This was the right thing to do. Especially considering that there is nothing to hide. It is time to put this kind of press speculation to rest. There are no dossiers. We have better things to do. There are more serious matters and things that we have already talked about.

[Deputy] You are talking about dossiers. In many very democratic—by our notions—countries there are, for instance, driver's cards [as published]. The policeman, just by noting a car's registration number, can get from the computer very extensive information about the car owner. It is clear what we are talking about.

From the History of Belorussian Intelligence

In 1922, Ignat Iosifovich Erdman, a Belorussian, was sentenced to 10 years in prison for participating in the fight against the Soviet power as a member of the Yudenich and Pilsudskiy armies. In January 1927, he was released on amnesty, and some time later he offered to help OGPU representatives in the western kray.

I. Erdman's offer got the chekists interested; after a period of preparation, the implementation phase of operation "Old Friends" began.

I. Erdman was a daring and skilled operative. In 1928, however, he was arrested and sentenced to 12 years of hard labor camp by the decision of the Wilno court. He behaved with dignity in the incarceration.

Beginning in 1930, our country started attempts to return I.I. Erdman to his motherland. On 22 November 1935, the intelligence officer was again on home soil at the border checkpoint Negoreloye.

[Lemeshenok] Your frank and convincing answers only prompt me to ask more sharp-edged questions. You will have to forgive me... But the chekists really cannot manage without so-called informants...

[Intelligence Officer] Can you imagine any special service today without helpers? There is no such thing in the world. For it is its own peculiar bread and salt. I repeat. These are helpers, not informants. In other countries such behavior is called patriotic; people who help the state are valued and encouraged in every possible way. A scientist returning from a symposium that has taken place, for instance, in our country, does not think it

shameful (rather, the contrary) to share his opinions, conclusions, and information with an appropriate state service.

[Head of Intelligence] You want a direct answer, though. Yes, there are people who voluntarily—and in most cases disinterestedly—help us. I bow my head to them. I and my colleagues are grateful for their help and we value their patriotic fervor. When it comes to working with foreigners, we do use, as we call it, a material basis. Good information is worth paying for. Providing help to ensure the security of one's country or a republic cannot be immoral. Most people among those who are now part of the history of Soviet intelligence, were not professional intelligence officers. They helped it, and their deeds are remembered with gratitude.

From the History of Belorussian Intelligence

In 1939-1941, INO officers of the republic Administration for State Security, managed, to a certain degree, to accomplish the task of obtaining intelligence data on the concentration of German Fascist troops on the Soviet border, and of implanting intelligence officers into the Abwehr (Wehrmacht military intelligence and counter-intelligence).

On 20 May 1941, P.S. Teodorovskiy arrived from Warsaw and brought the data from which the conclusion about the start of the war could be clearly "deduced."

Stories of our chekists actions during the Great Patriotic War deserve a special place. (We will omit it here for now.)

In 1950-1952, with the beginning of the "cold war," a number of American intelligence agents placed in our territory illegally for the purpose of collecting information, were arrested on the territory of Belorussia.

In the beginning of the 1980's, in the United States, a book by G. Loftus "Belorussian Front" was published; in it, there is documentary proof of nationalist participation in the crimes against the Belorussian people; the book also shows how they switched sides and went into CIA service.

[Lemeshenok] You have probably felt that the purpose of a publication on the basis of this conversation is also rather noble—to melt the remaining ice in the people's mind about the true face of the KGB. Otherwise, look what happens. Some mass media had trumpeted the story about the "listening" room in the building where the RSFSR Supreme Soviet's Presidium is located. An independent commission was created. Its conclusions are unequivocal: The equipment is not suitable for listening to B.N. Yeltsin's office. Moreover, a KGB officer and an RSFSR Supreme Soviet deputy speaks from a high podium and, generally, discloses a professional secret by saying that to listen in on someone's conversation there is no need to be in the room next door... Again, he is not believed. All of this was broadcast on television. I am speaking about this ice of mistrust. I

think that our meeting today will help our readers to develop a clearer idea about chekists' work and the tasks.

In conclusion, knowing readers' interests, I want to ask you to give an even more concrete example from real life...

[Head of Intelligence] Why not. Especially keeping in mind that it can provide some food for thought.

During one of my assignments, I had an assistant who was a rare and amazing person. He had unique analytical skills and worked only with open sources. Based on that, he arrived at very precise and valuable conclusions. It was practically impossible to catch him on any violations of law. Therefore, it was decided to remove him in a very primitive way. A sleeping medication was put in his glass of beer. The "drunkard" had to be quickly recalled from his assignment—after all, he had compromised the "image of a Soviet citizen." It took a lot of effort afterward to not allow this person's destiny to be crushed.

As we can see, although our adversaries used the simplest way to compromise this man, their calculations were correct. All because they knew well the atmosphere and the mentality that at that time ruled the Soviet bureaucratic circles.

[Lemeshenok] Well, it is a good example. Let us hope that your ties with SOVETSKAYA BELORUSSIYA will not end at this point, and we will have many opportunities to tell our readers about the work of intelligence officers—a work that is full of risk, responsibility, and significance.

We wish you success!

Ukraine KGB Activities, Recruitment, Training Described

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[Article by KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondent Gleb Pleskach: "KGB: Absolutely Not Secret"]

[Text] *Taking advantage of the invitation from the top officials of the republic Committee for State Security, who visited the editorial offices of KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA last September, our journalist paid a return visit. Correspondent Gleb Pleskach and photo correspondent Oleg Markevich became the first ones of the writing and photo-taking brotherhood to have such an extensive visit to the building at 33 Vladimirskaia.*

The number of questions asked by the visitors brought out a doubt on the part of the special services employees: "Are you guys sure you are not from counterintelligence?" The guys answered the question with another question: "Why is it that none of your offices has a hard-wired radio outlet?" "Because," answered the competent escort in jest. The chekists, however, answered correspondents' other questions in more detail.

...The formalities at the bureau of passes were settled in three minutes. We were issued yellow-colored forms—one-time “butterflies.” Our escort—Major Anatoliy Ivanovich Sakhno of the republic KGB’s Center for Public Relations—led us to the main entrance of the gray building that is located at 33 Vladimirskaia. Ensigns at the entrance carefully compared photos on our identification papers with the live presence and tore the “control” part off our passes. “You may go in,”—and we are on our way.

So, Who Is He—the ‘Average’ Chekist?

The image of a chekist in the movies and the mass media until April 1985 was SS Obergruppenfuhrer Schtirnitz, alias Soviet intelligence Colonel Isayev. After 1985, the masses’ perception of the chekists changed to the opposite—they all started to look like Lavrentiy Pavlovich’s children.

Cinema and newspapers... What about real life? There has not been much written about it.

The “average” rank of a chekist in the central apparatus is a major. The salary is 250 to 270 rubles [R]. There is additional pay for the length of service (five, 10, 15 years, and so on)—as in the army. Thus, the total take-home pay of a chekist is between R300 and R500 a month. “A ways to go to R500,” it was explained, however.

The backbone of the KGB is an “oper,” that is, an operative. “Oper” is a “bee,” a gatherer, who brings information to the Committee the same way a bee brings honey to a beehive. All operatives have a college education. There are no strict selection criteria in hiring: No preference is given to a background in humanities over a technical one, or vice versa. For instance, right now experienced economists, sociologists, and jurists are needed.

Almost every chekist knows at least one foreign language. Many speak several. The republic KGB has specialists with the knowledge of almost all languages in the world.

Annual recertification of a foreign language proficiency is mandatory; exams are conducted by a special commission.

Personnel migration in the KGB is usually caused by family reasons or promotion. Some officers from the republic organs are transferred to Moscow. Some “leave” Kiev for the oblast—to be promoted.

How To Become a Chekist?

We will tell you this using as an example our guide, Anatoliy Ivanovich, whose career in the KGB gives him a moral right to maintain that his way is quite customary for a chekist.

“I am from a rural area. Most of my colleagues are from rural settlements and small towns. After graduating from

high school I tried to enter Sumy Pedagogical Institute, but was unsuccessful. Then I was drafted into the Army and served for two years in the Border Troops. After the discharge I worked in a rural culture center. Later I did manage to be accepted into the institute and studied there. In 1977, I graduated and then worked for almost two years as a teacher in Sumy. I was teaching Ukrainian language and literature. I liked my work. I could not imagine in my wildest dreams that there was a job for the State Security in my future. But—I was offered the chance to join. I had a very vague notion of what my future work would be...

“Each chekist (for some reason, people call us ‘Kagebists,’ although this word even sounds strange to our ear—we call ourselves chekists), in addition to a college education received in the regular system of higher education, undergoes special training in the network of higher schools of the State Security system. The disciplines on which special emphasis is placed are history of the All-Union Extraordinary Commission [VChK], intelligence, counterintelligence, and legal subjects. The requirements in legal knowledge (Criminal Code, Criminal Process Code, Civil Code and others) is especially rigorous. The schools are of different levels—from one-year training to four-to-five years study.”

Chekists are required to take a military oath.

There is, however, a special—chekist—initiation that is conducted by either the leadership or by veteran chekists in a ceremonial atmosphere. Sometimes the newly initiated chekist receives, in addition to the identity card, a special memorandum, which is usually kept in the families of State Security members as a relic. Here is the text of the memorandum presented to our guide Anatoliy Sakhno in 1979:

“Comrade!

“Today is a memorable day in your life—you have become a chekist.

“From now on, you are entrusted with protecting the achievement of the Great October—the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics.

“Serve your Motherland honestly and selflessly; carry high the banner of proletarian internationalism; and carry on and multiply the glorious combat traditions of the VChK-KGB.

“Constantly maintain ties with the working people, draw on their help, and fight tirelessly against the intrigues of imperialist secret services.

“You are becoming a member of a collective where you are to add the best lines to your biography of a communist-chekist, ready for self-sacrifice in the name of victory of communism. This biography of a warrior—unforgiving towards the enemy, but sensitive and responsive to the interests of the people—will be the result of your own efforts; nobody can do it for you.

"Everywhere and in everything, be deserving of the memory of the best sons of the party and the people who have given their life for the sake of victory of communism."

"We wish you creative successes in this difficult but honored service in the organs of the Committee for State Security."

As a rule, one of older comrades must sponsor the applicant to chekist ranks. The responsibility for the younger colleague is strictly of a moral nature. However, as practice shows, sponsorship is a reliable guarantee of a sense of responsibility cultivated among the young generation.

Are there family dynasties in the KGB? Yes, there are families, in which grandfathers have been followed not only by their sons, but by the grandchildren, as well. However, continuity along the family lines does not beget nepotism. "This is out of the question. Here, even 'twice-removed' cannot work in the same unit, let alone direct relatives. Although it is not in legal writing anywhere, it is enforced as if it were the law."

A Workday of a Chekist

To begin with—a blitz poll at the entrance to the republic KGB building. There is only one question: "Do you get to work every day in a Volga?" The question is asked in that impudent tone that precludes any answer other than the affirmative "yes."

In reply, they laugh the way only a Rolls-Royce owner could laugh.

"On a trolley, man! For the eighth year now. Ha-ha-ha... (this lieutenant colonel, deputy chief of one of the departments, obviously was in a good mood coming to work today).

I asked several more men hurrying to work, but their answers were amazing—the "legends" were put together extremely well. People described with great knowledge the details of using public transportation in the rush hour, delving into the depth of descriptions of one or another route. Of the chekists questioned by me, none came to work in a company car. Just in case, I asked Anatoliy Ivanovich about gas: Is there enough? "Enough!" he said without great conviction. "Gas is limited, though, just as in other organizations."

A working day in the KGB starts, as a rule, at 0900. Fifteen minutes before the day starts one can observe the "races"—chekists hurrying to their work places. Rumor has it that this morning-time increased density of subordinates per square unit of space brings out a slight irritation on the part of the bosses. "Why do you guys run in groups? Can you not come to work twenty minutes earlier? Better be late..." But being late is not one of the habits here, so people rush in.

The day starts with purely mechanical movements: An office is opened and the seal on the safe is checked (each

chekist has his own safe and his own "name" seal, attached—as a rule—to the key. The loss of the key and the seal results in a most severe reprimand—up to dismissal from the service). Then papers needed for work are taken out of the safe. Unless there are new directives from above, officers work by the plan prepared by the end of the previous workday.

In the morning, shortly after 0900, they have to get instructions for the day from the "chief," as well as inform him on their own itinerary and the kind of work being planned.

From 1300 to 1400 is a lunch break. Chekists eat together with Border Troops personnel in two shifts: The cafeteria does not have the capacity to serve everyone at once. The menu? The same as everywhere; I saw it with my own eyes, and there was nothing to catch the eye.

Since the chekists' workday is not regimented and business sometimes cannot wait, many have to munch "on-the-go." Thus gastric conditions and ulcers.

There is no smoking in the offices. Strictly prohibited. Not as an order from "above," no. This is an "internal" rule, decided on through the efforts of the entire collective. You, as a guest, may be offered an ashtray, but they themselves would not smoke. There are, of course, "stealthy" violators, no matter what. But this is rather an exception, which only confirms the rule.

If one has to work late, a trip to the canteen is in order—it is open from 1800 on. For the gourmets' information—the canteen is not brimming with delicacies. To take water from the canteen to the office one has to return empty bottles in exchange. "I still have to do business for hours!" is the unbeatable argument of the woman behind the canteen counter; the chekists keep obediently silent, huddling in a tightly packed line.

The canteen often serves "markhalevka"—home-made sausage named after the rural settlement where the Committee's auxiliary services are located. In Markhalevka, under the watchful eye of "special services," boars are being raised, with the help of chekists themselves. These boars are the source of this sausage, heavily spiced with garlic.

The workday is over. All papers, including the desk calendar, go into the safe. Close the windows. Seal the safe, lock the office, and—go home. "We are lucky if we have time to stop at the store and buy something for the family..."

The pace of the workday quickens if Kiev is visited by a head of state, including a foreign one. Then protection is added to the regular load. There are also frequent assignments to the duty desk.

'Center to Yustas...'

This phrase from the "Moments..." for some reason brings out a clear mental association: A broad-shouldered chekist paces his office, hands behind his

back, and dictates to a secretary... The visit to the KGB has destroyed the stereotype, for years implanted into our heads by the works of Julian Semenov: Far from every chekist has a secretary. Not every chekist has a working typewriter. It is a rare chekist that has a personal dictaphone...

The lag in material and technical supply of special services is the child of "only our own" mentality. No, one cannot say, of course, that chekists live in poverty. But one cannot say, either, that the people who carry on Dzerzhinskiy's traditions want for nothing.

Yes, there are KGB's science and research units. Yes, so far State Security does not have trouble attracting "brains." But even when something is indeed invented by these home-grown talents and then put into physical shape, it is still practically hand-crafted. Trying to put an innovation into serial production is a hopeless task.

Masters from the technical services even assemble video cameras (!) "from scratch," using their golden skills and talents, but again—why should they be engaged in Sisyphus labor?

Researchers in one of the science units based in the departmental hospital created a preparation that removes radioactive nuclides from the human body. Boys from State Security who had been exposed in the "zone" went through an intensive treatment course; the method proved to be effective.

Operatives look like Sherlock Holmeses—the technical equipment of the work place is ancient: a pen, ink, and a typewriter. "We are short on paper. I personally bought two reams in the store."

There is, of course, modern equipment as well: for example, in the "memory unit"—the analytical service that puts together a data bank of operational information. But the equipment here is not all Soviet-made. Some is imported.

By the way, contrary to the widespread myth that chekists are armed predominantly with Western-made weapons, in reality there is nothing except Makarov guns and Kalashnikov automatic rifles.

One more myth—"each 'Kagebist' is always armed"—was dispelled by my interlocutor who opened his coat wide: "Search me if you do not believe!" So there is at least one chekist who is unarmed. They do have bullet-proof vests as part of their equipment.

We visited the shooting range where chekists practice with their Makarovs. Marksmanship is a mandatory exercise (as are annual physical fitness and sports tests). The passing score is 25 points in three shots at a head-and-shoulders target.

"Everybody here can do it." "And what if he does not make the score?" "Then he will be shooting until he learns how to shoot properly."

Each department of the Committee has a certain time reserved for it on the shooting range. Each State Security officer must "shoot out" once a week to stay in shape. The rumor is, though, that the guys run off from the "range"—too much work, why waste time on war games?

'To Stay at Home...'

The meaning of this notion—not at all of chekist origin—is impossible to describe easily and fully. It means more or less this: an opportunity to spend a whole day with the family without having to rush somewhere. An opportunity to look, at least once a week, through a son's school diary. An opportunity to turn the television set on long before program "Vremya" starts. And a thousand more of great and small opportunities. "To stay at home" means to temporarily become rich, because, maybe once a week, you still have everything you can wish for: peace, family, and comfort.

"It is not fair to say that chekists only socialize with each other, although a friendship between officers' families is quite common. Our guys have a rather wide social circle. Step into any office along this corridor, for instance, and ask what they were reading yesterday. You would be surprised, but most our guys are familiar with the latest in literature. Books, as well as the program "Vremya," are a tradition here.

"Fishing stands out on its own. Every other one among us is a 'professional' in this area. There are some hunters, but not too many. There are quite a few soccer fans and connoisseurs. Only a few are Spartak fans; most root for Dynamo or Dnepr. After the season ends, Lobanovskiy and his team always pay us a visit as our guests..."

"To stay at home" feels good. What is bad is that one cannot totally relax—officers' home telephones are linked directly to the duty desk; should anything happen, they will receive a warning signal. There are different kind of signals, and family members know the numeric designation of the signals.

"You are in a bathtub. The phone rings. Your wife answers: 'Signal Number One.' She does not know what this signal means; you are the only one who knows. You get dressed and... rush to the street, to a designated meeting place where your colleagues are already standing, waiting for the car on duty. You only have minutes for the whole 'mobilization.' I cannot say that it happens infrequently. That is our job."

The same job does not permit the wife to talk on the phone for too long—it is frowned upon: The line should always be open...

Holidays are usually celebrated at home, with the family, unless it is one's turn to be on duty.

Soviet holidays, Chekists Day (20 December), and Border Troops Day are celebrated in the club, located in the building that will mark its 10th "birthday" this March.

People come to the club with their families, after work. The old officialdom is a thing of the past; the ceremonial part is reduced to a minimum. After the awards ceremony there is a traditional amateur concert. The soloists' titles speak of the level of their performing skills: award winner of the Second All-Union Festival of Folk Arts, Colonel S. Torbenko; winner of the republic vocalist competition A. Sukhanov, officer...

Out of curiosity, I attended one concert of amateur performers. To be honest, the first 40 minutes I did not believe the organizers of the celebration who said that all performers were chekists. "They must have invited talented, but unknown artists, and now they put on this act," I thought. And got really angry, I must add... And suddenly... there is a guy on the stage, and he sings like a nightingale—you just want to close your eyes and listen. And I just saw him in the corridor of the building on Vladimirskaia three days ago... Then I believed.

The club and everything related to it is the Committee's pride. Because both the stage itself, the lighting, and make-up rooms were built by chekists themselves in their free time.

The club's permanent chief (not director!), Lieutenant Colonel Yevgeniy Nikolayevich Ustimenko is also a director-producer of almost all concerts.

More often than concerts, the club arranges for music recitals. Not only chekists' children, but their friends are welcome here as well. "This is my friend"—this verbal voucher is like a password.

What if your son brings a foreign student?

In general, this is to be avoided. But once he has brought him, they will be let in.

By the way, the club operates on the basis of economic self-sufficiency. Annual income is R33-R35 thousand. This is enough to pay the salaries of 17 employees—artistic directors and leaders of hobby circles. Supplies are also purchased with this money.

Visiting the Chairman

Room 401 is the suite of the chairman of the republic Committee for State Security, Nikolay Mikhailovich Golushko. Actually, suite is too big a word for it, since the style of both the reception and the chairman's inner office is strictly businesslike; there are no excesses, no sign of mahogany and leather in the interior decoration.

The chairman's office: a conference table and 16 chairs. A television set in the corner. The office owner's desk is larger than the one of the KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA executive secretary, but definitely smaller than one that belongs to the editor in chief. The number

of telephones on a separate side table, however, brought out an anxiety familiar, probably, only to fellow correspondents: What if all of them ring simultaneously... But the phones were silent.

Nikolay Mikhailovich rises to greet us: His handshake is firm—"Hello," "Please, sit down." He smiles: "See, I promised your editors and I keep my word—subscribed to your newspaper. No regrets—it is interesting."

A telephone rings. "Excuse me..."

Everything on the chairman's desk is neat and organized. A clock, an ordinary desk calendar, paper caddy, scotch tape, desk lamp, pen, and scissors. Among the books: the code of laws, USSR Constitution, Ukrainian-Russian dictionary. A stack of brochures: At the top is Managing the Quality of American Corporations. Newspapers: KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA, IZVESTIYA, VETERAN (Verochka the receptionist told us that the chairman subscribes to "a lot, really a lot" of newspapers and scans practically all of them). Under the desk top glass there is a list of the republic Supreme Soviet deputies.

The telephone conversation is over: "Do forgive me. Ask your questions..."

We ask questions:

[Pleskach] What is your regular work day like?

[Golushko] Get up at 0600 to the sound of MAYAK. Breakfast. Walk to work—about one hour walk. This is the rule. Work day begins at 0830. The workload in the first part of the day is very heavy. First I read secret cables, then get reports from duty desks on the happenings in the past 24 hours. The rest of the time is taken by current business. I work 12 to 14 hours a day.

I am tied to the phone—see how many there are. There are only slightly fewer at home. One in the car. The nature of my work does not allow me to be away from the telephone—I may be called on at any moment. And I do get called on. Quite often in the middle of the night. I try to get home in time to watch "Vremya," if possible. By company car. Have supper with my wife. Read. "Roll through" my head the work plan for the next day, and for the week.

As a rule, Sunday is a day off. How did I spent the last one? Called the office three times. Leafed through two volumes of Andrey Belyy. You know, it is hard to switch from the daily grind to poetry—the mood is not right. Scanned the newspapers. Went for a walk with my wife: We went down to Bessarabskiy Market, walked around the center of the city, and came back home. Read a bit more before going to bed... Anyway, you do not get much rest psychologically. There are only a few days in the year when you feel yourself truly relaxed inside.

Receiving visitors takes up a lot of energy. This is my principle: to meet more with people—I do not refuse anybody an audience. I have these visitors' days twice a

month. You can check the lists if you wish: I receive more visitors each year than my five deputies combined.

This telephone call that just interrupted us—it was a “liquidator,” a participant in the Chernobyl events. He needs help that only we can provide. You know, perhaps, that our medics have developed a technique for removing radioactive nuclides from the human organism. This man who just called asked us for help. Fortunately, the issue was resolved quickly—there is a bed available in our departmental medical facility. The victim will receive help. True, by placing a civilian in our clinic, I violated the instruction. But I console myself with the fact that I did it by using my deputy powers...

Now we are resolving this issue as a whole—we will treat civilian “liquidators” in our facility. On a contract basis: an organization pays us—we remove the radiation. We can not treat patients at our own expense—our organization is on a government subsidy.

[Pleskach] The Committee for State Security has been a target of criticism in the mass media for almost five years now. At the same time, the press and the television do not provide information to their audiences on the legal protection of special services’ employees, or on purely corporate, internal problems of your organization. Why is this so? Is it because the KGB does not have “problems,” or that it does not want to discuss its problems publicly?

[Golushko] Everybody is into criticizing us. Often for a good reason. Even more often—for nothing. The criticism is not constructive. Thus the problems.

We are not against criticism. But we advocate fairness in the complaints addressed to us, truthfulness, and frankness. We advocate legality. When, instead, there is a massive build-up of unfounded accusations, accompanied by threats... This is impermissible!

Over 60 percent of the current state security employees were born after 1953. It is now 37 years since Executioner Beria was shot! So now, when my colleagues are being blamed for all the sins since the time of Maljuta Skuratov, and Beria’s crimes, I want to tell these “accusers”: Direct your wrath at yourselves! Did you not applaud, too, at that time? Eulogized and sang praises? Why look for a scapegoat in the chekists? I understand that the fear of the 1930’s still lives in people’s conscience and will not disappear in one day. Still...

We are rumored to have some kind of privileges. This is stupid, incredibly stupid. We do not have the right to get any preference by showing our identification. Why invent the lies?

And we do have problems—except that nobody asks; you are the first one to ask. The situation regarding legal protection of our employees is probably better in the Ukraine than in other republics. The republic Supreme Soviet was the first in the country to speak in favor of protecting the law enforcement organs. The parliament

decree of 18 January in regard to these organs’ employees is a good beginning.

Let us look at our employees daily life, how they live outside of work.

Walk into any office in this building and ask the people how they feel working in such conditions... KGB employees do not have any accumulated funds. None of them have even decent savings for a rainy day, let alone sacks of money. There was an exchange of R50 and R100 denomination bills. We had less than ten people who brought in these bills for exchange in excess of the salary.

The republic committee does not have its own sanitarium or a rest and recreation facility. Vouchers to recreation facilities are allocated to us by the Union Committee. The Pioneer camp for our children is in Zaporozhye Oblast; the sanitarium is in Yevpatoria, and the rest and recreation facility is in Yalta. All of them are under All-Union jurisdiction. We do not have anything of our own.

The situation in Kiev is better in comparison with oblast centers. It is much easier here in terms of getting housing for our employees—we build ourselves up to fifty apartments a year through our own construction organization. The boarding guest house in Koncha-Zaspe, too. Veteran chekists do not have any privileges. Zero.

In the wake of the Chernobyl tragedy, the All-Union Committee reserved a certain number of spots in All-Union sanitariums for Ukrainian chekists. Many of my colleagues went through Chernobyl.

We do not have—and have not had before—any special stores, and we do not have a system of orders. Now that our country makes a transition to a market, we are in an especially hard situation. We do not want to look poor. But we keep silent; we do not beg, as others now commonly do. We make do with what we have.

The psychological impact of this current campaign unleashed against the KGB is hard on our families, our wives, and our children. There are cases of threats against families of our employees in the Western areas of Ukraine. The criticism directed at us is usually on a Philistine level. This difficult moral situation affects our cadres. No, we do not have an employee turnover; we have reliable people working here... But here is what the numbers tell us: In 1989, we had several thousand applications for employment, while in 1990—only about 500. There are, however, other figures as well: In 1989, about 20,000 citizens came to the Committee’s public reception office with their topical problems. Last year it was over 30,000. As you can see, there is popularity and popularity. I will tell you frankly—these visits have nothing to do with “informing”; it is more a matter of state necessity.

Some are shouting: “Disband the KGB!” This is fashionable now. I think it is time to stop looking at the

organs as a punitive truncheon or a stronghold of totalitarianism. This is a yesterday view.

Are we needed? Judge for yourself. The territory of the Ukraine comprises only about three percent of the USSR territory. This relatively small land area houses 26 percent of the large-scale chemical industry of the country. We cannot help but be concerned about the dangerous potential of nuclear facilities—we have quite a few of them! Finally, the Ukraine is a “bearer” of nuclear weapons. Somebody has to have the responsibility for the safety of all of this, for the safety of the region as a whole. Because of its geographic situation and economic potential, our republic has a geostrategic, geopolitical significance on the map of Europe...

The Persian Gulf War... Iraq is very close to where we are; it can use chemical weapons at any moment (the conversation with the chairman took place when the war against Iraq was at its peak.—G.P.). Therefore, right now we are investigating the state of the ecological and chemical situation in the Ukraine through our own channels. We are responsible for a lot of things. Some people simply have no idea how many things we are responsible for, and to what degree we are needed.

[Pleskach] Is the number of State Security personnel in the Ukraine still secret? For the third year arguments go on around this figure. I think that lifting the veil of secrecy off the numbers and the composition of chekist cadres would put an end to many idle conjectures and would put all the dots over the “i”s.

[Chairman] I cannot give you this figure now—if for no other reason than ethics. In my opinion, the figures, as well as the budget, do not constitute a secret today. But then, think for yourself—KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA readers will learn these figures before the Supreme Soviet does.

We are ready to make these figures public. And I am certain that we will do so in the nearest future in the parliament. To my knowledge, the USSR KGB is preparing exhaustive information in this respect for the national Supreme Soviet. So, be patient for a while longer—you will find everything out.

FROM THE EDITORS. You must have noticed by now: This material does not fit comfortably into the, by now, familiar framework of perestroika (read: expose) journalism. But do not be in a hurry to reproach the authors. Let us agree that when in Rome, do as the Romans do—and this applies to reporters as well. KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA reporters showed themselves to be exemplary guests in the KGB: They did not stick their nose where it did not belong; they did not question the currency of offered information; and they did not ask “tactless” questions. Alas, willingly or unwillingly, they left outside the “frame” many issues that concern our society today, filled with new awareness.

We can foresee a reproach: It is not only the good manners that are the culprit here, but also an instinct for self-preservation. A sort of internal Geiger counter that starts blinking alarmingly when one approaches a danger threshold. A generic trait of “homo sovieticus” that has undergone selective breeding by the keepers of ideological purity.

We are not going to argue. We do not think the KGB will either. Because it appears that chekists themselves are burdened by this dark and mysterious aura that surrounds them. Is not “open doors day” in the most closed organization in the republic a proof of this? The question that ought to be asked is different: Will the changes affect only the outmoded image, or will the reforms go deeper?

Armenian KGB Forms New Department To Fight Organized Crime

91UF0716A Yerevan GOLOS ARMENII in Russian
16 Mar 91 p 3

[ARMENPRESS report: “A New Feature in the Armenian KGB Structure”]

[Text] According to information from the Armenian KGB public relations department, the situation in the republic caused the committee to create an independent, functionally new subunit—“OP” [Organized Crime]. The subunit was formed from the inner reserves of the Committee and its main task was determined to be fighting against organized crime.

As you know, KGB organs previously participated in fighting the most dangerous crimes but their work was restricted to providing support for the MVD [Ministry of Internal Affairs] and the Procuracy. In certain cases corresponding forces and assets of the Committee were used if necessary. That kind of work organization did not bring the expected results and caused certain just criticism to be directed at the law enforcement organs and at the KGB in particular.

As early as 14 December 1990, a meeting was held between L. Ter-Petrosyan, chairman of the Republic of Armenia Supreme Soviet, and KGB officials where they outlined the task of eliminating various bandit groups and of fighting organized crime. These tasks were defined as top priorities and they continue to be the focus of attention for the Armenian leaders. On 8 May of this year, V. Manukyan, the Republic of Armenia Council of Ministers chairman, called a meeting with the KGB chairman and the leaders of the new OP department. They discussed the urgent issues of fighting crime, material and technological supply problems for the new department, and the necessity for a Republic of Armenia law on security organs; they also considered it necessary to add amendments to the penal code of Armenia for the purpose of creating a legal basis for fighting organized crime.

On 12 March of this year, a meeting of the organ leaders and of their respective subunits took place in the Republic of Armenia Procuracy. At the meeting they discussed the problems relating to coordinating the

efforts of the Procuracy, the KGB, and the MVD in fighting crime in Armenia. They also discussed some concrete measures for the implementation of the designed plans.

Ostankino To Broadcast Foreign TV

91UN1504A Moscow MOSKOVSKAYA PRAVDA
in Russian 1 May 91 p 3

[Article by N. Tatarinova: "Subscription to Free Airwaves"]

[Text] News for Ostankino: As early as this year, the TV tower will begin to relay several foreign satellite channels.

Time is money, at sky-high rates per minute. Air time has always been highly priced everywhere. Amounts which are quite modest by the standards of an international "TV price list," but astronomical by everyday standards, represent the financial foundation of a contract which will ensure the regular demonstration of an entire set of various Western programs on Moscow TV screens. Foreign companies are courteously accommodating as they develop foreign broadcasting in our virgin market. When contracts of this nature are signed, prospects for cooperation are taken into account, not just profits.

The television industry is a branch of a big civilized business where both profits and attention to the interests of the partner matter. Our unpampered viewers highly praised the generous gesture of the Super-Channel Company which donated large fragments of its programs free of charge for broadcasting on Soviet TV. This was an expensive and beautiful present—several one-hour weekend entertainment programs. Recently another well-known TV company, CNN, handed over to us, likewise free of charge, a "potpourri" of its popular programs. Its logo now appears regularly on the home screens of Muscovites who tune their TV sets to the appropriate channel in the decimeter band. Incidentally, the generous but fragmentary charity of our foreign colleagues is merely a preface to the forthcoming history of stable international TV contacts. Its first lines have already been written in the text of charter documents of a new joint enterprise which combines the interests of foreign companies, the domestic TV center, and, of course, our viewers. Thus, the All-Union Radio and TV Transmitter Station and the American company ICI have established business contacts.

We have lived to see unpredictable times. Signatures on this agreement are a post-mortem of sorts on endless years of fruitless struggle against Western "ideological sabotage." As recently as yesterday, the opportunity, long available technically, to hook up Soviet TV to the airwaves of foreign satellites was considered a heretical, utopian idea. Tomorrow, TV sets right in our homes will respond to the clicking of a switch by remote alien call signs like "This is America on the air." Let us be precise. To say tomorrow is to run ahead of events somewhat. Nonetheless, very soon, as early as the end of this year, the first TV viewers in Moscow will be able to "pull in" to their screens European and American satellite programs. The joint airwaves of the new joint enterprise will

fill as many as seven channels with imported TV products. Besides, Western additions to the domestic repertoire will expand the "bill of fare" on our home TV screens by a factor of two. Are the technical facilities of our TV tower prepared to handle this powerful influx of "airwaves" from space? Be that as it may, the Ostankino TV tower, together with the relaying equipment, has already put in almost a quarter of a century of service.

...Look higher, at the level where the concrete trunk is girded with the bulging glass belt of the observation deck. Look a little bit above the Cloud Nine restaurant. The 344 meter mark is encircled by the metal lace of antennas. This is precisely where transmitters will be installed which will relay TV signal from satellites. It is planned to use a system whose complex abbreviation is MMDS, or in plain language, a system of air and cable TV, in order to receive and broadcast foreign programs. Satellite receivers are set up at the bottom of the tower. The signal will travel from these receivers to the 344 meter mark, to the transmitters, and from there directly to subscribers. The radius of the area of stable reception will be 50 kilometers from the concrete vertical line in Ostankino.

The renewal of the TV airwaves will be accompanied by the modernization of the complex facilities of the tower itself. The tower was built with a margin of safety for many years, and it is continuously monitored. Recently, it was examined by experts from Germany. Their conclusion that the structure is in good condition is also confirmed by the continuous observation of our specialists. Not one but rather dozens of indicators are used to monitor the structure itself and its equipment. A special automatic system checks the assigned tension of cables—the cables which tighten the concrete trunk vertically inside it, and ensure the needed resilience and rigidity of the high-rise structure. The tower is a flexible structure. It is capable of growing or shrinking by about 40 centimeters depending on the weather. Its upper segment is designed to withstand hurricane force winds. It will not break even if a powerful stream of air makes it sway with an amplitude of 28 meters. This spring, strong winds tested the strength of the Ostankino needle: The whistling on the upper floors resembled that on a plane. However, even under these conditions the predicted deviation of the spire did not exceed two meters. When the tower was built, concrete cubes made of precisely the same material of which the entire structure was built were deposited for "storage" on all of the tower's floors. Every year, one cube from every floor is taken to a laboratory. There is mandatory testing of the strength of the concrete. Expert reviews invariably grade it "excellent."

The assembly of new transmitting equipment is being planned, taking into account the continuous "mobility" of the tower. The replacement of some transmitters, the lowering of the old ones, and the hoisting of the new ones are on the plan for high-altitude work this year. One cannot see from the ground the lifting equipment which makes it possible at present to reach any outside point

along the entire 540-meter vertical line. There is a mobile crane which is capable of moving around the concrete trunk, an extending telescoping outrigger, and extendable work stands. This mechanism makes it possible to perform complex assembly operations at high altitudes within hours.

These hours are few and expensive indeed—they are “windows” in the TV schedules when transmitters do not operate. A “pause” on the air is a necessary condition for preventive, repair, and maintenance work with tower equipment. Such pauses will become even shorter from this year on, as the airwaves become more populated. It is naive to believe that all of Moscow will be successfully hooked up to satellite TV overnight. It is envisaged to develop the system for the city in stages. To this end, special receiving devices should be assembled on houses on which large antennas are installed. The guests of large hotels and centers of international relations are likely to become the first viewers of foreign programs, but only at first. The installation of additional equipment will expand the audience for Western TV.

Let us not forget the technical aspect of the venture. The satellite TV purchase is not cheap. Settlements with “program suppliers” are anything but peanuts. Naturally, TV series purchased from them will not be given to our TV viewers free of charge. It is absolutely clear how they are going to settle for new TV services—on the basis of subscription fees. However, the amount is not yet clear; it is still to be calculated. Also, it needs to be determined which specific programs to opt for. About 50 of them exist in the world—sports, essay, information, and entertainment... Which ones should be given preference? This selection will be made with the participation of TV viewers. Polling them will help determine the prospective popularity rating of various specialty programs. One more TASS channel will become a novelty for our domestic TV, in addition to the seven foreign channels. The TASS TV program, with printed information, dynamic [dinamichnykh] pictures, and video episodes will be somewhat akin to a domestic version of the famous CNN company.

No, this is not yet all that is new about future broadcasting. A decision of the Ministry of Communications collegium “blessed” the collective of the All-Union Station to fill the air time which the former Gosteleradio [State Committee for Television and Radio Broadcasting] and the current TV company do not use. So is air time to be leased? And why not. Come and apply; there is interest on the part of potential lessees of free air.

Contenders for air time have already appeared in abundance. Associations of lessees, cooperative members, and industrialists are prepared to rent air time. Their idea is to organize a channel for business people. Various organizations, firms, and associations, from the NIKA-TV studio to the association of Seventh Day Adventists, would like to lease several hours. The winners in their competitive struggle will depend not only on the offered “amount written out” in the contract but also on the

quality of TV products prepared. The planned installation of a new transmitter will create technical opportunities for leasing air time. This will make it possible to introduce channel 31 in the decimeter band. Negotiations which Russia began with Italian businessmen concerning the installation of another new transmitter and the creation of a commercial channel offer more prospects for additional broadcasting.

Therefore, the Western and domestic business communities are penetrating our TV airwaves. In what language is foreign TV going to talk to our viewers? No linguistic problems are expected. The programs will be broadcast either with subtitles, or with simultaneous translation. In a word, no particular obstacles to our meeting with Western TV are expected either at the stage of organizational and technical preparations, or at the stage of international agreements. However, it is easy to predict obstacles of a different kind for a segment of the viewers if we familiarize ourselves with the condition of the city's TV network. A problem situation which Vyacheslav Nikolayevich Misyulin, chief of the All-Union Radio and TV Station, told us about appears to be a purely departmental problem at first glance. Ultimately, it may affect many Muscovites directly.

What does this have to do with? It has to do with whom the Moscow TV network will service and how. TV does not consist of the TV tower, transmitters, and studios alone. It also includes an extensive system of cable and antenna installations. They need to be continuously serviced, repaired, and modernized, in a word, maintained in an operating condition. The authorities have finally become convinced by trial and error, by transferring individual segments of this network to different departments, that it is most reliable to operate these complex facilities under the care of one master. This is how the divisions of the USSR Ministry of Communications assumed complete responsibility for the condition of the cable network. An organization of repair and maintenance services with their own technician personnel, pool of machinery, and specialized equipment emerged under the aegis of the All-Union Radio and TV Transmitting Station. This organization established firm contacts with designers and manufacturers of modernized equipment with a view to developing a network. This is how the implementation of a general program to convert the city to a cable TV system began. What has this got to do with the viewers' interests? When an endeavor is in the same hands for a long time, there are people to ensure the reliability and prospects for the renewal of TV. There is a dependable, specialized subdivision capable of ordering and assembling large sets of improved equipment. Additional technical assets are one of the conditions for hooking the city up to satellite TV. Who is going to meet this condition and when?

A hazy situation has developed. The TV network, which until recently was serviced by the station specialists, is now being handed out to dozens of various entities. Taking advantage of economic independence, housing organizations—the REU [Repair and Maintenance

Administration] and the PREU [Production Repair and Maintenance Administration] repudiate technical service contracts with the service collective. They sign new contracts with a variety of firms: from small enterprises to cooperatives. The latter have neither experience in operating such systems nor established technical facilities. The collective of the station is not concerned about losing a segment of its profits—the latter are almost entirely transferred to state revenue anyway. They are alarmed by the squandering of the TV network which may be easily and promptly wrecked given inexpert service, and which may be difficult and time-consuming to restore later.

Advantages gained by many cooperatives through operating the TV network are another aspect of the problem. Paid video rentals for residents of the houses serviced are arranged by using the network. There is no argument: This is spicy seasoning for our bland domestic TV diet. However, this path for developing television in the city is not very promising. Hooking up home screens to satellite TV will fill the spare channels on which cooperative TV serials are now shown. It will also draw the attention of an overwhelming segment of the audience. Of course, the station plans to provide satellite TV first to precisely those rayons with which it has technical service contracts. A ruinous competitor for video cooperatives will come along. After all, it is hopeless to compete on the air with the output of the best TV companies whose programs the entire world watches.

Union's Expulsion of Kravchenko Scored

PM1904161391 Moscow PRAVDA in Russian
17 Apr 91 Second Edition p 2

[V. Kozhemyako report: "Democratic Stick? Expelled From Journalists' Union for... Thinking Differently"]

[Text] So, it has happened. "Democratic dictatorship," about which so much has been said in certain circles recently, has been launched. And not just anywhere but in our own Journalists' Union, which, you might think, is called upon to set an example of really democratic relations and of a diversity of creative views. Let us recall that it was unanimously maintained at the journalists' recent congress that the union must be a professional, creative organization. In fact, it turns out that we have before us something exclusively administrative or even simply punitive.

What other explanation is there for the fact reported in the newspaper MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS? L. Kravchenko, chairman of the State Television and Radio Company, has been expelled from membership of the Moscow Journalists' Union by a resolution of the union's secretariat.

Everything here is bewildering. Starting with the headline: "He Did Not Appear Before the Moscow Journalists' Union, But..." Even during the worst stagnation times we journalists deemed it necessary to fight to

ensure that every personal case was, without fail, examined in the presence of the "defendant." But now, it turns out, this is certainly not compulsory.

What of the primary journalist organization? Did it discuss this painful and acute question? Did it have its say? Again, no, and one cannot understand why. I counted six signatures beneath the resolution reproduced in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS. Does this mean that six people decided everything? Six... A few more than the notorious and infamous "trios" that carried out reprisals in the thirties.

To all appearances, however, the leadership of the Moscow Journalists' Union considers such procedural circumstances insignificant trifles. The chief thing, they say, is not how he was expelled but for what. But it is here that there are still greater grounds for bewilderment.

Let us take, for example, the first and most important wording in the resolution: "For instances of the virtual introduction of censorship in television." What censorship is it talking about? As far as I understand it—about the television leadership's interference in particular programs and about attempts to somehow influence the political and artistic course of broadcasting.

But, pardon me: Does Pavel Gusev, who heads the Moscow Journalists' Union and, at the same time, is editor of MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS, really have no influence at all over the thrust of his publication? Do he and the newspaper's other leaders really not interfere at all in the journalists' work, which goes its own way—according to the will of the waves, so to speak? Oh, I don't believe it! The newspaper's line is quite definite—it does not print just any old thing. And where in the world is there a publication or a television and radio broadcasting company which publishes everything, absolutely unobserved by the leadership?

Another point in the guilty verdict against Kravchenko—the replacement of topical political programs by "low-grade entertainment shows." What can one say? There has been and still is a lot of dispute over the entertainment programs, which increased after the new leader came to Central Television. Some people like them, others do not. It is generally acknowledged that these programs include very successful ones, unsuccessful ones, and, maybe, even low-grade ones. But is this really grounds for expulsion from the Journalists' Union? I, for example, categorically maintain that low-grade articles appear in MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS from time to time. Does this mean the editor should at once be expelled from the creative union?

Pardon us, people will say to me, but you call articles low-grade on the basis of your own taste. I agree. But why must Pavel Gusev's taste be more decisive than mine or someone else's? The resolution refers to "numerous protests from viewers." But I know that, in addition to protests, which really do exist, PRAVDA and Central Television receive many hundreds and even thousands of letters ardently supporting the changes in television

associated with Kravchenko's work. So why is it that account is taken of the opinion of some viewers but not at all of others? Strange...

We are all different. Both viewers and journalists. With different tastes and political views, with different predilections and aspirations. And the press organs in which we work do not resemble one another, either. As I understand it, it is the task of the Journalists' Union to unite colleagues on some common creative platform. Certainly not by seeking like-mindedness. For it will be a bad thing if all newspapers, for example, became like MOSKOVSKIY KOMSOMOLETS alone. But it turns out that they are now goading us toward precisely this. But what if I do not want to go where the secretariat of the Moscow union is driving me?

There used to be Suslov, the country's formidable and omnipotent ideologue. If he took a dislike to some creative worker, he could decide his fate in an instant. Suslov no longer exists. But it seems that nature abhors a vacuum. There is Gusev. Here I am, writing these lines, and my hand is shaking involuntarily. If Pavel Nikolayevich takes a dislike to my article, he will call me "onto the carpet." And he will drive me out of the Journalists' Union, of which I have been a member almost since its very inception—since September 1957... Well? A perfectly real eventuality.

Honestly, all this is sad, citizens-comrades-gentlemen. And rather frightening, I confess.

Ecology Committee Chairman Salykov on New Chernobyl Victim Law

91WN0447A Moscow TRUD in Russian 8 May 91 p 1

[Interview with Kakimbek Salykov, chairman of the Ecology Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, by V. Badurkin: "Social Protection for the Victims of Chernobyl"]

[Text] Yesterday in the country's Supreme Soviet, there was an article-by-article discussion of the Law of the USSR: "On the Social Protection of Citizens Suffering as a Result of the Chernobyl Disaster." The accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station not only caused a very large-scale ecological calamity but was also reflected in the most direct way in the fates of many millions of people.

Kakimbek Salykov, chairman of the Ecology Committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet, tells our correspondent about the nature and some special features of the new law.

[Salykov] I will begin by saying that the passed law is only a link in the State Program for overcoming the consequences of the disaster intended for the period through the year 2010. In the five years since the accident, new social and economic living conditions have arisen in the regions contaminated with radioactivity, hundreds of thousands of people were forced to evacuate and resettle, and thousands of citizens who took part in the elimination of the consequences are worried about their health—and not without reason. It is necessary to protect their rights. This is the aim of the law.

[Badurkin] Kakimbek Salykovich, were not union legislators late in this matter? After all, the corresponding enforceable acts have already been passed in Belorussia and the Ukraine....

[Salykov] Precisely this is one of the special features of the law. It was supposed not only to take into account the realities of the republic but to go further and expand and specify the measures for the social protection of all citizens who came to harm. A second feature of the law is that it acts directly. That is, it directly defines the amount of compensation and lists the privileges and rights. And as you know, difficulties always arise where money is involved. The possibilities of the republics, especially of Belorussia, are quite limited and for this reason the appearance of a union law was necessary and proper. But preliminary estimates indicate that it will "cost" about 6 billion rubles.

[Badurkin] Many government decrees have been passed during these years that define the privileges for those suffering from the accident. What is new about the law?

[Salykov] In my view, the main thing is that the law defined a basic indicator for the making of a decision on the carrying out of protective measures and the compensation of losses—a level of radiation exposure of the population not exceeding 0.1 rem in relation to the natural background radiation.

In addition, the entire "contaminated" territory will now be divided into four zones: alienation, resettlement, living with protective measures, and living with a privileged social and economic status. Their boundaries will be set depending upon the radiation situation and will be reviewed no less frequently than once every three years. A special list of privileges and compensation is determined for each zone or, more accurately, for the people living or working in it.

[Badurkin] Could you tell about them in more detail?

[Salykov] I do not think that there is any need to do that today. The law will soon be published. I will note only that in preparing it we did not forget about anyone. All of those who are or were in any way affected by the consequences of the disaster receive compensation and privileges.

[Badurkin] Kakimbek Salykovich, it is well known that here in our country there are many people who suffered from radiation even before the disaster at Chernobyl. In particular those who participated in the testing of nuclear weapons. The problems of their social protection were also raised repeatedly in our newspaper. Do the provisions of the law extend to them?

[Salykov] The decree of the USSR Supreme Soviet on the procedure for the implementation of this law provides that beginning in 1992 compensation and privileges will be extended to all those with radiation sickness and also those who were disabled as a result of radiation accidents and their consequences at civilian and military installations.

At the same time, it is proposed that measures be specified for the social protection of persons having suffered from these accidents and their consequences. I think that the corresponding draft law will be prepared by the time of the fall session of parliament.

Book Cites Goskomgidromet Head Testimony on Post-Chernobyl Cover-Up

91WN0477B Moscow KOMSOMOLSKAYA PRAVDA in Russian 26 Apr 91 p 2

[Article by People's Deputy of the USSR A. Yaroshinskaya: "Truth With the Stamp of 'Secret': Thousands of People Were the Heroes and Victims of the Chernobyl Tragedy"]

[Text] This first became known to people's deputies of the USSR on 24 June 1989 in the course of the discussion of the candidacy of Yu.A. Izrael for the post of chairman of the USSR State Committee for Hydrometeorology [Goskomgidromet] at the conference of the committee of the USSR Supreme Soviet on questions of ecology and the rational use of natural resources. In speaking to the deputies about his program, Yuriy Antoniyevich anticipated their questions and declared:

"I will tell about two problems in which we took part. In the first place, we took part in the cleaning up of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Here Goskomgidromet took a most active part beginning on the 26th. Ten aircraft and helicopters were already working there three or four days after the accident. All of the meteorological stations in the European part of the country were involved. This is more than 1,000 stations. These data were reported **every day** (my emphasis—A.Ya.) to the government commission in Chernobyl and to the commission of the Politburo, which was located in Moscow. Extremely important decisions were made on the basis of these data. As you know, 116,000 people were evacuated. Subsequently the Ministry of Health and Gosagroprom calculated with us the possible consequences based on these data. The Ministry of Health and Gosagroprom made decisions with respect to continuing vital functions in those regions that were subjected to radioactive contamination.

"Information on the contamination was regularly transmitted not only to the directing agencies but also to the councils of ministers of the republics subjected to radiation. Above all this was Belorussia, the Ukraine, Bryansk Oblast, and the corresponding oblispolkoms.

"As for the data on the villages, I have this all of this information in my folder and it was given to the councils of ministers and oblispolkoms so that they could pass it on to the villages."

This was essentially the first official information about who received the measurements of radiation levels and contamination maps.

The next forced "undressing" of those who concealed the information obtained was done by Yu. A. Izrael within three weeks, on 12 July 1989 in the session hall, where his candidacy for the post of chairman of USSR Goskomgidromet was proposed in the name of the Government of the USSR. Here Yuriy Anfoniyeovich, understanding that all the blasts of the deputies' indignation will be vented on him, said even more:

"From the first day after the accident until today, this information was communicated to the Politburo commission headed by Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov, to the government commission that was working in Chernobyl, to the Central Committee of the CPSU, to the councils of ministers of the union republics, and to the oblispolkoms. And they are obliged to get the information to the population."

The lobbies of the deputies' building resounded with the demands of deputies that a special parliamentary commission be established to look into the reasons for the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and to evaluate the officials who concealed information about the radiation situation in the course of three years after the accident. And the louder these voices were and the more realistic this became, the more intensively Izrael issued information to the deputies about how promptly the machinery of Goskomgidromet worked. Having

begun in 1989 with the organizations and departments to which information was sent from the first days after the accident, by 12 April 1990 Yuriy Antoniyeovich had already proceeded to the specific family names of high and very high officials. Precisely this was the day of the joint session of two committees of the USSR Supreme Soviet—on questions of ecology and the rational use of natural resources and on the protection of the health of the people. It preceded the parliamentary hearings on Chernobyl.

This is what Yu.A. Izrael said under the pressure of the people's deputies: "...on 27 April, Goskomgidromet send a report on the radiation situation in the region of the Chernobyl accident with diagrams with the heading at the top 'To the CPSU'; there were no family names on this document." From out of the silence in the hall was heard the distinct question: "Did they also send it to the watchman?" In response Yuriy Antoniyeovich explained: "There is a routing form. If I prepare a program on behalf of the Council of Ministers, I do not write to Comrade Ryzhkov but I write 'USSR Council of Ministers.' There is such a form...."

INSTRUCTION OF THE THIRD MAIN DIRECTORATE OF THE USSR MINISTRY OF HEALTH ON 27 JUNE 1986 "ON THE STRENGTHENING OF THE REGIMEN OF SECRECY IN THE PERFORMANCE OF WORK TO ELIMINATE THE CONSEQUENCES OF THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER STATION":

"...4. Classify information on the accident... 8. Classify information on the results of treatment. 9. Classify information on the extent of radioactive exposure of personnel participating in the elimination of the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station.

Chief of the Third Main Directorate of the USSR Ministry of Health Shulzhenko:

Still another document issued by the government commission itself: "LIST OF INFORMATION ON QUESTIONS ABOUT THE ACCIDENT AT THE CHERNOBYL NUCLEAR POWER STATION THAT ARE NOT SUBJECT TO PUBLICATION IN THE OPEN PRESS OR RADIO AND TELEVISION BROADCASTS," No 423 FROM 24 SEPTEMBER 1987. It prescribed that the following should be classified: "1. Information on levels of exposure to radiation at individual population centers that exceed the permitted level (GDU). 2. Information on the indices for the worsening of physical working capacity and the loss of occupational skills by personnel working under the special conditions at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station or of persons brought in to eliminate the effects of the accident."

...The minister was nervous, and for good reason. All at once Izrael revealed dozens of family names of high-ranking persons to whom the information was sent from the first days. I quote from the original shorthand record that was kept at that time in the parliamentary hearings:

"To the CPSU Central Committee and Council of Ministers without family names on 27 April (here and further, 1986), to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov and the USSR Council of Ministers on 30 April, to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov on 2 May, to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov on 3 May, to Nikolay Ivanovich Ryzhkov on 4 May, to Murakhovskiy on 7 May, to Murakhovskiy on 12 May, to Gusev on 13 May, to Kovalev on 15 May, to Shcherbina on 18 May, to Gorbachev on 21 May, to Ryzhkov on 21 May, to Kovalev on 27 May, to Murakhovskiy on 24 May, and to Ryzhkov, Ligachev, Dolgikh, Chebrikov, Vlasov, Sokolov, Vorotnikov, Murakhovskiy, and Shchepin on 26 May. If necessary, I can continue." This is a day-by-day account. But it was also kept by the hour. That same night, at 0300 (that is, literally an hour or an hour and a half after the accident), it was reported from Chernobyl to V.V. Maryin, who at that time was in charge of the nuclear energy sector of the CPSU Central Committee. All of those named are responsible persons from the Government of the USSR, Russia, and KGB, and members of the country's top political leadership—the CPSU Central Committee and Politburo.

EXPLANATION OF THE CENTRAL MILITARY MEDICAL BOARD OF THE USSR DEFENSE MINISTRY, 8 JULY 1987, No 295, SENT TO THE MILITARY COMMISSARIATS:

"1. Leukemia and leucosis should be considered among the distant consequences from the action of the ionized irradiation and in a causal relationship with it, appearing five to 10 years after the irradiation in doses exceeding 50 rad. 2. The presence of acute somatic disorders as well as signs of the exacerbation of chronic illnesses in persons involved in the elimination of the effects of the accident and not having acute radiation sickness should not be linked causally with the effect of the ionized irradiation. 3. In putting together the evidence on the illness for persons previously brought in to work at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station and not suffering radiation sickness, do not reflect in Point 10 the fact of their involvement in the indicated work and the total radiation dose below the level of radiation sickness.

Chief of the 10th Medical Consultative Commission,
Colonel of the Medical Service Bakshutov."

Yu.A. Izrael:

"An operational group was organized in the Ukraine. At that time, besides these comrades, they also regularly started to include in the operational group a civil defense staff, which was also involved in this work. And, of course, departments—the Ukrainian SSR Academy of Sciences, the Ukrainian SSR Ministry of Health, etc. In addition, these maps also went to the oblispolkoms or to the obkoms; at that time we did not distinguish here. We sent absolutely all of the information to the Ukrainian and Belorussian councils of ministers and somewhat later to the Council of Ministers of the RSFSR." On 26 April 1986, to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian

Communist Party, First Secretary V.V. Shcherbitskiy, Secretary Kachura of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee, and the Ukrainian SSR Supreme Soviet. To V.S. Shevchenko, chairman of its Presidium and member of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee. Also, to Bakhtin and the Ukrainian SSR Council of Ministers—Lishko, Boyko, Kachalovskiy, and Kolomiys.

The documents that were sent to them stated that the levels of radiation in Kiev increased abruptly on 30 April 1986. It is well known, for example, that on Nauka Prospekt the radiation levels were a maximum of 2.2 millirem and a minimum of 1.4 millirem. "Toward evening they declined," Izrael goes on to explain, "and the level was 0.61 on 1 May, 0.85 on 2 May, 0.7 on 7 May, etc. After that it is already declining. That is, on the 30th (of April 1986—A.Ya.), there was a dramatic increase in the level of radiation at precisely 1300. We passed this information on to the Central Committee of the Ukrainian Communist Party and to the Ukrainian Council of Ministers. And our information was known to the leadership.... It was sent to Shcherbitskiy and Shevchenko....and to a number of Central Committee secretaries."

Yu.A. Izrael: "On 7 May, there was a meeting of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Central Committee, to which they invited me, Ilyin, an academician, and one other representative of the Biophysics Institute, whose family name I will specify later but do not remember right now. At first they verbally asked for our opinion on the evacuation of the city of Kiev, because by that date some of the population had spontaneously begun to leave Kiev. Not just children but also adults started to leave. The cash boxes were overflowing. I do not know but apparently this question was examined at the meeting of the Politburo of the Ukrainian Communist Party Central Committee under the influence of these reasons. They asked for my opinion and that of Ilyin. I said that I can present (which I did) data on the levels of radioactive contamination. Ilyin and I assessed the dose loads in comparison with the criteria that were set for evacuation. On this basis, we, as experts, stated that at these levels of radiation there was no justification for the evacuation of the population from the city of Kiev. At this point, when Shcherbitskiy told us to "put it down in writing," we sat and wrote for several hours. We understood that we were performing the responsible role of experts. We did that this and we wrote. Shcherbitskiy put this document in the safe and closed it.... "Good," they said.

And today, five long and painful years later, which millions of people lived through in ignorance of the danger and enveloped in the deceit of the officials, many of them are still holding key positions in the Communist Party, supreme soviets, and governments of the country and republics. Some of them left for their well-deserved—as we generally say here—rest and are receiving fabulous special pensions. As, for example, in the case of V.M. Kavun, our former first secretary of the

Zhitomir Obkom of the Ukrainian Communist Party. He moved from Zhitomir to Kiev and here they immediately offered him a state apartment and gave him a specially increased pension. By the way—and this is also quite secret—I learned about this from, N.I. Ignatovich, the chairman of the parliamentary commission on advantages and privileges. He told me how difficult it was for his commission to obtain from the Council of Ministers a list of special pensioners at the national level. It turns out that in spite of a pension "ceiling" of 250 rubles [R] for civilians and R300 for military people, apparently there are still superpensions for some special services. They are the ones who receive R500 and even R700. The list of these pensioners also included Vasiliy Mikhailovich Kavun, a holder of five orders of Lenin, orders of the Red Banner of Labor and Friendship of Nations, countless medals and different decorations, and a Hero of Socialist Labor. By the way, he received his fifth Order of Lenin 2 years after the accident. (Perhaps it was for keeping silent about Chernobyl, among other things?) After all, as A.S. Malinovskiy, chairman of the Zhitomir Oblispolkom, stated on 31 August 1990 in response to my query as a deputy, "from the first days after the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station, an oblast civil defense network of observation and laboratory control was set up to monitor the status of the radiation situation in population centers in northern rayons. The first reports on the strength of the dose of gamma radiation in individual population centers began to arrive at the oblispolkom from the oblast civil defense staff on 28 April 1986." And from Narodichi on April 26.

ORDER OF THE USSR MINISTER OF POWER AND ELECTRIFICATION A.I. MAYORETS. It speaks of the information that should be kept secret from the public. That included data on the accidents and fires at power and construction facilities of the USSR Ministry of Power and Electrification, contamination of the environment, the breakdown of basic equipment and the level of material losses and human victims, etc.

Former leaders at the oblast level have now been promoted. Today Deputy Chairman of the Zhitomir Oblispolkom G.A. Gotovchits is head of the Ukrainian state committee for the protection of the population against the effects of the accident at the Chernobyl Nuclear Power Station. Yu.P. Spizhenko, formerly in charge of the oblispolkom health department, is now minister of health of the Ukrainian SSR. G.S. Tarazevich, former chairman of the Belorussian Supreme Soviet Presidium, is now head of the Commission for National Policy and International Relations of the USSR Supreme Soviet. The list can be continued.

Nor did they let A.Ye. Romanenko, former minister of health of the Ukrainian SSR, fall. They put him in the chair of the director of the All-Union Center for Radiation Medicine. Almost all of them persistently assured us from the beginning until recently that "nothing was

threatening the health of children," and then they said that they "had no information," they "did not know," etc.

When Deputy Vitaliy Chelyshev asked Izrael about the First of May demonstration in Kiev after the explosion, Yuyiy Antoniyevich answered: "I repeat once more that neither I personally nor a single representative of Goskomgidromet participated in the discussion of this matter or knew whether or not there would be a demonstration."

Three months later, in a discussion with deputies and experts in the Committee on Ecology on 20 July 1990, Yu.A. Izrael continued to declassify, even revealing details on practically every radioactive cloud.

Yu.A. Izrael: "This map shows what is most essential.... Yes, to put it concisely, this is an accurate map, as are all of the maps or, more precisely, the diagrams that we sent to the Central Committee and Council of Ministers. Exposures were taken every day. After three or four days, we already had eight aircraft and helicopters that also measured the overall gamma radiation—the strength of the dose and the spectrum of the gamma radiation.

"—since I was in Chernobyl and in Kiev, I regularly sent telegrams from Kiev to Ryzhkov (every other day) and to Secretary of the KPSU Central Committee Dolgikh less frequently."

Ultimately Izrael moved to the operational group of the Politburo and—by name—to the government commission.

Yu.A. Izrael: "We reported to the operational group of the Politburo. But it was at the end of July when we reported. There were three memoranda. From each council of ministers, I emphasize. The Council of Ministers itself worked on its own with the oblispolkoms of the Ukraine, Belorussia, and Russia. Ryzhkov was in charge of the Politburo group.

"This commission met exceptionally frequently. I do not know exactly but I think that during May it met at least every other day. After that somewhat less frequently.

"The government commission was headed by the deputy chairmen of the Council of Ministers. The first was Shcherbina, the second Silayev, the third Voronin, the fourth Maslyukov, the fifth Gusev, the sixth Vedernikov, and the seventh Shcherbina."

THEY KNEW. They all knew. And they knew everything.

Yuriy Antoniyevich wanted at all costs to show that he performed his duty well, that he is not guilty of anything, and that the publicizing of the information was not his doing. Here is the response that he repeated in different versions during several hours of personal contact: "As for the official information—yes, we sent the full information to the councils of ministers. And speaking of the oblast committees, we sent these data to the Gomel

Obkom. By the way, the Gomel Obkom was the most active.... We sent these data to Mogilev. I have this information.

"I have a map. It is another matter that the isotope composition went to them later. I have proof that they distributed even to the rayon party committees and rayispolkoms...." People's Deputy of the USSR Vitaliy Chelyshev asked why the population was not informed. Izrael answered by saying: "Ask this question to the Council of Ministers of the republics, because our duty was to inform the leaders and they take it from there...."

And here is what they did with it.

FROM THE ADDRESS OF MINISTER OF HEALTH OF THE UKRAINIAN SSR A.YE. ROMANENKO ON REPUBLIC TELEVISION ON THE 10TH DAY OF THE TRAGEDY.

"Do not drive out into the countryside, close your shutters, and wash down the premises...."

It was not until after 20 May, that is, almost a month after the accident, that the order was issued for several regions: do not drink your own milk. But, on the other hand, this is the kind of remarkable concern that our USSR Goskomgidromet expressed about the "dirty" milk in Poland: "...questions about the consumption of milk in the territory of Poland (our suggestions): 0.1 milliroentgen per hour—this was reported to Ryzhkov." A touching concern about our Slavic brothers in other countries, is it not?

In the three years after Chernobyl, our official medicine—the USSR Ministry of Health headed by Ye.I. Chazov—officially changed the maximum allowable dose of irradiation three times! First it was 70 rem over a 70-year human lifespan, then it was 50 rem, and finally, beginning in 1987, it was 35 rem. But it was only 25 rem prior to Chernobyl.

In all the hearings and in all his interviews, articles, and addresses, Izrael was completely unable to understand what was obvious to every conscientious person: warn about the danger, for you knew, reported "to the leadership," and understood the threat, especially for children. He knew and remained silent. He persisted in his silence for 3 years and duly continued to report information "to the top." He received the order of Lenin for Chernobyl.

[Boxed material]

Academician A. Aleksandrov—was one of the initiators of atomic power. Just as all the other founders, he was among the first to experience the effects of radiation in his own organism. The author of the "Chernobyl" reactor, he remained loyal to it in spite of the storm of accusations. He was consulted by telephone on every action in Chernobyl. He soon left his post as president of the USSR Academy of Sciences.

Academician V. Legasov—former first deputy to Aleksandrov in the Nuclear Power Institute. He flew to Chernobyl with the government commission at 2000 on

26 April. He declared as early as 2 May that the effects of this large-scale accident will be very long-lasting. A year and a half later, he committed suicide under mysterious circumstances.

B. Shcherbina—former deputy chairman of the USSR Council of Ministers. Precisely he was the one heading the government commission from the first days. On the evening of the 26th, he made the decision to evacuate Pripyat, which did not begin until the next day. Working for the first time under the conditions of a nuclear disaster, he himself received a considerable dose.

A. Adamovich—Belorussian writer and people's deputy of the USSR. For five years, he has been fighting—alas, almost without results—for the resettlement of people from the contaminated territories. He was the first to raise the question in public about the radioactive cloud that headed for Moscow and that the services of Goskomgidromet placed on the approaches to the capital.

Yu. Izrael—chairman of USSR Goskomgidromet. It was precisely "his" people who carried out and continue to carry out the dosimetric monitoring of the contaminated territories. In the words of the chairman, there was no cloud moving toward Moscow. This story remains a secret.

A. Grishchenko—a helicopter pilot from Chernobyl. Just as all the first participants in the "elimination of the effects," he knew little about radiation and therefore he worked bravely and without thought above the burning reactor. He died of leucosis last year after an operation in the United States.

A. Yaroshinskaya—a journalist with the newspaper RADYANSKA ZHITOMIRZHCHINA and a people's deputy of the USSR. She devoted two years to her own deputy's investigation of those who remained silent in regard to the truth about Chernobyl. It was the basis of a book that came out, an excerpt of which we are publishing today.

Former Deputy Chief Engineer Recounts Chernobyl Events

91WN0437A Kiev KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA in Russian 20 Apr 91 pp 4-5

[Interview with Anatoliy Stepanovich Dyatlov, former deputy chief engineer of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station], by A. Budnitskiy and V. Smaga, KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA correspondents, in Kiev; date not given: "The Reactor Had To Explode..."]

[Text] A new development project in Kiev. A standard apartment house constructed from prefabricated panels. The door is padded with imitation leather. We ring. It is opened by a tall man thin with disease. An intelligent and attentive gaze from beneath his whitish eyebrows. He smiles affably, extends his hand.... Only as we shook hands did we inadvertently notice the blotches of the radioactive burns on them. Pale pink, but noticeable

blotches.... This is A.S. Dyatlov, former deputy chief engineer of the Chernobyl AES [Nuclear Electric Power Station]. Convicted and sentenced—to blame, that is, for the entire well-known crime. The law and the public have seen Dyatlov as one of the principal “authors” of one of the greatest disasters of the 20th century. Anatoliy Stepanovich returned home quite recently. From the “slammer”—the term he uses for the regular-regime correctional labor colony where in the intervening years he has served out his punishment under Article 220 of the UkSSR Criminal Code. There is no point in concealing it: When we came, we thought of Dyatlov as a criminal. But when we left his apartment, we felt we were leaving the home of a victim. Our intention had been to denounce, but we were compelled to sympathize.... And to agree.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Tell us a little bit about yourself. People say that before you worked at the Chernobyl AES you worked on the power plants of nuclear submarines in the Far East.

[Dyatlov] Yes, that is so. I was born near Krasnoyarsk in 1931. By education and my work experience, I am a qualified specialist in the operation of nuclear power plants. I like my work in the Far East. But once, when I was on vacation, I stopped by the Chernobyl AES, which was then under construction. And I reached agreement with Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov, the director, that I would take the position of deputy shop chief. At Chernobyl, I took part in the installation, startup, and operation of all four power generating units. When the investigation was conducted, it all came down to putting the blame on operating personnel, and above all on Dyatlov. But the personnel of the Chernobyl AES nevertheless reasoned that the accident was not their fault at all. That is why during the trial the overwhelming majority of the witnesses did not deny my competence. What is more, the trial record itself, in my view, convincingly proves that the plant's operating personnel were innocent.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] But the verdict, as everyone knows, was quite different. How do you explain that?

[Dyatlov] The verdict could not have been otherwise. I could object, but you could not name a single case when anyone has been punished for the most important accidents in recent years except the dispatchers, the operators, the ship captains, and other “switchmen.” The point about this was well-made in a letter printed in the magazine MOLODAYA GVARDIYA from the mine rescue workers in Donetsk Oblast, who were called in when a mine filled with poisonous gas: “A system has been created and operates effectively to remove responsibility from those principally to blame for scandalous things. The monopolist himself investigates the accident, he himself outlines the measures to be taken, and he follows up their performance.”

That is exactly how it was with us at the Chernobyl plant. Not a single commission, and there were several of them, included representatives of the operating personnel, that is, those who were blamed for the accident. The commissions consisted only of the potential, and sometimes even actual, perpetrators of the disaster. They could not have been expected to conduct an objective investigation. And there was none. And no attention whatsoever was paid to the material refuting the generally accepted version in the interdepartmental scientific-technical councils on 2 and 17 July 1986, which were chaired by A.P. Aleksandrov, member of the academy. A conception was in fact worked out in those conferences that relieved the designers of the equipment of responsibility and passed all the blame onto the personnel. The material of those conferences was the basis for the report of the government commission, which was made to the Politburo of the CPSU Central Committee, to the USSR Council of Ministers, and to the IAEA [International Atomic Energy Agency].

Is there any reason to be surprised that the decisions of the Politburo should have spoken clearly about our guilt? It would have been extremely naive, then, to count on the court's objectivity.

To be sure, an unlikely statement was made from the platform of the 28th CPSU Congress to the effect that the Politburo and government had not gained an understanding of the causes of the Chernobyl accident. No, it is not true that they “did not gain an understanding,” they did not want to figure it out! After all, no one prevented the supreme bodies of government from calling on the best scientists to analyze the causes of the accident, to study carefully what we might call the history of the matter....

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] So, the Chernobyl disaster had certain prerequisites?

[Dyatlov] Prerequisites? That is not the right word! That is how an official explanation of what happened sounds. The accident occurred because of the improbable coincidence of several flagrant violations of the standards and rules of operating a power generating unit by the attendant personnel. But it is not difficult for me to prove that the RBMK-1000 reactor inevitably had to explode somewhere. Facts like that are practically unknown to the public.

In 1975, there was an accident at the Leningrad AES: A channel ruptured on the same kind of reactor as at Chernobyl. A commission consisting of staff members of the Atomic Energy Institute imeni Kurchatov analyzed what had happened and drafted a list of recommendations for improving the reactor's reliability, including recommendations on such important questions as lowering the steam reactivity coefficient and creating a fast-acting emergency safety system.

Those recommendations began to be implemented after more than 10 years, that is, after the Chernobyl disaster.

I will go on. In 1983, when our reactor at Chernobyl was loaded with fuel, physical measurements were made of the characteristics of the active zone, and an extremely dangerous phenomenon was observed—during the first five seconds, the downward movement of the emergency safety rods produced in the reactor not negative, but positive reactivity. But the commission for the physical startup deemed it possible, utterly without grounds, to allow the reactor to be operated. The inspector from Gosatomenergondzor [State Agency for Surveillance of Nuclear Power Facilities] agreed with the commission. To be sure, the scientific director, understanding the danger of this, wrote a letter to the principal designer about the need to eliminate the defect. The designer was working on a technical assignment until December 1984, and...that is where the matter ended.

It took a disaster for this issue to finally be taken seriously and for people to begin to change the rods in the reactor!

And another staggering fact. V.P. Volkov, who headed the team for reliability and safety of nuclear power plants with the RBMK reactors in the laboratory of the Institute imeni Kurchatov, repeatedly issued memoranda to all his managers making the case that the reactor was dangerous and issuing recommendations for its improvement. No one paid any attention to them. In the end, V.P. Volkov had to turn to that same A.P. Aleksandrov, member of the academy. But, alas, his memorandum was still lying there in the office of the president of the USSR Academy of Sciences when the accident took place. When the tragedy occurred, Volkov turned over all the material to the USSR Procurator's Office. After that, they no longer allowed him into the institute. Then, in his search for the truth he wrote to M.S. Gorbachev himself. The staff of the CPSU Central Committee sent V.P. Volkov's material on to Gosatomenergondzor. They created a commission which in fact acknowledged that the specialist was right.

So this is where there was in fact an improbable coincidence of scandalous negligence!

Nothing prevented A.P. Aleksandrov, member of the academy and scientific director of the project to design the reactor, and N.A. Dolellezal, member of the academy and chief designer, from improving the reactor after the accident at the Leningrad AES, after the results of the startup tests at Chernobyl, and after the serious warnings of V.P. Volkov! This would have been done in time—the disaster would not have occurred. So who are the true criminals—we or they?

In the court, incidentally, the evidence of the guilt of the reactor's designers was set aside for a separate case. No one knows how it came out. How can this be?

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Rumor has it (there have been no official announcements) that the case of the designers was halted because it had no judicial prospects. You see, they were covered by the amnesty proclaimed in connection with the 70th Anniversary of

Soviet Power. Although we are speaking now about something else. The truth about the real causes of the accident, if we have understood you correctly, still has not been stated to this day. Why not, what do you think?

[Dyatlov] Because those who are really to blame for the disaster are firmly bound by the general lie. Sometimes it is so obvious that you are simply amazed that people do not figure it out. How many times, for example, has there been mention about the failure to study the question of the influence of small doses of radiation on health? And this is being said in a country where for decades thousands of people have been working with radioactive materials! One needs only to take the medical cards, gather data on pollution by years, and construct elementary mathematical functions to learn the answer to that question.

The lie about Chernobyl is being disseminated by publications whose circulation runs into the millions. Here is an elementary example. Krivomazov, PRAVDA correspondent, quoted the chairman of the government commission to investigate the tragedy in Ufa as follows: "We recall that at Chernobyl there were four entire systems for protection 'against a fool,' and they were smart enough to turn off all four." Can it really have been just like that? If only people would think before they speak! What does he think we are—suicides, to turn off the protection?

The truth is that the RBMK-1000 reactor in 1986 did not have a single so-called "foolproof" protective system. I wrote about this to the newspaper PRAVDA, but I never received an answer.... The body of the CPSU Central Committee, like Caesar's wife, always ends up above suspicion. And this is not an isolated case. L.A. Buldakov, member of the academy, asserts in the pages of the magazine SMENA (No 24 for last year) that the evacuation of the population of Pripyat was not tardy, but was timely. How can one speak of timeliness when by noon on the 26th it could not have been clearer that people should not be living in Pripyat? A member of the academy cannot fail to understand that. Why does he say something he knows to be untrue?

I would like to emphasize: L.A. Buldakov is a medical man, he bears no direct responsibility for the accident. Now just imagine what is being said by people with the same kind of ethics who are directly responsible for the disaster, people like Anatoliy Petrovich Aleksandrov, member of the academy. From the very outset of the events and up until the present year (I am judging from a recent issue of OGONEK), he has been asserting the responsibility of the operating personnel.

Let us put our heads together. If the official version is valid as to the causes of the disaster, then why was all the information about the accident declared secret? Journalists, we suppose, could as a matter of fact get things confused. But the specialists working at AES's ought to know everything about the disaster so as not to make similar mistakes. But not a word has been said to them

because these people would immediately figure out how reliable Aleksandrov's reactor really is.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Fine, but still no one has deprived you or the other specialists of the right to vote in the court.

[Dyatlov] Right. I did not intend to keep silent. That is why the record of the trial, as I have already said, completely proves our innocence.

The forensic experts made the argument about the reliability of the reactors that at the moment of the accident those reactors had already operated about 100 reactor-years (in actuality, only 87). It sounds convincing at first. But just take a pencil. If we divide the 87 reactor-years by the 13 RBMK-1000 reactors in the country, it turns out that we must have what we had at Chernobyl every five or six years. Does anybody want that? Of course not. What is more, N.A. Dolellezal himself, member of the academy, has contributed an eloquent admission to the case. I allow myself to quote him.

"In operation with two-percent uranium enrichment, the influence of the steam effect and the reactivity is regulated by the arrangement of the channels containing the special control rods, which is strictly provided for in the operating instructions. It is impermissible to do without them because it makes the reactor uncontrollable."

Our reactor did not have additional control rods in the active zone. It follows that sooner or later it had to explode—on the admission of the chief designer himself!

Dolellezal, incidentally, is the only one of the specialists involved with reactors who has told the truth. As you see, he himself has admitted that the reactor that was at Chernobyl was uncontrollable, and the emergency safety system had not been properly designed. Aleksandrov, on the other hand, is still putting all the blame on the operating personnel and does not acknowledge anything.

Just remember: The disaster began when the emergency safety button was pressed. I would like to explain: This button is used for ordinary shutdown of the reactor under normal conditions. So, on 26 April 1986, we pressed the button under ordinary conditions envisaged by all the instructions in order to smother the reaction. Instead there was an explosion.

How is anything like that possible—the emergency safety system does not shut down the reactor, it causes it to explode? There can be only one answer—that is how it was designed. Taking into account everything that has been said, I want to state it plainly: The builders, the assemblers, the manufacturers of the equipment, and the personnel of the power plant were completely innocent in the disaster at the Chernobyl AES. The physicists and the designers must take full responsibility for it.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] The accident was a great tragedy. As in any tragedy, there are those to blame

and the rescuers. What do you say about the firemen? There are people who say that their death was all but in vain.

[Dyatlov] Perhaps, I do not know what instructions they violated. But I am firmly convinced that on 26 April the firemen saved us from a global catastrophe. If the fires that had started and which they put out had developed into a large fire and spread to the other generating units operating at nominal speed, then the scale of the tragedy would have been incomparably greater. As for the death of the firemen, there is one caveat: Even if they had been wearing special clothing, this would not have saved them from the gamma radiation. Those firemen who put out the fires on the roof from the scattered burning fuel are unquestionably heroes. Only the existence of an automatic sprinkler system could have saved them from death. But there was none on the roof. That is why we must bow to the shining memory of those courageous men.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] We understand your desire to shed light on the true causes of the disaster. But now let us speak about something else. The reactor was destroyed, radioactive pollution of the locality was rising. What personal responsibility for the effect on human beings is borne in your view by the plant's specialists? Specifically by Viktor Petrovich Bryukhanov, plant director?

[Dyatlov] It is difficult for me to make a judgment about others. I see Bryukhanov's guilt in that he sent to Kiev on the first day a report on the radiation situation with patently understated figures. But I do not suppose that that document could have influenced the decisions made later. The readings were taken regularly, and the powers that be should have made appropriate decisions on the basis of them. Bryukhanov, incidentally, was not responsible for the civil defense of the city, but only that of the plant. The decision should have been made by Vladimir Pavlovich Voloshko, civil defense chief in Prip'yat and chairman of the gorispolkom [city soviet executive committee]. It might, of course, be said that at that time Bryukhanov should have pounded his fist on the table, or something like that, and insisted on evacuation.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] The indecisiveness at that critical moment does, of course, deserve condemnation. But in discussing this we are straying from the topic of our conversation in the realm of ethics. We would like to know exactly how the charge against you in the court verdict was stated.

[Dyatlov] This is what the verdict said: "Flagrant violations of the rules set down for guaranteeing nuclear safety at a POTENTIALLY EXPLOSIVE-PRONE ENTERPRISE were the main causes that resulted in the accident." That accounts for Article 220 of the UkSSR Criminal Code, which was the basis for sentencing me to 10 years in jail. But nuclear power plants have never been considered explosive-prone enterprises as is the case, say, with powder plants! If nuclear power plants are

in fact explosive-prone, then they need to be designed and built quite differently. What utter nonsense: Before the trial, I knew that I was working at an ordinary plant, and only in the trial did I suddenly learn that it was potentially explosive-prone!

Everyone is aware of the absurdity of such a charge. The court might have easily learned that the reactor never would have exploded if it met the requirements of the normative documents adopted in the country for the safety of nuclear power plants.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] That is clear. But in the eyes of the public, you appear to be a man who undertook some absurd experiment on a full-scale reactor that was in operation. Please tell us about the nature of the experiment.

[Dyatlov] Gennadiy Petrovich Metlenko, representative of "Dontekhenenergo," and I were the authors of the program of the experiment. Even before that, he had taken part in tests of many electrical systems at the plant. The essence of the idea came down to using the kinetic energy stored in the spinning rotor of the turbogenerator while it was shut down.

In each of the station's generating units, there is a system for emergency reactor cooling. It is supposed to prevent meltdown of the active zone in a hypothetical situation—the maximum accident envisaged in the design. Rupture of a large-diameter pipe in the first loop is taken to be such an accident. So, when the maximum design accident occurs, current is shut off in the power supply system, and the generator continues to operate the feed pumps at an ever diminishing speed. And thus it must provide the supply of water to the reactor until the system for emergency long-term cooling is turned on. And we intended to conduct a test in order to find out whether the generator operated long enough to perform that operation.

The program of the experiment was written and approved. After the disaster, it was thoroughly analyzed by a great number of specialists, and no one found any mistakes. It is true that they all said that safety measures were not worked out in our program. That is true. But they were performed even before this experiment began and they were noted down in other parts of the program. So it turns out that I am guilty for not having copied the list of those measures from one section to the other!

No one wants to pay attention to the absurdity of such a charge. The expert witnesses have written: according to the instruction, a representative of the nuclear safety office should have been summoned for starting the main circulating pump. They simply did not read the entire instruction to which they were referring. It states there that this is not to be done "without special order." And that order was given....

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] You constantly mention the expert witnesses. As far as we understand, it

was on them that the court's decision directly depended. What kind of people were they?

[Dyatlov] The overwhelming majority of the experts were representatives of those same design and planning organizations that have a direct interest in preserving the honor of the uniform of their "firms." It is amoral to permit them to make a forensic analysis of the causes of the disaster. The conclusions of the experts hardly ever stand up to criticism. The program of the experiment, for instance, had been checked by many specialists, and it is invalid to say that it was incompetently written. That is the first thing. Second. They say that the program was not cleared with supervisory agencies. Yes, that is true, but the instructions in effect at the time did not call for that. And finally, third. It is obvious that the disaster could have occurred even in any other operation with such a reactor. That is not my opinion alone. I will refer just to the conclusions of the commission of Gennadiy Aleksandrovich Shashanin, deputy minister of power, who wrote a supplement to the official record of the inquiry back in May 1986. Why did the court not take this fact into account? The answer to that question is obvious. Because it had to lead public opinion away from the true causes of the accident, to obscure the matter, to conceal the names of those who were really to blame.

There has been a particularly large amount of speculation over the question of shutting off the emergency reactor cooling system during the experiment. Nonspecialists are perplexed: How is it that an accident occurred, and the reactor emergency cooling system was turned off? That is an outrage! Not everyone knows that the instructions permitted that system to be turned off for the time allowed by the plant's chief engineer. And it was he who approved the program. I will go further. The emergency system was not designed for such a case. Even if it had been turned on, it would not have managed to begin to operate. And, most important, it does not seem that it could have helped. The reactor was completely destroyed by the explosion, the reactor channels were ruptured, the fuel had been turned to dust. There was no longer anything to cool.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Do not be offended, but we must ask you: So those who in actuality were convicted for the accident are criminals or victims of the disaster?

[Dyatlov] We are unquestionably victims. The personnel in the unit were the first to take the fatal blow of radiation. And those who recovered also had to take the shame of the judicial inquiry and the monstrous injustice of public condemnation. Those who wield the power in our country always have "switchmen" at hand....

Only death rescued my comrades from shame: Sasha Akimov, shift chief in the unit, Lenya Toptunov, reactor operator, and Valera Perevozchenko, shift chief in the reactor shop. It is scandalous that the cynicism of our bureaucratic machine knows no bounds. The USSR

Procurator's Office hit upon the idea of sending documents to the families of Toptunov, Perevozchenko, and Akimov to the effect that they were relieved of judicial accountability "because of their death." Be aware, it said, that your deceased sons, fathers, and husbands are criminals.

To be fair, it should be said that now the truth about what happened at Chernobyl is nevertheless making its way. There are sensational documents, but for the present they are known to practically no one, such as the report of A.A. Yadrichinskiy, inspector of Gospromatomenergonadzor, the report of Prof. B.G. Dubovskiy, the conclusions of the commission chaired by N.A. Shteynberg, and a host of other documents. They offer a competent analysis of the true causes of the disaster, and our innocence has been practically proven. These documents have not been made secret, they can be read in the Commission for Investigation of the Causes

of the Accident at the Chernobyl AES of the USSR Supreme Soviet. Why is no one writing about them now?

I attach all hopes of justice to the work of that commission.

[KOMSOMOLSKOYE ZNAMYA] Anatoliy Stepanovich, how do you intend to live after this?

[Dyatlov] My only task is to make the truth about the causes of the disaster public, to rescue from shame at least the memory of my comrades who were killed. I have no other personal plans now, nor can I have. I received 550 rems during the accident, and in addition approximately 100 rems during my previous work. My skin has been burned by radiation. I am now in disability group two. My life is coming to an end. That is why I think day and night of only one thing, I want only one thing—the truth and nothing but the truth.

Dzasokhov, Academicians, Educators on Future of Znaniye Society

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[Article consisting of guest contributions by A.S. Dzasokhov, chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs and member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo, and by other politicians, educators and academicians: "Sow the Reasonable, the Good and the Eternal"; first three paragraphs are source introduction]

[Excerpts] In all ages and among all peoples the dissemination of knowledge among the masses, knowledge which helps people to find reliable answers to the questions presented by life, has always been considered the great mission of education.

The "guest pages" of our journal contain the reflections of politicians, scholars and other public figures, as well as education and cultural workers on how to raise the mission of education to the level of today's global requirements and to infuse it with new humanistic content, which breaks through ideological dogmas and national boundaries.

A.S. Dzasokhov—chairman of the USSR Supreme Soviet Committee on International Affairs, member of the CPSU Central Committee Politburo; K.V. Frolov—academician and vice-president of the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the board of the All-Union Znaniye Society; G. Domen—chairman of the the board of the German Union of Higher People's Schools; M.I. Demchuk—corresponding member of the BSSR Academy of Sciences, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the board of the Belorussian Znaniye Society; Ye.V. Golovinskiy—chairman of the Federation of Societies for the Dissemination of Knowledge (Bulgaria); S.P. Kapitsa—doctor of physicomathematical sciences, professor, Moscow Municipal Organization of the RSFSR Znaniye Society; U. Damacelli—staff member of the East-West Cultural Center (Italy) A.A. Plotniyeks—corresponding member of the Latvian Academy of Sciences, doctor of juridical sciences, deputy of the USSR and Latvian supreme soviets, chairman of the board of the Latvian Znaniye Society; A.V. Raukas—academician of the Estonian Academy of Sciences, chairman of the board of the Estonian Znaniye Society; M.S. Salakhitdinov—academician and president of the UzSSR Academy of Sciences, chairman of the board of the UzSSR Znaniye Society; V.S. Semenov—doctor of philosophical sciences, chairman of the sociopolitical propaganda section of the All-Union Znaniye Society board; V.I. Shinkaruk—corresponding member and academician of the USSR of the USSR Academy of Sciences, USSR people's deputy, chairman of the Ukrainian Znaniye Society.

Education and Global Problems

[A.S. Dzasokhov] The purpose of our discussion is to answer one main question: do the humanistic traditions,

values and priorities possess the strength and ability to resolve today's global contradictions, to help the world community to defend peace, to overcome economic adversities, ecological disasters, national and regional conflicts?

In the USSR an active process of returning to people their individual uniqueness, their material and spiritual integrity is taking place. Today it is the individual person who is understood as the measure of all our work. It is time to translate into reality K. Marx's idea that the free development of each person is the condition for the free development of all. Herein lies the main humanistic priority of socialism, the humanistic essence of the socialist ideal; herein lies the entire sense of perestroika in our country in the areas of economics and politics, and in the social and spiritual spheres.

Despite the difficulties and contradictions of the perestroika processes, the humanistic theme running throughout the state's domestic and foreign policy is steadily growing stronger. The following processes are intensifying: the development of a law-based state, the formation of market relations with many forms of property, democratization and the protection of individual rights.

Understanding as we do that knowledge, education and culture actively influence a person's view of and feelings about the world, as well as his understanding of values, ethics and morality, these spheres are becoming priority ones; they are playing a growing role in the spiritual rebirth of our society. The spiritual life of society needs a firm legislative base, the necessary financing, and intensified processes of democratization and self-rule. The first steps along this path have been taken. An ukase of the USSR President: "Concerning the Status of the USSR Academy of Sciences" has been adopted.

The Soviet people and public opinion abroad are interested in seeing the Soviet Union survive and emerge successfully from its trials, in seeing it remain a single, strong state; they are convinced that the Union treaty will provide a new basis for inter-nationality relations and will ensure the rights and freedoms of the individual in the proper way.

The essence of our policy is to invite the cooperation of everyone who believes in freedom, democracy and humanistic values; it is to bring together all progressive forces.

At the same time certain state and political circles are attempting to interfere in our internal affairs, to cast doubt on the USSR policy which is aimed at broad cooperation with the international community. At this difficult time educational organizations can play an important role in developing humanistic traditions and in strengthening the ties between countries and people. It is necessary to integrate the efforts of national and international organizations of historians, philosophers, economists, psychologists, scientists, ecologists and of literary and artistic figures.

In today's complex age of technological progress we need to approach the problems of culture in a new way. After all, culture is a component of enlightenment. Let us recall that the great humanist Nikolay Rerikh divided the word "culture" into two parts: "cult," or reverence, and "ur," or light. Reverence for the light.

Today there are few who doubt that it is only through the affirmation of the good, the beautiful and the light that mankind will succeed in saving itself from catastrophe. But after all, for centuries mankind has been carelessly pushing aside these well-known truths, as a result the manifestations of sharp political ambitions and of religious and national quarrels, as well as intolerance of different opinions and a reluctance to understand and listen to each other have all become so very frequent. Hence the conflicts, the wars, and the blood of innocent people shed in our country and in many corners of the world.

The new thinking opens up for us a completely different approach to the resolution of problems—even the most acute—based on the affirmation of universal human values. After all, if one analyzes the problems and tasks which face all peoples, as well as the expectations and interests of people in any country, we discover that they have much in common, that they are much alike.

The desire of all people for a new, successful life, for happiness and peace is identical. Education must contribute to a broader and deeper understanding of these truths, to an awareness of the fact that the world is one, that people share a common future, and that preserving and improving it is the common task of each and every person.

The present world is not the world of 70, 30 or even five years ago. The rate of social change staggers the imagination; the state of civilization on our planet has not turned out to correspond completely to any one prognosis of previous years. On this subject, the final goal of every predictive methodology is to see through to the future. We must especially strive toward this, taking into account the very fine nuances in the current state of society and its contradictory developmental tendencies. Here it is essential to stimulate in a definite way the thinking representatives of the social sciences; it is essential to encourage special sociological investigations, public opinion polls and much else. What we are talking about is moving to qualitatively new forms, methods and means of struggle for the minds and hearts of the broad masses, of sensitively picking up not only the current but also the coming problems and contradictions of society.

Many of our difficulties of today result above all from the unusual persistence of the stereotypes of consciousness, from inertness of thought, and from the conservatism of habits inherited from the past. At times it is more difficult to restructure thought and to change consciousness than to act.

This is a very important task for the educational organizations of all countries.

[K.V. Frolov] At present we are assigning great significance to our international ties in the area of education. It would probably be a good idea if we simply signed a series of contracts and established some contract relations with a number of foreign countries on a whole range of subjects. These could include adult education and the improvement of our lecture facilities, and, finally, specific projects for the joint publications of magazines, journals and newspapers. In the final analysis this is about the education of the new man, the man of the future. Today we talk about the education of adults. But we also need to think about what kind of education our children will receive in 20-30 years. And in this regard international cooperation and the study of foreign experience, including the experience of international educational organizations, are very important. Exchange programs to share modern curricula and methods of instruction, as well as scientific knowledge, modern technology and intellectual potential, are also important. At present all this is becoming the dominant factor in the establishment of sound relations among peoples. We are convinced that holding, for example, an international business fair in Moscow (and we plan to organize "days of international business" in the very near future), including broad discussions and lectures which will be held then in connection with the reforms being carried out in our country and in Eastern Europe, will facilitate the strengthening of firm ties between East and West not only in the business sphere but also in the spiritual and intellectual spheres. [passage omitted]

[Gunther Domen] In educational work, especially in Eastern Europe, but also in other regions, more attention should be devoted to teaching people the theory of the market and a market economy. We already have some experience in this area, and this experience provides evidence that people must be informed not only of the advantages of the market but also of its inadequacies. The market is not a universal solution to all our problems. I am somewhat disturbed that people who are inadequately acquainted with the market idealize it. But the market is not an ideal solution for all problems. The market will never help you to achieve social justice, equal opportunities or a stable ecological situation. I get the impression that people who do not know the market from their own experience put too much faith in it; they believe it to be a panacea for all problems. Of course, it has many advantages, but it also has many disadvantages. And people need to talk about all this, to explain the need for a counterbalance to the market. In Germany we have a large-scale debate going on about the advantages and disadvantages of the market. People need to be guided to a deeper understanding of what a market really is.

In the course of discussion the question of incentives to stimulate the work of young researchers and scientists was raised. Our experience indicates that it is not enough to have some kind of centralized plan and to resolve these questions only at the governmental level. Action at the local level is essential. In our country this kind of

effort has been directed at all rural regions, at all places where there is a secondary school. Secondary schools select candidates who have an inclination for scientific work, and many of them then receive federal scholarships for further studies. Our experience in this area may be useful for other countries as well. [passage omitted]

Knowledge Is the Basis of Consolidation

[K.V. Frolov] The historical experience of mankind testifies that any country's success in overcoming critical situations in its economic or spiritual life is determined above all by the degree to which the development and preservation of intellectual potential is ensured, as well as by how receptive production is to the achievements of science and scientific-technical progress. Unfortunately, we have nothing to boast about in this regard.

By the early 90's the Soviet Union accounted for 11-12 percent of world expenditures for science (down from 21 percent in 1975), while the United States accounted for 37 percent (up from 33 percent). American exports and imports of science-intensive products balance at the level of \$90 billion a year, while the USSR's share of world trade in these products and licenses is insignificantly small.

In machine building, we have two-fifths as many high-level scientists of all types as the United States, but in terms of specialists engaged in preventing the harmful effects on man and nature of the equipment being designed, the United States has at least 100-fold more than we do. It is not surprising that only eight percent of the items produced by our industry meet world standards for labor safety.

All this is to a significant degree the result of economizing on science, of organizing labor incorrectly, of providing an insufficiently thorough education in the area of modern equipment utilization to our practical workers, specialists and engineers—in general, it is the result of inadequacies in our educational work.

In general, the priorities for the development of scientific-technical progress in our country coincide with the trends in the scientific programs being carried out in all the developed countries of the world. However, in our country serious science has still not come to those sectors which work directly at satisfying human needs. For example, basic research and other research activity involved in the design and production of consumer goods account for 32 percent of the total number of inventions in Japan, in the United States the figure is 20 percent, but it is only two percent in the USSR. We are behind many countries in the proportion of basic research in the structure of scientific potential. Within the national expenditures for all types of scientific research the proportion of expenditures devoted to basic science is 10 percent in the USSR, 13 percent in Japan, 14 percent in the United States, 21 percent in France and 22 percent in Germany.

In the main sectors of the economy we have on average 10-15 scientific employees for every 1,000 blue- and white-collar workers, while the USA has 30-40; moreover, the statistics suggest that in our country the worst situation occurs in those sectors which work for people—light industry, the food industry and textiles.

The time has come for all science, all scientific and educational institutions to turn toward the individual, toward his needs, and requirements. Proceeding from this premise, the work of the Znaniye Society also needs to be restructured.

In general, the agro-industrial complex is located outside the realm of our educational activities. But it is the most important component of our national economy! About one-third of the national income is produced here, and the stability of this sector's development largely determines our economic and political potential. Moreover, the agro-industrial complex is in a state of very deep crisis: the food program has not been unfulfilled, and the slow growth in agricultural output has been accompanied by enormous losses and a reduction in the quality of many products.

The ecological situation is worsening, the water conditions in enormous areas are disturbed, and in a number of regions the natural landscapes are being destroyed. Many farms are using mineral fertilizers inefficiently and even incorrectly. Acid rain, environmental pollution, and even the poisoning of people have become realities.

Would it not be useful for the Znaniye Society, under conditions of a market economy, to have consultation points for farmers or for the agro-industrial complex in general? But, alas, so far there are none.

The Znaniye Society must work out effective measures aimed at spreading propaganda for the balanced interaction of the humanities and the natural and technical sciences.

A large number of public scientific-technical organizations has been established. Many of them are called academies. An engineering academy has already been formally established, and a separate chemical-technical academy is in the works, as are an academy of scientific-technical creative work, an academy of inventors, etc. However, we cannot agree with the thoughtless attempt to destroy the existing scientific-technical and educational structures simply for the sake of creating new ones. The new is not a goal in itself. It must be the means of consolidation; it must help to raise the spiritual forces and to affirm a scientific world view. [passage omitted]

[Shinkaruk] I would like to express sincere regret that our colleagues in Latvia, Estonia and even Georgia sent only observers and that nobody at all came from Lithuania.

After all, we are not here as representatives of states, sovereign states or Union republics. We are representatives of public organizations who have been delegated by the community to reorganize our all-Union society and to pursue our work—friendly and joint work—in the interests of the entire country, and of all the republics. [passage omitted]

I cannot understand the position of our colleagues who have sent only observers here. The charter of the Znaniye Society of the Ukraine establishes that membership is not dependent on citizenship, nor on national or party affiliation. We, lecturers of various nationalities, have joined together, both in the republic-level societies and here, in the all-Union society, to fulfill our great educational function with regard to our peoples and to our community. [passage omitted]

For an Intellectual Alliance To Disseminate Genuine Knowledge

[S.A. Kapitsa] Today the democratic transformations of our society, the emancipation of consciousness and, glasnost, along with profound and genuinely revolutionary, progressive transformations, are also leading to some negative phenomena: to the broad dissemination of pseudo-scientific ideas and to the emergence of anti-science and antitechnology sentiments. This is a complex social phenomenon, which reflects, of course, the critical times which we are experiencing.

We know that this is not the first time in history that such situations have arisen. Maybe you recall what there was before the revolution: it was Rasputin then. One can go further back, into the depth of the ages, during the era of the reformation, the Thirty-Years War, and the profound restructuring of the entire way of life in Europe after the collapse of the philosophy, ideology and societal organization of the Middle Ages, when there was a terrible flowering of every kind of mysticism. At that time no fewer than 50,000 witches were burned in a fit of mystical fever. Such things have occurred before in history.

Today it seems to me the very first duty of our society is to ensure that it in no way becomes a hotbed of ideas and phenomena of that kind. It should be firmly understood that astrology and palmistry are not a science and no matter how they array themselves, no matter how keenly they try to prove their authenticity, their position does not change—they are persistent prejudices; they should be studied but as a historical-cultural phenomenon. This is the job of cultural scholars, historians of religion and social anthropologists, but not of physicists and astronomers.

We cannot forbid astrology and palmistry, but we can do a lot so that people know that they have nothing in common with science. In essence, they need to be put in the category of folklore or art—after all, no one forbids the telling of stories about witches and magic carpets, clairvoyants, star-gazers, sorcerers, etc.

The mass media have an exceptionally important role to play here but, unfortunately, they do not possess the necessary critical faculties in this area.

A separate question concerns the growth of anti-technology sentiments. I would say that this conceals an enormous danger, if you will, for scientific and technical progress in our country. It is necessary to change people's attitude toward nuclear power plants. This is a very complex issue; it needs to be dealt with in a special way as it is a very serious matter. In this area, it seems to me, it is necessary to undertake some profound and serious steps to educate people. [passage omitted]

[Demchuk] At the crucial points in our history it happens that above all we sustain losses of the intellect; we lose the intellectual potential of our peoples, and that means that we hopelessly lose our perspective.

Today this sad tradition presents itself to us in a somewhat different form, maybe not with such obvious crudeness as was the case during the post-revolutionary years and during the Stalinist period but just as aggressively and noticeably. Moreover, the discussion is not about the obvious manifestations of this tendency, the so-called brain drain, and not about the state's understanding of intellectual problems. The discussion concerns something else: the decline in the country's intellectual potential, which is taking place as a result of the declaration of republican sovereignties and the establishment of narrowly departmental structures within science itself.

If these processes—I have in mind the struggle for political and economic sovereignties of the republics—in a historical sense can be considered objective and inevitable, then this is a phenomenon of a special type. This is our invention, which we cannot relinquish. I have in mind the continuing division of science into academic, VUZ and industrial science, and now—the division of the academic potential. The Academy of Sciences is also a department, which is divided into structures with narrower departmental focus when all kinds of mini-academies and so forth are created. This is a direct route to the purposeful splitting of the existing small potential and it is already at the level of state policy.

Here everything is bad: both the academy's monopoly on science is bad and so is the splitting of that potential.

Of course, the maximum depoliticization of our organization with regard to the social disciplines and sciences and the complete removal of politics from the area of the natural sciences—this constitutes an incontestable component of the Znaniye Society's renewal.

These reflections of mine amount not only to the need to create the conditions for guaranteed protection of intellectual property and intellectual achievements of the individual. The Znaniye Society must become an ideologue and a conductor for the intellectual policy of the state; on these questions it must have monopoly rights to legislative initiative.

The law on intellectual property, which will soon be adopted by the Union's Supreme Soviet, is only a small part of the iceberg of this large policy, but it is that first touchstone, on which it is essential to confirm the seriousness of our intentions. Above all I apply this to the recent, newly-created deputy group of the Znaniye Society.

I am confident that the very process of creating an intellectual nucleus and a corresponding bank of knowledge is capable not only of bringing down Union boundaries and barriers with regard to the intellect, but also of opening up barriers in many foreign countries.

Public, Commercial, Democratic

[M.S. Salakhitdinov] People have been asking with increasing loudness and frequency whether the Znaniye Society will pass the serious tests of time. Indeed, the situation is difficult: the Znaniye Society is working under conditions of harsh competition and serious tax pressure. In some places "liquidation" sentiments are gaining the upper hand. If we do not join forces and pool our opportunities at this difficult time, if we do not go forward to meet each other, then we may lose our society.

Taking this into account, the organizations at the republic, kray and oblast levels may hand over to the central board a number of functions and powers, but it must justify our trust and hopes. And recently the links which the board and its methodological organs have with local organizations have been reduced to almost nothing. The presidium of the board—its highest leadership—presented to the state organs a weak defense of the rights and interests of the society and its territorial organizations. Methodological assistance is being curtailed, and methodological programs of Union-wide significance are not being carried out. The necessary concern for improving the facilities and materials of the society's organizations and subdivisions is lacking. It is regrettable that the board is giving up its publishing work as an absolute majority of the republic, kray and oblast organizations, not to mention the city and rayon ones, does not have basic duplicating or printing capacities.

We hope that these bitter lessons will especially rouse from sleep the new board of the Znaniye All-Union Society and that it will become once again the coordinating center for the determination of basic directions in the work of disseminating knowledge. We hope that it will be the truly authorized representative organ for the resolution of those problems which have accumulated and those which are constantly being encountered in practical work.

[V.S. Semenov] When we call for breathing new life into the work of our society, we have in mind the need for it to begin operating in a new way. In this regard I would propose programs which the society should concentrate on first.

The first program involves a kind of center for adult education. We know that the All-Union Adult Education Association has been established and that the Znaniye Society supports it. This is good, but we are talking about what we ourselves can realistically begin to do in this area.

The second program involves scientific and technical progress and modern labor. I would definitely link these two things because we have forgotten that we still face the problem of learning to work.

The third program involves market relations and the social protection of working people. All this could be part of the economic program, as well as the sociopolitical or legal programs, etc. I know that much is being done in this regard in many of the republics. However, more coordinated work is necessary to enable us to share information on each program. This will constitute a real and effective concentration of efforts.

The fourth program involves what is new in science and culture, as well as the criticism of pseudo-science. The wave of pseudo-scientific concepts and dilettantist notions which has swept over us requires that we show what is new in our science, our culture and our spiritual life, and it demands that we expose pseudo-science for what it is.

Further, there is sociopolitical subject matter. At present this interests everyone. The lack of knowledge about the essence of what is happening, as well as the inability to make sense of it, frequently inflames passions and leads to internationality conflicts.

The sixth program involves legal issues. At present these are questions concerning the Union treaty and the constitution, the laws of the Union and the republics. This adds up to a large number of issues dealing with legal knowledge.

The seventh program deals with the educational achievements of the republics—the successes achieved in science and culture, as well as information about them, and the exchange of this information.

Finally, the eighth and last program involves some kind of print organ, which is necessary in order for the voice of the Znaniye Society to be heard.

Finally, two fears which I have as someone who has worked for long years in methods sections.

I fully share a viewpoint which has been expressed here already: it is not ruled out that we stand on the edge of disaster. Two forces, I think, are working in this direction. The first is the excessive role of the apparatus. But I would say not simply the role of the apparatus, of the rank-and-file employees; what I am talking about is the command apparatus, what we usually call the command-administrative system. The second force which may exert destructive influences on the society is an unskillful approach to commerce, money, profits, etc.

Commerce is necessary, no one will argue with that, but only in conjunction with our basic tasks.

[K.F. Frolov] One of the central points of the pre-congress discussion concerned the need to put the work of the all-Union Znaniye Society and of all of its organizations on a firm, self-financing, commercial basis. This requires very profound and serious steps. We need to work out a mechanism for obtaining funds to be transferred to the society by various organizations or private persons once a special Znaniye Fund has been established. Through it we could finance many projects. The time has come to go to the USSR Supreme Soviet and the government with an initiative on granting to those organizations of the Znaniye Society which are carrying out educational work the right to preferential tax status; that is, it is necessary, in essence, to free the Znaniye Society from the need to make tax payments.

But, on the other hand, we must understand that it is necessary to move away from the total commercialization of the Znaniye Society, which has recently taken hold in a number of organizations. This sometimes leads to curious facts. Judge for yourself: under the flag of the Znaniye Society—although this is also a kind of knowledge—beauty salons for cats and dogs are being set up, for example, as are courses to train care-givers for well-born young ladies. Of course, to some degree this can be understood as part of the search for ways to survive under the hard conditions of the market, but these endeavors, to put it mildly, do not become our society. Having started down the path of such economic-contract relations, the Znaniye Society may turn into just one of the many ordinary khozraschet companies.

An important area of the Znaniye Society's work has always been the analysis of the international situation and the elucidation of Soviet foreign policy for a community which traditionally has shown intense interest in issues of this kind. The world in which we live as the 20th century comes to an end has entered a period of profound change which is altering our entire way of our life into unrecognizability. The century which is coming to an end has no equal in world history in the scale and degree of the transformations wrought by people.

The present times, it would seem, are unwinding the fly-wheel of change to the maximum rotations. These changes touch in one way or another the most diverse spheres in the existence of the individual and mankind: they effect the relations between mankind and the planet on which he lives, as well as that part of outer space which he has developed; the interaction between states, each of which goes its own way into the future and at the same time cannot fail to take account of the interests of other peoples and states; and the struggle of rival social classes, currents and organizations to achieve their own goals and interests.

In our era mankind has a common destiny, as well as common ideals and values, which must guide us in all interactions among people. By using the available and

potential opportunities for cooperation with international and national organizations in foreign countries, the Znaniye Society must actively promote the inclusion of Soviet people in the common processes of civilization.

[A.S. Dzasokhov] Today, as we leave behind the epoch of the cold war and enter an epoch of peaceful coexistence and cooperation among states, we justifiably count on the educational organizations to take advantage of all opportunities to bring people closer together. In all times a firm faith, common sense and human reason, oriented toward human welfare, have provided the basis of enlightenment. And in our times, too, there is no goal more noble than that of helping the individual—and through him—whole peoples and states to understand each other better.

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Ukrainian Leaders Meet Head of Uniate Church

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1800 GMT 23 May 91

[Text] The top hierarchy of the Ukrainian Uniate Church Cardinal Liubachivsky met with Chairman of the Ukraine's Supreme Soviet Leonid Kravchuk and the republic's premier Vitold Fokin. The cardinal expressed his support of the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. It was agreed that the state still had much to do to restore historical justice as regards the Uniate Church that was banned in 1946, following which many believers and priests were subjected to repressions. Kravchuk noted that he was glad to see the church revived. He believes that a law on freedom of conscience will help its further development.

Autocephalous Metropolitan on Ukrainian Religious Situation

91UN1408A Lvov ZA VILNU UKRAYINU
in Ukrainian 28 Mar 91 pp 1, 2

[Interview with Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church Metropolitan Ioann Bodnarchuk by Bohdan Vovk: "...We are Recognized by Eastern Patriarchs"]

[Text] We should long ago have met with the bishop of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church (UAPTs), His Beatitude Ioann Bodnarchuk, Metropolitan of Lvov and Galich, vicar of the Kiev patriarchal throne. Our readers asked for this in their letters to the editor and the religious situation, which is complicated by inter-denominational conflicts, also made it necessary. The bishop, for his part, has probably also thought about such a meeting, for as soon as we proposed it, he immediately left his hospital bed for a few hours and came to the consistory.

The bishop is a controversial figure and we are aware of the fact that this article will displease many people. However, one has to start somewhere: we would not be

Christians if we did not take the first step towards peace, especially towards people who also believe in Christ. The Metropolitan made it understood that this interview could be regarded as a sign of readiness and a proposal on the part of the UAPTs to negotiate with the Greek-Catholics. May God bring this about!

[Vovk] Your Holiness, we have seen reports in the press and rumors have been circulating among the people that changes have been made in the leadership of the Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church. Can you comment on these reports or make a statement on this subject?

[Ioann] I can. There are no changes at present. The fact that a patriarchal office has been established in Kiev at the instructions of our head, Patriarch Mstyslav, does not speak of any changes. Everything remains as it was. I am still—as was decided on June 5 - 6 of last year by the UAPTs Council in Kiev - - the Lvov and Galich Metropolitan and vicar of the Kiev patriarchal throne. I am not able to carry out my duties, because I have been in the hospital for the past three months. The patriarchal office exists in order to enable the Patriarch to be in contact, which in fact he has not been since December 2. Although the office now exists and has a director, Bishop Antonyi, we still do not have contact with Boundbrook.

We just had a council of bishops and we decided that when I get well, I must take up my post and work for the rebirth of our church, just as we had begun to do before. To expect the return of the Holy Patriarch is very difficult—he is 94 years old. Who knows whether he will come, but we will keep in contact by telephone or fax.

[Vovk] How do you feel after three months in the hospital?

[Ioann] Not well, I have stones. . . The operation will be very complicated. Who knows whether I will survive it, after my two heart attacks. I have already had one operation, and my incisions are still not healed.

[Vovk] We would like to hear about the present situation of the UAPTs, in particular here, in Galicia.

[Ioann] You probably know about it. There is no agreement among denominations. I wrote a Christmas message, saying that we all should unite. We must come together, for otherwise we will not be able to achieve what we dreamed of for so long and what we want so much. We must attain peace, harmony, unity. This is the theme that constantly runs through our sermons, the services of our church.

Often in newspapers—even today my secretary showed me one example of that—the Catholic Church attacks us, takes a negative attitude towards us, so it appears to me. We do not do this; we never say bad things about anyone. We would like the press to prepare people for unity, for peace, and not for confrontation, for they are ready for that even without help. I would like the denominations to find a common language and not condemn others, for

they do not have the right to do this. I read an article like that in FRANKOVA KRYNYTSIA, by a priest, Nyzhko-huz. That's very nasty; we don't like it; we will set this straight and reply to such attacks, and this is not needed at present. I think that we should respect each other, only then will we come to a common view.

At present in the Lvov Eparchy there are 403 congregations and, so far, 246 priests, each being responsible for two congregations. We publish a newspaper, TSERKOVNI DZVONY. A seminary was established a while ago, but we cannot get permission for a religious center on Lysenko Street, although we were publicly promised this during the visit of our Patriarch. As soon as we get that center, we will immediately open a seminary. Sunday schools are constantly being opened in the parishes; religious instruction is taking place. Deacons or archpriests, who look after parishes, report twice per month how our life is developing. The consistory at 91 Lychakivsky Street in Lvov has a secretary, who registers complaints from the people and from priests.

As far as Great Ukraine is concerned, I would like to say that things have slowed down a bit because of my illness and the departure of the Patriarch. We will soon be consecrating bishops, sending them to eparchies. In Kiev, we have theology courses, four Sunday schools, a religious center at St. Michael's Church and the attached building. I would say that things are going well. But I am very concerned that there is no spiritual contact among the denominations. Filaret speaks very badly about our church, and MOLODA GWARDIA in Kiev stated that he is not really a metropolitan, that he is married (to Evhenia Petrivna), that they have children, that he cannot be head of a church. If this is true, can such a church really be considered canonical?

The Ukrainian Autocephalous Orthodox Church has always been canonical and we cannot worry about the fact that the Russian Church disdains us. The Russian Church has lost a lot of material support from us, millions of rubles. In the past, the Russian Church gilded not only crosses and cupolas, but even floors—in the Danylov Monastery—with our money. And now all this has broken off, so they have to say something against us. But when the Catholic Church speaks against us, then we feel really bad. And we will ask you to say this in your newspaper: it is time for us not to attack, but to tolerate one another, to make peace, because we serve the same God.

[Vovk] It seems to me that we write about this in every issue, but somehow no visible result has yet been seen. But let us return to the situation of your church. You say that the Russian Church does not recognize you, but who does? I read somewhere that the UAPTs is not recognized by anyone.

[Ioann] No, we are recognized by Eastern patriarchs. In fact, we need to send out our delegates, to make ourselves visible, as they say. In August of last year I was in

the United States and the Holy Universal and Constantinople Patriarch Dymytriy I wanted very much to meet with me, but I was not able to do it. To tell you the truth, our Patriarch—still the future patriarch at that time—did not want such a meeting. That is the only reason why I did not meet him, which I still regret now. And he said that he wanted to help us. And he will. As soon as I get well I will definitely have to go to see him. Everybody knows about our church and everybody understands it. We are not something new, we are the continuation of the church that Moscow enslaved in 1686. And that enslavement is not canonically recognized by the Eastern patriarchs or the Universal Patriarch Dymytriy I. The Moscow patriarchate knows about this. But the fact that they do not recognize us will not bother us very much; we will survive without them.

[Vovk] Can it be said that the UAPTs is also not recognized by Constantinople?

[Ioann] The Patriarch has never said that. If he says or writes that he does not recognize us, then we will have a different conversation. But he did not and will not say it. I spoke in the United States with his representatives and they take a very positive attitude towards us. Here is a "Tomos" from 1924, which the Constantinople Church gave to ours, which at that time was in Poland, in which is written: "The first division from our throne of the Kiev Metropolitanate of the Orthodox metropolitanates of Lithuania, which were subject to it, as well as their annexation to the Holy Muscovite Church, did not proceed according to canonical regulations." Thus, the Greek Church does not recognize the non-canonical act perpetrated by the Muscovite Church against the Ukraine. And we have only taken away from Moscow that which was ours. Moscow cannot be the mother-church, because when the Ukrainian people of Holy Rus were being baptized, Moscow still did not even exist, but only appeared two hundred years later. How can the mother be two hundred years younger than the daughter? This is an absurdity! Just as Kiev is the mother of all "Rus cities," so too our faith is the mother of all the Rus nations: the Ukrainian, Russian, Belorussian, Lithuanian. The Russian Church cannot be a mother to us. Patriarch Dymytriy I of Constantinople and all Eastern patriarchs know this.

[Vovk] From the wide expanses of the world, let us return to Galicia. Conflicts between Greek-Catholics and the adherents of autocephaly very often are, in essence, battles for church buildings, property, the right of this or that priest to work in a given parish. In this situation, a possible, although only temporary, solution could be for the two communities to take turns having services in the same building. How do you feel about this idea? How do you view such a solution to these misunderstandings about property?

[Ioann] I have already spoken about this to our democratic government in Lvov and abroad. Our point of view is this: the majority—Orthodox or Greek-Catholic—should have the building. The majority

should help the minority build a chapel or a new church. This is quite simple, for people in the villages now quickly put up three-story buildings. And for a whole community to build a church would, I think, be even simpler. The property should be equally divided, so there will not be any conflicts or disagreements among people.

As to alternating services, you know, it is not pleasant for us to serve at the same altar with people who say such bad things about us. This, first of all. And second, in Ukrainian history there is no record of such alternating services ever having been practiced. This is impossible. The church building has to belong to one master. Prayers cannot be carried out in any old way, because somebody is already waiting, is rushing you; this would not be prayer, but, pardon me, some kind of play which can be shortened. However, if local people agree to this, then we have nothing against it—let them go ahead. But in Stryi the priest and church community agreed to such alternating services, and within two weeks the Greek-Catholics took the church, threw out the Orthodox and still do not allow them in. The same thing happened in Stebnyk, and many other places...

We would very much like the matter to be solved as follows: if there is not another church, build one. If there are Roman Catholic churches—let one of the congregations go there, but the church should go to the majority.

[Vovk] But while the church is being built, the minority must satisfy its spiritual needs somewhere. Maybe it will turn out that they will build new churches, and there will be nobody to go there and pray, because in most cases the majority held by one denomination is very large, and on the other side there are only a handful of people, who are simply incapable of constructing a church?

[Ioann] The majority should help the minority, I always add that stipulation. Don't worry that there won't be anyone to pray—the numbers of people are growing with every day, with every year. And churches which were built one hundred years ago are not suitable today for prayer—they are going out of use and people do not fit in, they freeze standing outside. So it will be very good if in a village there will be two churches.

We must come together, for we see how clouds are gathering over our church and over our people. Faith should not drive us apart, for then we will be non-believers. We never entered by force into any church, although we are waging—in words only—the following battle: whoever serves the Moscow Church should understand that this is a NON-UKRAINIAN church. That person should come over to our side and create a single church in the Ukraine. But we have never come out against the Greek-Catholic Church, because we have enough space for prayer, all that is needed is for love to exist between us.

[Vovk] You, bishop, spoke of clouds which are gathering over the Ukrainian people. I don't know what you had in mind, but I want to ask how the UAPTs views the idea of the new Union treaty?

[Ioann] What kind of position or attitude can our church have to these events, these ideas, when our church was destroyed by the Stalinist regime and only Ivan Teodorovych remained alive, and the rest were shot? Of course our church takes a negative attitude towards those things and cannot forget the wrong done to us during the whole time of our existence.

[Vovk] I cannot leave you without having spoken of that which most hurts both our readers and the whole nation—inter-denominational arguments. Metropolitan Volodymyr Sternuk lives and works in Lvov. At the end of March, the head of the Ukrainian Greek-Catholic Church, His Beatitude Ivan-Myroslav Cardinal Lyubachivskyy is coming here. Will you contact him? Is it really so difficult to shake hands with each other, to forget the insults and bad acts, to embrace as brothers?

[Ioann] All Christians should maintain contacts. But when our Holy Patriarch Mstyslav came here and wanted to bless a memorial plaque on the National Home together with the Metropolitan Volodymyr Sternuk, Bishop Sternuk did everything himself. He somehow turned his back and the Patriarch gave up. When Patriarch Mstyslav came, he stopped in front of St. George's Church. He wanted to go in and even kiss the altar; he thought that someone would come out to meet him, but Sternuk did not do this, so I don't know how they will behave in future.

We are always ready for a sincere meeting, so that there would be mutual relations between us and not bad feelings, because we are all Ukrainians.

[Vovk] In this television age, a meeting of two highly-placed hierarchs of the two denominations in some television studio, fraternization and a joint call for peace would probably do more than several commissions. I don't see any obstacles to this. How do you regard this idea?

[Ioann] It would be very laudable if we met in this way, because we need some way to unite. I wrote a Christmas message and in this same spirit will write my Easter message. We should think first of God and second, of Ukraine. Nothing should be able to divide us. It is very sad when they say that we are Muscovites, KGB agents, that we are not blessed and so on. Why say this? Nobody has a special geiger counter to find out who is blessed. Only God himself knows that.

I would like to greet the adherents of all other denominations on the holy day of Easter, for I will certainly not be out of the hospital by that time. I wish everyone love, unity, and harmony amongst themselves; to remember that we serve a single God; and to live and respect yourselves. I wish everyone happiness and success in honorable work and prayer.

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